Displaying 17 results from an estimated 17 matches for "svm_exit_monitor".
2020 May 20
2
[PATCH v3 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
...gt; + pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
> + monitor_pa = vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt->regs->ax);
> +
> + ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, monitor_pa);
> + ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->cx);
> + ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->dx);
> +
> + return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MONITOR, 0, 0);
Why? If SVM has the same behavior as VMX, the MONITOR will be disarmed on
VM-Enter, i.e. the VMM can't do anything useful for MONITOR/MWAIT. I
assume that's the case given that KVM emulates MONITOR/MWAIT as NOPs on
SVM.
> +}
> +
> static enum es_result vc_handle_exitco...
2020 May 20
2
[PATCH v3 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
...gt; + pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
> + monitor_pa = vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt->regs->ax);
> +
> + ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, monitor_pa);
> + ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->cx);
> + ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->dx);
> +
> + return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MONITOR, 0, 0);
Why? If SVM has the same behavior as VMX, the MONITOR will be disarmed on
VM-Enter, i.e. the VMM can't do anything useful for MONITOR/MWAIT. I
assume that's the case given that KVM emulates MONITOR/MWAIT as NOPs on
SVM.
> +}
> +
> static enum es_result vc_handle_exitco...
2020 Apr 28
0
[PATCH v3 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
...hys_addr_t monitor_pa;
+ pgd_t *pgd;
+
+ pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa());
+ monitor_pa = vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt->regs->ax);
+
+ ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, monitor_pa);
+ ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->cx);
+ ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->dx);
+
+ return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MONITOR, 0, 0);
+}
+
static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
struct ghcb *ghcb,
unsigned long exit_code)
@@ -860,6 +876,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
case SVM_EXIT_WBINVD:
result = vc_handle_wbinvd(ghcb, ctxt);
break;...
2020 Jun 11
2
[PATCH v3 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
..._virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt->regs->ax);
> > > +
> > > + ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, monitor_pa);
> > > + ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->cx);
> > > + ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->dx);
> > > +
> > > + return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MONITOR, 0, 0);
> >
> > Why? If SVM has the same behavior as VMX, the MONITOR will be disarmed on
> > VM-Enter, i.e. the VMM can't do anything useful for MONITOR/MWAIT. I
> > assume that's the case given that KVM emulates MONITOR/MWAIT as NOPs on
> > SVM.
>
>...
2020 Jun 11
2
[PATCH v3 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
..._virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt->regs->ax);
> > > +
> > > + ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, monitor_pa);
> > > + ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->cx);
> > > + ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->dx);
> > > +
> > > + return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MONITOR, 0, 0);
> >
> > Why? If SVM has the same behavior as VMX, the MONITOR will be disarmed on
> > VM-Enter, i.e. the VMM can't do anything useful for MONITOR/MWAIT. I
> > assume that's the case given that KVM emulates MONITOR/MWAIT as NOPs on
> > SVM.
>
>...
2020 Jun 11
0
[PATCH v3 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
...t; > + monitor_pa = vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt->regs->ax);
> > +
> > + ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, monitor_pa);
> > + ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->cx);
> > + ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->dx);
> > +
> > + return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MONITOR, 0, 0);
>
> Why? If SVM has the same behavior as VMX, the MONITOR will be disarmed on
> VM-Enter, i.e. the VMM can't do anything useful for MONITOR/MWAIT. I
> assume that's the case given that KVM emulates MONITOR/MWAIT as NOPs on
> SVM.
Not sure if it is disarmed on VMRU...
2020 Jun 11
0
[PATCH v3 59/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MONITOR/MONITORX Events
...s(ghcb, ctxt->regs->ax);
>>>> +
>>>> + ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, monitor_pa);
>>>> + ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->cx);
>>>> + ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->dx);
>>>> +
>>>> + return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MONITOR, 0, 0);
>>>
>>> Why? If SVM has the same behavior as VMX, the MONITOR will be disarmed on
>>> VM-Enter, i.e. the VMM can't do anything useful for MONITOR/MWAIT. I
>>> assume that's the case given that KVM emulates MONITOR/MWAIT as NOPs on
>>> S...
2020 Feb 11
83
[RFC PATCH 00/62] Linux as SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run
under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete,
but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the
size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial
feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code
here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.
2020 Feb 11
83
[RFC PATCH 00/62] Linux as SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run
under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete,
but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the
size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial
feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code
here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.
2020 Apr 28
116
[PATCH v3 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES
guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes
since the last version.
What is SEV-ES
==============
SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted
State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the
register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by
2020 Apr 28
116
[PATCH v3 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES
guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes
since the last version.
What is SEV-ES
==============
SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted
State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the
register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by
2020 Jul 24
86
[PATCH v5 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a rebased version of the latest SEV-ES patches. They are now
based on latest tip/master instead of upstream Linux and include the
necessary changes.
Changes to v4 are in particular:
- Moved early IDT setup code to idt.c, because the idt_descr
and the idt_table are now static
- This required to make stack protector work early (or
2020 Jul 14
92
[PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I
addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and
rebased the code v5.8-rc5.
The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the
#VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big
pile of entry code changes merged into
2020 Jul 14
92
[PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I
addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and
rebased the code v5.8-rc5.
The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the
#VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big
pile of entry code changes merged into
2020 Aug 24
96
[PATCH v6 00/76] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the new version of the SEV-ES client enabling patch-set. It is
based on the latest tip/master branch and contains the necessary
changes. In particular those ar:
- Enabling CR4.FSGSBASE early on supported processors so that
early #VC exceptions on APs can be handled.
- Add another patch (patch 1) to fix a KVM frame-size build
2020 Sep 07
84
[PATCH v7 00/72] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The
previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/
I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the
discussions around it.
Another important change is that the early IDT
2020 Sep 07
84
[PATCH v7 00/72] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The
previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/
I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the
discussions around it.
Another important change is that the early IDT