Displaying 19 results from an estimated 19 matches for "svm_exit_ioio".
2020 Feb 11
0
[PATCH 19/62] x86/sev-es: Add support for handling IOIO exceptions
...rch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
index 02fb6f57128b..b2a2d068dc12 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev-es.c
@@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ void boot_vc_handler(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		goto finish;
 
 	switch (exit_code) {
+	case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
+		result = handle_ioio(boot_ghcb, &ctxt);
+		break;
 	default:
 		result = ES_UNSUPPORTED;
 		break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
index f83292c54ab7..bd21a79da084 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared...
2020 Apr 28
0
[PATCH v3 25/75] x86/sev-es: Add support for handling IOIO exceptions
...ned long insn_get_seg_base(struct pt_regs *regs, int seg_reg_idx)
+{
+	return 0UL;
+}
+
 static inline u64 sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr(void)
 {
 	unsigned long low, high;
@@ -150,6 +179,9 @@ void do_boot_stage2_vc(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit_code)
 		goto finish;
 
 	switch (exit_code) {
+	case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
+		result = vc_handle_ioio(boot_ghcb, &ctxt);
+		break;
 	default:
 		result = ES_UNSUPPORTED;
 		break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
index 22eb3ed89186..5d4d0e2b7777 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-sha...
2020 May 20
2
[PATCH v3 25/75] x86/sev-es: Add support for handling IOIO exceptions
...busted, it's aways non-zero.  Same goes for the SI/DI
adjustments below.
> +			if (ret)
> +				return ret;
> +		}
> +
> +		sw_scratch = __pa(ghcb) + offsetof(struct ghcb, shared_buffer);
> +		ghcb_set_sw_scratch(ghcb, sw_scratch);
> +		ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_IOIO,
> +				   exit_info_1, exit_info_2);
> +		if (ret != ES_OK)
> +			return ret;
Batching the memory accesses and I/O accesses separately is technically
wrong, e.g. a #DB on a memory access will result in bogus data being shown
in the debugger.  In practice it seems unlikely to matter, but...
2020 May 20
2
[PATCH v3 25/75] x86/sev-es: Add support for handling IOIO exceptions
...busted, it's aways non-zero.  Same goes for the SI/DI
adjustments below.
> +			if (ret)
> +				return ret;
> +		}
> +
> +		sw_scratch = __pa(ghcb) + offsetof(struct ghcb, shared_buffer);
> +		ghcb_set_sw_scratch(ghcb, sw_scratch);
> +		ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_IOIO,
> +				   exit_info_1, exit_info_2);
> +		if (ret != ES_OK)
> +			return ret;
Batching the memory accesses and I/O accesses separately is technically
wrong, e.g. a #DB on a memory access will result in bogus data being shown
in the debugger.  In practice it seems unlikely to matter, but...
2020 Feb 11
0
[PATCH 41/62] x86/sev-es: Handle MSR events
...{
+		regs->ax = ghcb->save.rax;
+		regs->dx = ghcb->save.rdx;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /*
  * This function runs on the first #VC exception after the kernel
  * switched to virtual addresses.
@@ -196,6 +225,9 @@ static enum es_result handle_vc_exception(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
 	case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
 		result = handle_ioio(ghcb, ctxt);
 		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
+		result = handle_msr(ghcb, ctxt);
+		break;
 	case SVM_EXIT_NPF:
 		result = handle_mmio(ghcb, ctxt);
 		break;
-- 
2.17.1
2020 Apr 28
0
[PATCH v3 53/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MSR events
...) {
+		regs->ax = ghcb->save.rax;
+		regs->dx = ghcb->save.rdx;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /*
  * This function runs on the first #VC exception after the kernel
  * switched to virtual addresses.
@@ -708,6 +733,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
 	case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
 		result = vc_handle_ioio(ghcb, ctxt);
 		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
+		result = vc_handle_msr(ghcb, ctxt);
+		break;
 	case SVM_EXIT_NPF:
 		result = vc_handle_mmio(ghcb, ctxt);
 		break;
-- 
2.17.1
2020 Apr 28
0
[PATCH v3 51/75] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events
...cb, ctxt);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = ES_UNSUPPORTED;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
 					 struct ghcb *ghcb,
 					 unsigned long exit_code)
@@ -445,6 +630,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
 	case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
 		result = vc_handle_ioio(ghcb, ctxt);
 		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_NPF:
+		result = vc_handle_mmio(ghcb, ctxt);
+		break;
 	default:
 		/*
 		 * Unexpected #VC exception
-- 
2.17.1
2020 Apr 28
0
[PATCH v3 64/75] x86/sev-es: Cache CPUID results for improved performance
...t ghcb *ghcb,
 					 unsigned long exit_code)
@@ -926,7 +1043,7 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
 		result = ES_UNSUPPORTED;
 		break;
 	case SVM_EXIT_CPUID:
-		result = vc_handle_cpuid(ghcb, ctxt);
+		result = vc_handle_cpuid_cached(ghcb, ctxt);
 		break;
 	case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
 		result = vc_handle_ioio(ghcb, ctxt);
-- 
2.17.1
2020 Aug 24
0
[PATCH v6 52/76] x86/sev-es: Handle MMIO events
...cb, ctxt);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = ES_UNSUPPORTED;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
 					 struct ghcb *ghcb,
 					 unsigned long exit_code)
@@ -462,6 +679,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
 	case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
 		result = vc_handle_ioio(ghcb, ctxt);
 		break;
+	case SVM_EXIT_NPF:
+		result = vc_handle_mmio(ghcb, ctxt);
+		break;
 	default:
 		/*
 		 * Unexpected #VC exception
-- 
2.28.0
2020 Apr 28
116
[PATCH v3 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES
guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes
since the last version.
What is SEV-ES
==============
SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted
State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the
register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by
2020 Apr 28
116
[PATCH v3 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES
guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes
since the last version.
What is SEV-ES
==============
SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted
State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the
register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by
2020 Jul 24
86
[PATCH v5 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a rebased version of the latest SEV-ES patches. They are now
based on latest tip/master instead of upstream Linux and include the
necessary changes.
Changes to v4 are in particular:
	- Moved early IDT setup code to idt.c, because the idt_descr
	  and the idt_table are now static
	- This required to make stack protector work early (or
2020 Jul 14
92
[PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I
addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and
rebased the code v5.8-rc5.
The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the
#VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big
pile of entry code changes merged into
2020 Jul 14
92
[PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I
addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and
rebased the code v5.8-rc5.
The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the
#VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big
pile of entry code changes merged into
2020 Aug 24
96
[PATCH v6 00/76] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the new version of the SEV-ES client enabling patch-set. It is
based on the latest tip/master branch and contains the necessary
changes. In particular those ar:
	- Enabling CR4.FSGSBASE early on supported processors so that
	  early #VC exceptions on APs can be handled.
	- Add another patch (patch 1) to fix a KVM frame-size build
	 
2020 Feb 11
83
[RFC PATCH 00/62] Linux as SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run
under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete,
but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the
size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial
feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code
here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.
2020 Feb 11
83
[RFC PATCH 00/62] Linux as SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run
under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete,
but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the
size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial
feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code
here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.
2020 Sep 07
84
[PATCH v7 00/72] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The
previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here:
	https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/
I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the
discussions around it.
Another important change is that the early IDT
2020 Sep 07
84
[PATCH v7 00/72] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The
previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here:
	https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/
I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the
discussions around it.
Another important change is that the early IDT