Displaying 20 results from an estimated 303 matches for "strengthens".
2009 Sep 16
3
[LLVMdev] Type strengthening and type weakening
Has anyone done any experiments with regards to type strengthening or
weakening in the context of LLVM?
For example, the GWT compiler does type strengthening - that is, if you
are calling a method on an interface or abstract type, and the compiler
determines through live variable analysis what the concrete type is,
then it goes ahead and re-writes the type information to be the stronger
2009 Sep 16
0
[LLVMdev] Type strengthening and type weakening
Talin wrote:
> For example, the GWT compiler does type strengthening - that is, if you
> are calling a method on an interface or abstract type, and the compiler
> determines through live variable analysis what the concrete type is,
> then it goes ahead and re-writes the type information to be the stronger
> type. The advantage is that it may then be able to do additional
>
2020 Jun 30
0
[PATCH 18/18] arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CLANG_LTO=y
On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 09:47:30PM +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> I do wonder, though, if there is some way to make the compiler do
> something better for us. Clearly, implementing real
> memory_order_consume hasn't worked out until today. But maybe the
> compiler could promote dependent loads to acquires if it recognizes it
> lost dependencies during optimizations. Just thinking
2020 Jul 01
0
[PATCH 18/18] arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CLANG_LTO=y
On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 09:47:30PM +0200, Marco Elver wrote:
> On Tue, 30 Jun 2020 at 19:39, Will Deacon <will at kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > When building with LTO, there is an increased risk of the compiler
> > converting an address dependency headed by a READ_ONCE() invocation
> > into a control dependency and consequently allowing for harmful
> >
2020 Jul 01
0
[PATCH 18/18] arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CLANG_LTO=y
On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 03:57:54PM -0700, Sami Tolvanen wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 12:47 PM Marco Elver <elver at google.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Tue, 30 Jun 2020 at 19:39, Will Deacon <will at kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > When building with LTO, there is an increased risk of the compiler
> > > converting an address dependency headed by a
2020 Jul 01
0
[PATCH 18/18] arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CLANG_LTO=y
On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 09:25:03PM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 7:39 PM Will Deacon <will at kernel.org> wrote:
> > +#define __READ_ONCE(x) \
> > +({ \
> > + int atomic = 1; \
2020 Jul 06
0
[PATCH 18/18] arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CLANG_LTO=y
On Mon, Jul 06, 2020 at 05:08:20PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 06:37:34PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h
> > new file mode 100644
> > index 000000000000..515e360b01a1
> > --- /dev/null
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/rwonce.h
> > @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
> >
2020 Jul 06
0
[PATCH 18/18] arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CLANG_LTO=y
On Mon, Jul 06, 2020 at 05:00:23PM +0100, Dave Martin wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 02, 2020 at 08:23:02AM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > On Wed, Jul 01, 2020 at 06:07:25PM +0100, Dave P Martin wrote:
> > > Also, can you illustrate code that can only be unsafe with Clang LTO?
> >
> > I don't have a concrete example, but it's an ongoing concern over on the LTO
> >
2020 Jul 02
0
[PATCH 18/18] arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CLANG_LTO=y
On Wed, Jul 01, 2020 at 06:07:25PM +0100, Dave P Martin wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 06:37:34PM +0100, Will Deacon wrote:
> > When building with LTO, there is an increased risk of the compiler
> > converting an address dependency headed by a READ_ONCE() invocation
> > into a control dependency and consequently allowing for harmful
> > reordering by the CPU.
> >
2020 Jun 30
2
[PATCH 18/18] arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CLANG_LTO=y
On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 7:39 PM Will Deacon <will at kernel.org> wrote:
> +#define __READ_ONCE(x) \
> +({ \
> + int atomic = 1; \
> + union { __unqual_scalar_typeof(x) __val; char __c[1]; } __u; \
> +
2020 Jun 30
2
[PATCH 18/18] arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CLANG_LTO=y
On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 7:39 PM Will Deacon <will at kernel.org> wrote:
> +#define __READ_ONCE(x) \
> +({ \
> + int atomic = 1; \
> + union { __unqual_scalar_typeof(x) __val; char __c[1]; } __u; \
> +
2020 Jun 30
0
[PATCH 18/18] arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CLANG_LTO=y
When building with LTO, there is an increased risk of the compiler
converting an address dependency headed by a READ_ONCE() invocation
into a control dependency and consequently allowing for harmful
reordering by the CPU.
Ensure that such transformations are harmless by overriding the generic
READ_ONCE() definition with one that provides acquire semantics when
building with LTO.
Signed-off-by:
2020 Jul 10
0
[PATCH v3 19/19] arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CONFIG_LTO=y
When building with LTO, there is an increased risk of the compiler
converting an address dependency headed by a READ_ONCE() invocation
into a control dependency and consequently allowing for harmful
reordering by the CPU.
Ensure that such transformations are harmless by overriding the generic
READ_ONCE() definition with one that provides acquire semantics when
building with LTO.
Signed-off-by:
2020 Jul 07
0
[PATCH 18/18] arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CLANG_LTO=y
I'm trying to put together a Micro Conference for Linux Plumbers
conference focused on "make LLVM slightly less shitty." Do you all
plan on attending the conference? Would it be worthwhile to hold a
session focused on discussing this (LTO and memory models) be
worthwhile?
On Tue, Jul 7, 2020 at 3:51 PM Paul E. McKenney <paulmck at kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Jul 07,
2013 Aug 22
0
Close with a ggplot chart but need a little assistance
I have the following code and data
data.csv
"","Goal","Frequency","Weight","Group"
"1","Move",13,0.245283018867925,"Public"
"2","Create",10,0.188679245283019,"Public"
"3","Strengthen",30,0.566037735849057,"Public"
2016 Apr 02
0
p values from GLM
On 4/2/2016 11:07 AM, David Winsemius wrote:
>> On Apr 1, 2016, at 5:01 PM, Duncan Murdoch <murdoch.duncan at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 01/04/2016 6:46 PM, Bert Gunter wrote:
>>> ... of course, whether one **should** get them is questionable...
>> They're just statistics. How could it hurt to look at them?
> Like Rolf, I thought that this utterance
2016 Jan 27
3
DCE in the presence of control flow.
I have been looking at some internal codes looking for differences between Clang (specifically 3.7.1) and gcc (typically 4.8.1 but sometimes later).
One area where I bumped into was dead code elimination in the presence of complex control flow. I note that the “aggressive dead code elimination” (ADCE.cpp) treats all branch operations as live (isa<TerminatorInst>(I)). Doing more requires
2009 Mar 27
2
[LLVMdev] secure virtual architecture / safecode
On Wed, 25 Mar 2009, Vikram S. Adve wrote:
> We do have a static array bounds checking algorithm based on the Omega
> integer programming library, but it is not hugely effective. I think
> this can be strengthened a *lot*.
I should add that I would be interested in helping with hooking a good
decision procedure into LLVM. This will be useful far beyond array bounds
check
2017 Mar 18
3
frozen bubble for C7
...op)
Requires: perl(Compress::Bzip2)
Can't find perl(compress::bzip2) anywhere.
thansk in advance!
Fred
--
---- Fred Smith -- fredex at fcshome.stoneham.ma.us -----------------------------
I can do all things through Christ
who strengthens me.
------------------------------ Philippians 4:13 -------------------------------
2017 Dec 31
2
Legacy option for key length?
Hello,
On Sat, Dec 30, 2017 at 12:16 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg at fifthhorseman.net
> wrote:
> On Thu 2017-12-28 21:31:28 -0800, Dan Mahoney (Gushi) wrote:
>
>
> > Perhaps if you're dead-set on this being so dangerous,
>
> It's not the developers who are dead-set on weak-keyed RSA being
> insecure, it's the cryptanalysts who have shown that to be the