search for: start_level

Displaying 6 results from an estimated 6 matches for "start_level".

2005 Mar 28
1
Retrieving Playing Stats
...em)) { list($level[$xml_elem['level']],$extra) = array_values($xml_elem['att ributes']); } else { $level[$xml_elem['level']] = $xml_elem['tag']; } } if ($xml_elem['type'] == 'complete') { $start_level = 1; $php_stmt = '$params'; while($start_level < $xml_elem['level']) { $php_stmt .= '[$level['.$start_level.']]'; $start_level++; } $php_stmt .= '[$xml_elem[\'tag\']] = $xml_elem[\'value...
2005 Mar 28
0
Retrieving Playing Stats
...m['level']],$extra) = > array_values($xml_elem['att > ributes']); > } else { > $level[$xml_elem['level']] = $xml_elem['tag']; > } > } > if ($xml_elem['type'] == 'complete') { > $start_level = 1; > $php_stmt = '$params'; > while($start_level < $xml_elem['level']) { > $php_stmt .= '[$level['.$start_level.']]'; > $start_level++; > } > $php_stmt .= '[$xml_elem[\'tag\&...
2012 Jun 21
0
[RFC PATCH V2] Btrfs: introduce extent buffer cache for each i-node
...t, b, key, p, ins_len, cow, + lowest_unlock, &write_lock_level, + min_write_lock_level, lowest_level, true); + if (ret == -EAGAIN) + goto again; + + BUG_ON(ret == -ERESTART); + + return ret; +} + +static int check_search_result_valid(struct btrfs_path *p, int ins_len, + int start_level, bool is_found) +{ + int i; + + if (ins_len < 0 && p->slots[start_level] == 0) { + for (i = start_level - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + if (p->slots[i] != 0) + return 1; + } + return 0; + } + + if (is_found) + return 1; + + if (p->slots[start_level] == 0) { + for (i = start_l...
2018 Jul 20
4
Memory Read Only Enforcement: VMM assisted kernel rootkit mitigation for KVM V4
Here is change log from V3 To V4: - Fixing spelling/grammar mistakes suggested by Randy Dunlap - Changing the hypercall interface to be able to process multiple pages per one hypercall also suggested by Randy Dunlap. It turns out that this will save lots of vmexist/memory slot flushes when protecting many pages. [PATCH RFC V4 1/3] KVM: X86: Memory ROE documentation [PATCH RFC V4 2/3] KVM:
2018 Jul 19
8
Memory Read Only Enforcement: VMM assisted kernel rootkit mitigation for KVM
Hi, This is my first set of patches that works as I would expect, and the third revision I sent to mailing lists. Following up with my previous discussions about kernel rootkit mitigation via placing R/O protection on critical data structure, static data, privileged registers with static content. These patches present the first part where it is only possible to place these protections on memory
2018 Jul 19
8
Memory Read Only Enforcement: VMM assisted kernel rootkit mitigation for KVM
Hi, This is my first set of patches that works as I would expect, and the third revision I sent to mailing lists. Following up with my previous discussions about kernel rootkit mitigation via placing R/O protection on critical data structure, static data, privileged registers with static content. These patches present the first part where it is only possible to place these protections on memory