search for: ssh_auth_socket

...use DSA-keys and a config file with this: Protocol 2 ForwardAgent yes ForwardX11 yes Compression yes CompressionLevel 9 and running ssh-agent and ssh-add, and then loggin in without giving keys. One commenter said that this has big holes. An intruder with root privileges could set SSH_AUTH_SOCKET to at socket for ssh-agent found in /tmp, and he could also find the keys in the /proc area for the ssh-agent. Is that true? Are the keys visible under Linux in the /proc memory mapping for ssh-agent? Could there be done something to better these vulnerabilities? I was thinking along the lines o...

...; followed by 'ForwardAgent yes' entries, and no other Host lines. As far as I can see, there are no sshd_config directives that affect agent forwarding. The Mandrake installation (on A) uses ssh-agent to set up KDE, so I see an ssh-agent running and have a corresponding SSH_AGENT_PID and SSH_AUTH_SOCKET in the shell environment. I ssh-add .ssh/gary_shea.dsa (my identity file, set up with IdentityFile2 in .ssh/ssh_config). ssh-add -l shows the identity. If I then 'ssh -A' to machine B, I do not need to type the passphrase, indicating that the ssh-agent works to that extent. BUT, my envi...

...00/spice/ssh:/tmp/ssh-hHomdONwQus6/agent.6907 The idea has been discussed a little in this e-mail thread: http://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2015-September/034381.html Signed-off-by: Fabiano Fid?ncio <fidencio at redhat.com> --- Changes since v1: - Fix a typo in the commit (SSH_AUTH_SOCKET -> SSH_AUTH_SOCK) --- authfd.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c index 12bf125..20fcba2 100644 --- a/authfd.c +++ b/authfd.c @@ -83,21 +83,12 @@ decode_reply(u_char type) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_F...