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...ecially performance wise. Does that sounds like good idea? I wanted to make sure because maybe maybe hypercalls aren't that much used in kvm for a reason, so I wanted to verify that. On 18 June 2018 at 16:34, David Hildenbrand <david at redhat.com> wrote: > On 16.06.2018 13:49, Ahmed Soliman wrote: >> Following up on these threads: >> - https://marc.info/?l=kvm&m=151929803301378&w=2 >> - http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/02/22/18 >> >> I lost the original emails so I couldn't reply to them, and also sorry >> for being la...

Following up on these threads: - https://marc.info/?l=kvm&m=151929803301378&w=2 - http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/02/22/18 I lost the original emails so I couldn't reply to them, and also sorry for being late, it was the end of semester exams. I was adviced on #qemu and #kernelnewbies IRCs to ask here as it will help having better insights. To wrap things up, the

Following up on these threads: - https://marc.info/?l=kvm&m=151929803301378&w=2 - http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/02/22/18 I lost the original emails so I couldn't reply to them, and also sorry for being late, it was the end of semester exams. I was adviced on #qemu and #kernelnewbies IRCs to ask here as it will help having better insights. To wrap things up, the

On 16.06.2018 13:49, Ahmed Soliman wrote: > Following up on these threads: > - https://marc.info/?l=kvm&m=151929803301378&w=2 > - http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2018/02/22/18 > > I lost the original emails so I couldn't reply to them, and also sorry > for being late, it was the end of s...

On 20 July 2018 at 03:28, Jann Horn <jannh at google.com> wrote: > On Fri, Jul 20, 2018 at 2:26 AM Ahmed Soliman > <ahmedsoliman0x666 at gmail.com> wrote: >> >> On 20 July 2018 at 00:59, Jann Horn <jannh at google.com> wrote: >> > On Thu, Jul 19, 2018 at 11:40 PM Ahmed Abd El Mawgood >> >> > Why are you implementing this in the kernel, instead of doing it in...

Hi Please could someone assist me? I?e got a 3g usb dongle - Huawei E1552. [root@]# lsusb Bus 008 Device 001: ID 1d6b:0001 Linux Foundation 1.1 root hub Bus 007 Device 002: ID 03f0:8407 Hewlett-Packard Bus 007 Device 001: ID 1d6b:0001 Linux Foundation 1.1 root hub Bus 006 Device 001: ID 1d6b:0001 Linux Foundation 1.1 root hub Bus 005 Device 001: ID 1d6b:0001 Linux Foundation 1.1 root hub Bus

Hi, This is my first set of patches that works as I would expect, and the third revision I sent to mailing lists. Following up with my previous discussions about kernel rootkit mitigation via placing R/O protection on critical data structure, static data, privileged registers with static content. These patches present the first part where it is only possible to place these protections on memory

Hi, This is my first set of patches that works as I would expect, and the third revision I sent to mailing lists. Following up with my previous discussions about kernel rootkit mitigation via placing R/O protection on critical data structure, static data, privileged registers with static content. These patches present the first part where it is only possible to place these protections on memory

On 19 June 2018 at 19:37, David Vrabel <david.vrabel at nutanix.com> wrote: > It's not clear how this increases security. What threats is this > protecting again? It won't completely protect prevent rootkits, because still rootkits can edit dynamic kernel data structures, but it will limit what rootkits damage to only dynamic data. This way system calls can't be changed, or

On 20 July 2018 at 00:59, Jann Horn <jannh at google.com> wrote: > On Thu, Jul 19, 2018 at 11:40 PM Ahmed Abd El Mawgood > Why are you implementing this in the kernel, instead of doing it in > host userspace? I thought about implementing it completely in QEMU but It won't be possible for few reasons: - After talking to QEMU folks I came up to conclusion that it when it comes