search for: sev_es_init_vc_handl

...ncrypt.h index 4e72b73a9cb5..c9f5df0a1c10 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void); /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); +void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void); bool sme_active(void); bool sev_active(void); bool sev_es_active(void); @@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { } static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { } static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { } +st...

...e58aa1603 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size); void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void); +void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void); bool sme_active(void); bool sev_active(void); bool sev_es_active(void); @@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { } static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { } static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { } +st...

...n_stacks *stack; @@ -272,6 +286,8 @@ static void __init sev_es_setup_vc_stack(int cpu) tss = per_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tss_rw, cpu); tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC] = (unsigned long)first_stack + size; + + per_cpu(cea_vmm_exception_stacks, cpu) = &cea->vc_stacks; } void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) @@ -290,6 +306,16 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) sev_es_init_ghcb(cpu); sev_es_setup_vc_stack(cpu); } + + init_vc_stack_names(); +} + +const char *vc_stack_name(enum stack_type type) +{ + if (type < STACK_TYPE_VC || type > STACK_TYPE_VC_LAST) + return NULL; + +...

...or all CPUs + */ + first_stack = cea->vc_stacks.stacks[N_VC_STACKS - 1].stack; + size = sizeof(cea->vc_stacks.stacks[N_VC_STACKS - 1].stack); + tss = per_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tss_rw, cpu); + + tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC] = (unsigned long)first_stack + size; +} + void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { int cpu; BUILD_BUG_ON((offsetof(struct sev_es_runtime_data, ghcb_page) % PAGE_SIZE) != 0); + BUILD_BUG_ON((offsetof(struct sev_es_runtime_data, vc_stacks) % PAGE_SIZE) != 0); if (!sev_es_active()) return; @@ -249,6 +288,7 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) for_e...

...NFIG_SMP +static void __init sev_es_setup_play_dead(void) +{ + smp_ops.play_dead = sev_es_play_dead; +} +#else +static inline void sev_es_setup_play_dead(void) { } +#endif + static void __init sev_es_alloc_runtime_data(int cpu) { struct sev_es_runtime_data *data; @@ -540,6 +596,8 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) sev_es_setup_vc_stack(cpu); } + sev_es_setup_play_dead(); + xa_init_flags(&sev_es_cpuid_cache, XA_FLAGS_LOCK_IRQ); sev_es_cpuid_cache_initialized = true; -- 2.17.1

On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 05:16:48PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote: > +bool sev_es_active(void) > +{ > + return !!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_es_active); I don't see this being used in modules anywhere in the patchset. Or am I missing something? -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

...urn true; +} + static void sev_es_terminate(unsigned int reason) { u64 val = GHCB_SEV_TERMINATE; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c index c5e0ceb099c2..e1fea7a38019 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c @@ -670,6 +670,9 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) if (!sev_es_active()) return; + if (!sev_es_check_cpu_features()) + panic("SEV-ES CPU Features missing"); + /* Enable SEV-ES special handling */ static_branch_enable(&sev_es_enable_key); -- 2.27.0

...+ return; + + /* Read back old IST entry and write it to the TSS */ + p = (unsigned long *)ist; + this_cpu_write(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC], *p); +} + /* Needed in vc_early_forward_exception */ void do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr); @@ -277,6 +333,9 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) if (!sev_es_active()) return; + /* Enable SEV-ES special handling */ + static_branch_enable(&sev_es_enable_key); + /* Initialize per-cpu GHCB pages */ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { sev_es_alloc_runtime_data(cpu); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps...

...long edx; +}; + +static struct xarray sev_es_cpuid_cache; +static bool __ro_after_init sev_es_cpuid_cache_initialized; + /* For early boot hypervisor communication in SEV-ES enabled guests */ static struct ghcb boot_ghcb_page __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); @@ -463,6 +474,9 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) sev_es_setup_vc_stack(cpu); } + xa_init_flags(&sev_es_cpuid_cache, XA_FLAGS_LOCK_IRQ); + sev_es_cpuid_cache_initialized = true; + init_vc_stack_names(); } @@ -744,6 +758,91 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio(struct ghcb *ghcb, return ret; } +static unsigned long s...

...xarray sev_es_cpuid_cache; > +static bool __ro_after_init sev_es_cpuid_cache_initialized; > + > /* For early boot hypervisor communication in SEV-ES enabled guests */ > static struct ghcb boot_ghcb_page __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); > > @@ -463,6 +474,9 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) > sev_es_setup_vc_stack(cpu); > } > > + xa_init_flags(&sev_es_cpuid_cache, XA_FLAGS_LOCK_IRQ); > + sev_es_cpuid_cache_initialized = true; > + > init_vc_stack_names(); > } > > @@ -744,6 +758,91 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio(struct ghcb...

...xarray sev_es_cpuid_cache; > +static bool __ro_after_init sev_es_cpuid_cache_initialized; > + > /* For early boot hypervisor communication in SEV-ES enabled guests */ > static struct ghcb boot_ghcb_page __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); > > @@ -463,6 +474,9 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) > sev_es_setup_vc_stack(cpu); > } > > + xa_init_flags(&sev_es_cpuid_cache, XA_FLAGS_LOCK_IRQ); > + sev_es_cpuid_cache_initialized = true; > + > init_vc_stack_names(); > } > > @@ -744,6 +758,91 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_mmio(struct ghcb...

...l-back stack */ + vaddr = CEA_ESTACK_BOT(&cea->estacks, VC2); + pa = __pa(data->fallback_stack); + cea_set_pte((void *)vaddr, pa, PAGE_KERNEL); +} + /* Needed in vc_early_forward_exception */ void do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr); @@ -249,6 +281,7 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { sev_es_alloc_runtime_data(cpu); sev_es_init_ghcb(cpu); + sev_es_setup_vc_stacks(cpu); } } -- 2.28.0

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/ I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the discussions around it. Another important change is that the early IDT

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/ I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the discussions around it. Another important change is that the early IDT

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a rebased version of the latest SEV-ES patches. They are now based on latest tip/master instead of upstream Linux and include the necessary changes. Changes to v4 are in particular: - Moved early IDT setup code to idt.c, because the idt_descr and the idt_table are now static - This required to make stack protector work early (or

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the new version of the SEV-ES client enabling patch-set. It is based on the latest tip/master branch and contains the necessary changes. In particular those ar: - Enabling CR4.FSGSBASE early on supported processors so that early #VC exceptions on APs can be handled. - Add another patch (patch 1) to fix a KVM frame-size build

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and rebased the code v5.8-rc5. The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the #VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big pile of entry code changes merged into

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and rebased the code v5.8-rc5. The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the #VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big pile of entry code changes merged into

Hi, here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes since the last version. What is SEV-ES ============== SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by

Hi, here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes since the last version. What is SEV-ES ============== SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by