Displaying 12 results from an estimated 12 matches for "sev_es_efi_map_ghcb".
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sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs
2020 Apr 28
0
[PATCH v3 75/75] x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
...s.h
index a242d16727f1..ce9a197bf958 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ void sev_es_nmi_enter(void);
void sev_es_nmi_exit(void);
int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh);
void sev_es_nmi_complete(void);
+int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd);
#else /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
static inline const char *vc_stack_name(enum stack_type type)
{
@@ -97,6 +98,10 @@ static inline int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh)
return 0;
}
static inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void) { }
+static inline int sev_e...
2020 Sep 07
0
[PATCH v7 71/72] x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
...ev-es.h
index e919f09ae33c..cf1d957c7091 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
@@ -102,11 +102,13 @@ static __always_inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void)
if (static_branch_unlikely(&sev_es_enable_key))
__sev_es_nmi_complete();
}
+extern int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd);
#else
static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
static inline int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh) { return 0; }
static inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void) { }
+static inline int sev_es_efi...
2020 Sep 09
0
[PATCH v7 71/72] x86/efi: Add GHCB mappings when SEV-ES is active
...gt; +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h
>>> @@ -102,11 +102,13 @@ static __always_inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void)
>>> if (static_branch_unlikely(&sev_es_enable_key))
>>> __sev_es_nmi_complete();
>>> }
>>> +extern int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs(pgd_t *pgd);
>>> #else
>>> static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }
>>> static inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { }
>>> static inline int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(struct real_mode_header *rmh) { return 0; }
>>> static inline...
2020 May 20
1
[PATCH v3 38/75] x86/sev-es: Add SEV-ES Feature Detection
On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 05:16:48PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> +bool sev_es_active(void)
> +{
> + return !!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_es_active);
I don't see this being used in modules anywhere in the patchset. Or am I
missing something?
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
2020 Sep 07
84
[PATCH v7 00/72] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The
previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/
I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the
discussions around it.
Another important change is that the early IDT
2020 Sep 07
84
[PATCH v7 00/72] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The
previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/
I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the
discussions around it.
Another important change is that the early IDT
2020 Jul 24
86
[PATCH v5 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a rebased version of the latest SEV-ES patches. They are now
based on latest tip/master instead of upstream Linux and include the
necessary changes.
Changes to v4 are in particular:
- Moved early IDT setup code to idt.c, because the idt_descr
and the idt_table are now static
- This required to make stack protector work early (or
2020 Jul 14
92
[PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I
addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and
rebased the code v5.8-rc5.
The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the
#VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big
pile of entry code changes merged into
2020 Jul 14
92
[PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I
addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and
rebased the code v5.8-rc5.
The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the
#VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big
pile of entry code changes merged into
2020 Aug 24
96
[PATCH v6 00/76] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the new version of the SEV-ES client enabling patch-set. It is
based on the latest tip/master branch and contains the necessary
changes. In particular those ar:
- Enabling CR4.FSGSBASE early on supported processors so that
early #VC exceptions on APs can be handled.
- Add another patch (patch 1) to fix a KVM frame-size build
2020 Apr 28
116
[PATCH v3 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES
guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes
since the last version.
What is SEV-ES
==============
SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted
State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the
register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by
2020 Apr 28
116
[PATCH v3 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES
guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes
since the last version.
What is SEV-ES
==============
SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted
State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the
register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by