search for: sev_es_act

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Add the sev_es_active function for checking whether SEV-ES is enabled. Also cache the value of MSR_AMD64_SEV at boot to speed up the feature checking in the running code. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> --- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 +...

On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 05:16:48PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote: > +bool sev_es_active(void) > +{ > + return !!(sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED); > +} > +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_es_active); I don't see this being used in modules anywhere in the patchset. Or am I missing something? -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-n...

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Add the sev_es_active function for checking whether SEV-ES is enabled. Also cache the value of MSR_AMD64_SEV at boot to speed up the feature checking in the running code. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> --- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 ++...

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Add the sev_es_active function for checking whether SEV-ES is enabled. Also cache the value of MSR_AMD64_SEV at boot to speed up the feature checking in the running code. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encry...

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Add the sev_es_active function for checking whether SEV-ES is enabled. Also cache the value of MSR_AMD64_SEV at boot to speed up the feature checking in the running code. Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202...

..._encrypt.h @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size); void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void); +void __init encrypted_state_init_ghcbs(void); bool sme_active(void); bool sev_active(void); bool sev_es_active(void); @@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { } static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { } static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { } +static inline void encrypted_state_init_ghcbs(void) { } static inline bool s...

...MI->#DB) may back-adjust the IST entry > + * too early. Is this comment accurate, I cannot find the patch touching nmi_enter/exit()? > + */ > +void noinstr sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) > +{ > + unsigned long old_ist, new_ist; > + unsigned long *p; > + > + if (!sev_es_active()) > + return; > + > + /* Read old IST entry */ > + old_ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]); > + > + /* Make room on the IST stack */ > + if (on_vc_stack(regs->sp)) > + new_ist = ALIGN_DOWN(regs->sp, 8) - sizeof(old_ist); > + else > +...

...MI->#DB) may back-adjust the IST entry > + * too early. Is this comment accurate, I cannot find the patch touching nmi_enter/exit()? > + */ > +void noinstr sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) > +{ > + unsigned long old_ist, new_ist; > + unsigned long *p; > + > + if (!sev_es_active()) > + return; > + > + /* Read old IST entry */ > + old_ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]); > + > + /* Make room on the IST stack */ > + if (on_vc_stack(regs->sp)) > + new_ist = ALIGN_DOWN(regs->sp, 8) - sizeof(old_ist); > + else > +...

...pt.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void); /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); +void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void); bool sme_active(void); bool sev_active(void); bool sev_es_active(void); @@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { } static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { } static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { } +static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { } static inline bool sme_...

...mem_encrypt.h @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size); void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void); +void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void); bool sme_active(void); bool sev_active(void); bool sev_es_active(void); @@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { } static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { } static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { } +static inline void sev_es_init_vc_handling(void) { } static inline bool sme_...

...t first, but needed to move it out because the possible DR7 access needs the #VC stack already adjusted. > > + */ > > +void noinstr sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) > > +{ > > + unsigned long old_ist, new_ist; > > + unsigned long *p; > > + > > + if (!sev_es_active()) > > + return; > > + > > + /* Read old IST entry */ > > + old_ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]); > > + > > + /* Make room on the IST stack */ > > + if (on_vc_stack(regs->sp)) > > + new_ist = ALIGN_DOWN(regs->sp,...

...__init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size); > void __init mem_encrypt_init(void); > void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void); > > +void __init encrypted_state_init_ghcbs(void); > bool sme_active(void); > bool sev_active(void); > bool sev_es_active(void); > @@ -71,6 +72,7 @@ static inline void __init sme_early_init(void) { } > static inline void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(struct boot_params *bp) { } > static inline void __init sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp) { } > > +static inline void encrypted_state_init_ghcbs(void) {...

...; > +#include <asm/sev-es.h> > > struct real_mode_header *real_mode_header; > u32 *trampoline_cr4_features; > @@ -107,6 +108,11 @@ static void __init setup_real_mode(void) > if (sme_active()) > trampoline_header->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE; > > + if (sev_es_active()) { > + if (sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(real_mode_header)) > + panic("Failed to update SEV-ES AP Jump Table"); > + } > + So this function gets slowly sprinkled with if (sev-something) bla Please wrap at least those last two into a sev_setup_real_mode() or so. -...

...an be also be + * unconditionally back-adjusted in sev_es_nmi_exit(). Otherwise a + * nested nmi_exit() call (#VC->NMI->#DB) may back-adjust the IST entry + * too early. + */ +void noinstr sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + unsigned long old_ist, new_ist; + unsigned long *p; + + if (!sev_es_active()) + return; + + /* Read old IST entry */ + old_ist = __this_cpu_read(cpu_tss_rw.x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC]); + + /* Make room on the IST stack */ + if (on_vc_stack(regs->sp)) + new_ist = ALIGN_DOWN(regs->sp, 8) - sizeof(old_ist); + else + new_ist = old_ist - sizeof(old_ist); + + /* Stor...

...diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c index 61a52b925d15..df701f87ddef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c @@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ static void sme_sev_setup_real_mode(struct trampoline_header *th) th->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE; if (sev_es_active()) { + /* + * Skip the call to verify_cpu() in secondary_startup_64 as it + * will cause #VC exceptions when the AP can't handle them yet. + */ + th->start = (u64) secondary_startup_64_no_verify; + if (sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(real_mode_header)) panic("Failed to upda...

...ryption */ + if (sme_active()) { + /* + * SME is mutually exclusive with any of the SEV + * features below. + */ + pr_cont(" SME\n"); + return; + } + + /* Secure Encrypted Virtualization */ + if (sev_active()) + pr_cont(" SEV"); + + /* Encrypted Register State */ + if (sev_es_active()) + pr_cont(" SEV-ES"); + + pr_cont("\n"); +} + /* Architecture __weak replacement functions */ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) { @@ -422,8 +447,6 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void) if (sev_active()) static_branch_enable(&sev_enable_key); - pr_info(&quot...

...diff --git a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c index 61a52b925d15..df701f87ddef 100644 --- a/arch/x86/realmode/init.c +++ b/arch/x86/realmode/init.c @@ -46,6 +46,12 @@ static void sme_sev_setup_real_mode(struct trampoline_header *th) th->flags |= TH_FLAGS_SME_ACTIVE; if (sev_es_active()) { + /* + * Skip the call to verify_cpu() in secondary_startup_64 as it + * will cause #VC exceptions when the AP can't handle them yet. + */ + th->start = (u64) secondary_startup_64_no_verify; + if (sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table(real_mode_header)) panic("Failed to upda...

...h/x86/kernel/nmi.c @@ -511,6 +511,13 @@ NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(is_debug_stack); dotraplinkage notrace void do_nmi(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code) { + /* + * Re-enable NMIs right here when running as an SEV-ES guest. This might + * cause nested NMIs, but those can be handled safely. + */ + if (sev_es_active()) + sev_es_nmi_complete(); + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) && cpu_is_offline(smp_processor_id())) return; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c index 00a5d0483730..eef6e2196ef4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c @@ -341,6...

...00644 >> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c >> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c >> @@ -197,6 +203,26 @@ static bool __init sev_es_setup_ghcb(void) >> return true; >> } >> >> +void sev_es_init_ghcbs(void) >> +{ >> + int cpu; >> + >> + if (!sev_es_active()) >> + return; >> + >> + /* Allocate GHCB pages */ >> + ghcb_page = __alloc_percpu(sizeof(struct ghcb), PAGE_SIZE); >> + >> + /* Initialize per-cpu GHCB pages */ >> + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { >> + struct ghcb *ghcb = (struct ghcb *)per_cpu_p...

...00644 >> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c >> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c >> @@ -197,6 +203,26 @@ static bool __init sev_es_setup_ghcb(void) >> return true; >> } >> >> +void sev_es_init_ghcbs(void) >> +{ >> + int cpu; >> + >> + if (!sev_es_active()) >> + return; >> + >> + /* Allocate GHCB pages */ >> + ghcb_page = __alloc_percpu(sizeof(struct ghcb), PAGE_SIZE); >> + >> + /* Initialize per-cpu GHCB pages */ >> + for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) { >> + struct ghcb *ghcb = (struct ghcb *)per_cpu_p...