search for: session_subsystem_req

...ccessful, then the log left off with a semi-cryptic "subsystem request for sftp" line. After that, nothing. Poking around the source, I found this little routine in session.c (it appears to be identical to the same routine in the OpenBSD source, so it's not a porting issue): int session_subsystem_req(Session *s) { unsigned int len; int success = 0; char *subsys = packet_get_string(&len); packet_done(); log("subsystem request for %s", subsys); xfree(subsys); return success; } To my eyes, this looks like a planned no-op. Markus Friedl...

...stat /usr/lib/openssh/sftp-server: No such file or directory subsystem request for sftp failed, subsystem not found Connection closed by 127.0.0.1 Setting "Subsystem sftp internal-sftp" works around the problem, but that option is not allowed inside a Match block. If the stat() call in session_subsystem_req succeeds, is_subsystem is set to SUBSYSTEM_EXT; then do_exec is called, it overrides this and sets is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP. I believe that calling stat() on the external program and then calling the internal sftp handler is not intended behaviour. Regards J?rn Heissler -- Configure bu...

...rd_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.verify_reverse_mapping), - - (struct sockaddr *)&from); + (struct sockaddr *)&from, realname); #ifdef USE_PAM /* @@ -1509,7 +1509,7 @@ } static int - -session_subsystem_req(Session *s) +session_subsystem_req(Session *s, const char *realname) { struct stat st; u_int len; @@ -1530,7 +1530,7 @@ } debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd); s->is_subsystem = 1; - -...

...rting session: forced-command" in session.c:do_exec() the command variable contains the requested forced command and that is what is actually executed. https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/V_7_4_P1/session.c#L623-L663 The "subsystem: exec()" comes earlier from session.c:session_subsystem_req(), which is recording (badly) which subsystem was requested, but this is before the forced command is applied in do_exec(). https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/V_7_4_P1/session.c#L1938-L1944 Further evidence that this is the case is the audit calls that log the command being executed...

On 30.06.23 17:56, MCMANUS, MICHAEL P wrote: > The actual command is similar to the following (parameters inserted to protect the source): > (print ${FQDN} ; print ${Environment} ; cat ${OutFileXML}) | \ > ssh -Ti ${EmbeddedPrivateKey} \ > -o HostKeyAlias="${Alias}" \ > -o

...type, "x11-req") == 0) { success = session_x11_req(s); +#endif +#ifdef WITH_AGENTFWD } else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req at openssh.com") == 0) { success = session_auth_agent_req(s); +#endif } else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) { success = session_subsystem_req(s); } @@ -1640,6 +1670,7 @@ setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list()); } +#ifdef WITH_X11FWD int session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s) { @@ -1674,6 +1705,7 @@ } return 1; } +#endif static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt) Index: ssh.c =======...

I'm reading this fine article on O'Reilly: http://linux.oreillynet.com/lpt/a//linux/2001/11/08/ssh_keystroke.html <quote> The paper concludes that the keystroke timing data observable from today's SSH implementations reveals a dangerously significant amount of information about user terminal sessions--enough to locate typed passwords in the session data stream and reduce the

...tion) + { + options.use_steno_timing_manipulation = 0; + } + return 1; +} +/* End SD Mod */ + static int session_exec_req(Session *s) { @@ -1795,6 +1839,14 @@ } else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) { success = session_subsystem_req(s); } + /* + * Begin SD Mod: Handle request from the client + * to turn off server's timing manipulation. + */ + else if (strcmp(rtype, "no_steno") == 0) { + success = session_n...

Hello, In response to the timing analysis attacks presented by Dawn Song et. al. in her paper http://paris.cs.berkeley.edu/~dawnsong/ssh-timing.html we at Silicon Defense developed a patch for openssh to avoid such measures. Timing Analysis Evasion changes were developed by C. Jason Coit and Roel Jonkman of Silicon Defense. These changes cause SSH to send packets unless request not to,