Displaying 20 results from an estimated 25 matches for "ryabinin".
2015 Mar 04
2
[Xen-devel] kasan_map_early_shadow() on Xen
On 03/03/2015 07:02 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 06:38:20PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
>> On 03/03/2015 05:16 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>>> On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 04:15:06PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
>>>> On 03/03/2015 12:40 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
>>>>> Andrey,
>>>>>
>>>>> I believe that...
2015 Mar 04
2
[Xen-devel] kasan_map_early_shadow() on Xen
On 03/03/2015 07:02 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 06:38:20PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
>> On 03/03/2015 05:16 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>>> On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 04:15:06PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
>>>> On 03/03/2015 12:40 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
>>>>> Andrey,
>>>>>
>>>>> I believe that...
2015 Mar 03
2
[Xen-devel] kasan_map_early_shadow() on Xen
On 03/03/2015 05:16 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 04:15:06PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
>> On 03/03/2015 12:40 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
>>> Andrey,
>>>
>>> I believe that on Xen we should disable kasan, would like confirmation
>>
>> I guess Xen guests won't work with kasan because Xen guests doesn't setup shadow
>>...
2015 Mar 03
2
[Xen-devel] kasan_map_early_shadow() on Xen
On 03/03/2015 05:16 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 04:15:06PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
>> On 03/03/2015 12:40 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
>>> Andrey,
>>>
>>> I believe that on Xen we should disable kasan, would like confirmation
>>
>> I guess Xen guests won't work with kasan because Xen guests doesn't setup shadow
>>...
2015 Mar 06
2
[Xen-devel] kasan_map_early_shadow() on Xen
On Wed, Mar 04, 2015 at 05:47:03PM -0800, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 6:36 AM, Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin at samsung.com> wrote:
> > On 03/03/2015 07:02 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> >> If it is like that - then just using what had to be implemented
> >> for the stack protection as a template ought to pave most of the
> >> work?
> >
> >...
2015 Mar 06
2
[Xen-devel] kasan_map_early_shadow() on Xen
On Wed, Mar 04, 2015 at 05:47:03PM -0800, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 6:36 AM, Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin at samsung.com> wrote:
> > On 03/03/2015 07:02 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> >> If it is like that - then just using what had to be implemented
> >> for the stack protection as a template ought to pave most of the
> >> work?
> >
> >...
2015 Mar 03
0
[Xen-devel] kasan_map_early_shadow() on Xen
On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 06:38:20PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> On 03/03/2015 05:16 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 04:15:06PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> >> On 03/03/2015 12:40 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> >>> Andrey,
> >>>
> >>> I believe that on Xen we should di...
2015 Mar 05
0
[Xen-devel] kasan_map_early_shadow() on Xen
On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 6:36 AM, Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin at samsung.com> wrote:
> On 03/03/2015 07:02 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>> If it is like that - then just using what had to be implemented
>> for the stack protection as a template ought to pave most of the
>> work?
>
> Probably. I think I could ma...
2015 Mar 03
0
[Xen-devel] kasan_map_early_shadow() on Xen
On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 06:38:20PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> On 03/03/2015 05:16 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 04:15:06PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> >> On 03/03/2015 12:40 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> >>> Andrey,
> >>>
> >>> I believe that on Xen we should di...
2015 Mar 05
0
[Xen-devel] kasan_map_early_shadow() on Xen
On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 6:36 AM, Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin at samsung.com> wrote:
> On 03/03/2015 07:02 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>> If it is like that - then just using what had to be implemented
>> for the stack protection as a template ought to pave most of the
>> work?
>
> Probably. I think I could ma...
2015 Mar 06
0
[Xen-devel] kasan_map_early_shadow() on Xen
On Fri, Mar 06, 2015 at 11:02:50AM -0500, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 04, 2015 at 05:47:03PM -0800, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 6:36 AM, Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin at samsung.com> wrote:
> > > On 03/03/2015 07:02 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> > >> If it is like that - then just using what had to be implemented
> > >> for the stack protection as a template ought to pave most of the
> > >> work...
2018 Mar 07
0
[compiler-rt] Use of ESR context in AArch64 sigframe
On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 4:39 PM, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin at virtuozzo.com> wrote:
> On 03/06/2018 08:58 PM, Will Deacon wrote:
>> Hi all,
>>
>> As part of some recent work to harden the Kernel Address Space Layout
>> Randomisation (KASLR) implementation in arm64 Linux, I've proposed a
>> patch for the...
2018 Mar 07
2
[compiler-rt] Use of ESR context in AArch64 sigframe
On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 7:48 AM, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov at google.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 4:39 PM, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin at virtuozzo.com> wrote:
>> On 03/06/2018 08:58 PM, Will Deacon wrote:
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> As part of some recent work to harden the Kernel Address Space Layout
>>> Randomisation (KASLR) implementation in arm64 Linux, I've proposed a
&g...
2018 Mar 07
1
[compiler-rt] Use of ESR context in AArch64 sigframe
On 03/06/2018 08:58 PM, Will Deacon wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> As part of some recent work to harden the Kernel Address Space Layout
> Randomisation (KASLR) implementation in arm64 Linux, I've proposed a
> patch for the kernel which omits the ESR context from the signal frame
> if the faulting virtual address is outside the range of addresses which
> can be mapped by userspace.
2018 Mar 08
0
[compiler-rt] Use of ESR context in AArch64 sigframe
Thanks for the replies. Some comments below.
On Wed, Mar 07, 2018 at 11:40:41AM -0800, Evgenii Stepanov wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 7:48 AM, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov at google.com> wrote:
> > On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 4:39 PM, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin at virtuozzo.com> wrote:
> >> On 03/06/2018 08:58 PM, Will Deacon wrote:
> >>> Hi all,
> >>>
> >>> As part of some recent work to harden the Kernel Address Space Layout
> >>> Randomisation (KASLR) implementation in arm64 Linu...
2015 Mar 03
0
[Xen-devel] kasan_map_early_shadow() on Xen
On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 04:15:06PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> On 03/03/2015 12:40 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> > Andrey,
> >
> > I believe that on Xen we should disable kasan, would like confirmation
>
> I guess Xen guests won't work with kasan because Xen guests doesn't setup shadow
> (kasan_map_early_shadow...
2015 Mar 03
0
[Xen-devel] kasan_map_early_shadow() on Xen
On Tue, Mar 03, 2015 at 04:15:06PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote:
> On 03/03/2015 12:40 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> > Andrey,
> >
> > I believe that on Xen we should disable kasan, would like confirmation
>
> I guess Xen guests won't work with kasan because Xen guests doesn't setup shadow
> (kasan_map_early_shadow...
2015 Mar 03
1
kasan_map_early_shadow() on Xen
On 03/03/2015 12:40 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> Andrey,
>
> I believe that on Xen we should disable kasan, would like confirmation
I guess Xen guests won't work with kasan because Xen guests doesn't setup shadow
(kasan_map_early_shadow() is not called in xen guests).
Disabling kasan for Xen in Kconfig is undesirable because that will disable kasan
for allmodconfig and
2015 Mar 03
1
kasan_map_early_shadow() on Xen
On 03/03/2015 12:40 PM, Luis R. Rodriguez wrote:
> Andrey,
>
> I believe that on Xen we should disable kasan, would like confirmation
I guess Xen guests won't work with kasan because Xen guests doesn't setup shadow
(kasan_map_early_shadow() is not called in xen guests).
Disabling kasan for Xen in Kconfig is undesirable because that will disable kasan
for allmodconfig and
2018 Mar 06
2
[compiler-rt] Use of ESR context in AArch64 sigframe
Hi all,
As part of some recent work to harden the Kernel Address Space Layout
Randomisation (KASLR) implementation in arm64 Linux, I've proposed a
patch for the kernel which omits the ESR context from the signal frame
if the faulting virtual address is outside the range of addresses which
can be mapped by userspace.
http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/linux-arm-kernel/2018-March/563837.html