search for: ruid

...ogin (home folder). I think pam had a problem with the kerberos ticket? The error 126? I tested it with debian/wheezy and Xubuntu 14.04 LTS. The manual mount work,... Bye Gregor (pam_mount.c:554): pam_mount 2.13: entering session stage reenter password for pam_mount: (misc.c:39): Session open: (ruid/rgid=0/1000000, e=0/1000000) (mount.c:267): Mount info: globalconf, user=gburck <volume fstype="cifs" server="edfs001.mvz.ffm" path="users\gburck" mountpoint="/home/MVZ/gburck" cipher="(null)" fskeypath="(null)" fskeycipher="(nu...

...#include <arpa/inet.h> *** uidswap.c.orig Thu Apr 5 10:19:08 2001 --- uidswap.c Thu Apr 5 10:24:28 2001 *************** *** 17,22 **** --- 17,59 ---- #include "log.h" #include "uidswap.h" + #ifndef HAS_SETEUID + /* Linux man page says: + + int setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid); + int seteuid(uid_t euid); + + setreuid sets real and effective user ID's of the current process. + Un-privileged users may change the real user ID to the effective + user ID and vice-versa. + + [...] + + Currently seteuid(euid) is functionally equivalen...

...creen -r" 3. result failure as userA cant access the ttyX but no message After looking around in screen's code I found that after doing a seteuid( userA ) an open on root's terminal is still succeseding. Surely this is a problem as when running euid userA there should be no access to ruid's files? Steve / K

...chkrootkit and it gave me: Checking `lkm'... You have 179 process hidden for readdir command You have 179 process hidden for ps command chkproc: Warning: Possible LKM Trojan installed Checking `chkutmp'... The tty of the following user process(es) were not found in /var/run/utmp ! ! RUID PID TTY CMD ! root 3206 tty1 /sbin/mingetty tty1 ! root 3285 tty2 /sbin/mingetty tty2 ! root 3337 tty3 /sbin/mingetty tty3 ! root 3388 tty4 /sbin/mingetty tty4 ! root 3439 tty5 /sbin/mingetty tty5 Those hidden tty can be "su -&quot...

...ly. Is this a known bug or something you can do anything about? Killing the smbd-process makes the win2k-client reconnect and everything works again. The user can open files and work. If you truss the smbdprocess when the problem have ocurred you see: root@dune:>truss -p 12325 *** SUID: ruid/euid/suid = 0 / 0 / 60001 *** *** SGID: rgid/egid/sgid = 0 / 0 / 60001 *** Before the problem: root@dune:>truss -p 14245 *** SUID: ruid/euid/suid = 0 / 0 / 18097 *** *** SGID: rgid/egid/sgid = 0 / 0 / 18097 *** 60001 matches the user and group nobody from /etc/passwd and 180...

...SETREUID) */ +#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) +int seteuid(uid_t euid) +{ + return(setresuid(-1,euid,-1)); +} +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) */ + +#if !defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) +int setreuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid) +{ + return(setresuid(ruid,euid,-1)); +} +#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) */ + #if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) int setegid(uid_t egid) { --cut-here-- Of course on this particular platform I need other patches (to tu...

...401e4000 567 close(4) = 0 567 munmap(0x40014000, 23853) = 0 567 getpid() = 567 567 getuid() = 1000 567 geteuid() = 1000 567 geteuid() = 1000 567 setresuid(ruid 4294967295, euid 1000, suid 4294967295) = 0 567 umask(022) = 037 567 open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY) = 4 567 read(4, "R/\262\6=\253\344\273PR\23\346\232\302s\263\21\336\214"..., 64) = 64 567 close(4) = 0 567 brk(0)...

...For file 5000_photos/Thumbs.db, dev = 2c00002, inode = 297939333. Deleting it to continue ... [2004/12/03 16:31:33, 0] lib/util.c:smb_panic(1055) PANIC: open_mode_check: Existant process 21819 left active oplock. and a truss -d for the process which has crashed gives the following: *** SUID: ruid/euid/suid = 0 / 2053 / 2053 *** *** SGID: rgid/egid/sgid = 0 / 500 / 500 *** poll(0xFFBEED08, 2, 32000) (sleeping...) poll(0xFFBEED08, 2, 32000) = 0 time() = 1102092631 getuid() = 0 [2053...

Hello all. I''ve recently installed the 0.2.2 pre-release of mongrel_cluster to try out the new --clean option. However, after installing, when I give a simple "mongrel_rails" command, the cluster::status command is not listed. The error I receive when I do try and run the full "mongrel_rails cluster::status" is... ERROR RUNNING

Anyone, Fpc v9.3 is a fingerprint database basically. http://www.agcol.arizona.edu/ I have downloaded the pre-compiled Linux binaries for 32 and 64 bit when I try to launch them I receive this error: FATAL ERROR (ruid: null, euid: null, nodeid: null, program: null, version: null, file: graphgdk.c, line: 194) - Can't load default font 8x13 When I click exit the program ends. I have also compiled the source code with the required gtk2, glib2, pango, cairo, atk, fontconfig, freetype2 and I still receive the...

...and the user is logged out, effectively locking the user out of the system (unless they use some other method of logging in, such as rlogin or telnet). A possible fix for this involves passing the user's password entry from session.c to do_pam_chauthtok(). do_pam_chauthtok() then changes the RUID to the user's uid, call pam_chauthtok(), and changes it back after the call. I am including some diffs of the fix as I made it - the official version may wish to have it enclosed in #ifdef's. diff auth-pam.h /extra/openssh-3.1p1/auth-pam.h | more 1c1 < /* $Id: auth-pam.h,v 1.3 2002/05/...

...that hit our shares are written correctly. However, I started peeking at a lot of these smbd proceses and it seems like something is amiss perhaps on the Samba side. Here's the pertinent info on a randomly selected "hung" process: # truss -v all -aef -p 2506767 25067: *** SUID: ruid/euid/suid = 0 / 122 / 122 *** 25067: *** SGID: rgid/egid/sgid = 0 / 9 / 9 *** 25067: psargs: /usr/sfw/sbin/smbd -D 25067: fcntl(10, F_SETLKW64, 0xFFBFF6F8) (sleeping...) 25067: typ=F_WRLCK whence=SEEK_SET start=32412 len=1 sys=4245464 pid=0 What's FD 10 you ask? # pfile...

I suspect this has been asked before but I'll ask anyway. Q1: Is it possible for a non-root process to perform a chroot? My interest is this: I have a typical ISP hosting account (verio; on a FreeBSD 4.4 server.) I'd like to install and run various CGI packages, yet protect myself (and my email, and my .ssh keys) from bugs being exploited in those CGI packages. Chroot at the start

...ed out (possibly not in this thread) that basing > > protection on euid is not workable. Although I like the concept of > > variable expansion in pathnames, I don''t see it as a security mechanism. > > Why not? Because programs that _were_ privileged but have set euid == ruid will put the tmpfile into a directory to which the user has access, I guess - and that''s the root of the problem; the tmpfile _must_ be inaccessible to all but the processes which actually need it. > Right! very important point: "not particularly security-conscious"! > The...

Introduction. ------------ Every now and then a new "exploit" turns up of some program that uses tmp files. The first solution was "sticky bits", but since links exist (that''s a LONG time), that solution is inadequate. Discussion. ---------- The problem is that you put an object (link/pipe) in the place where you expect a program to put its tempfile, and wait for

...ba31bd930c4 in waitpid () from /lib/libc.so.6 #1 0x00002ba31bd3d5ff in strtold_l () from /lib/libc.so.6 #2 0x00000000005c1374 in smb_panic2 (why=0x6ac813 "failed to set uid\n", decrement_pid_count=<value optimized out>) at lib/util.c:1545 #3 0x00000000005c60d8 in assert_uid (ruid=4294967295, euid=10122) at lib/util_sec.c:96 #4 0x000000000049235e in become_id (uid=10122, gid=10000) at smbd/sec_ctx.c:60 #5 0x0000000000492c8c in pop_sec_ctx () at smbd/sec_ctx.c:375 #6 0x000000000048a579 in unbecome_root () at smbd/uid.c:435 #7 0x00000000005eeaf1 in reply_to_oplock_brea...

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1567 Summary: Insufficient privileges to chroot() on AIX Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.2p1 Platform: PPC OS/Version: AIX Status: NEW Severity: major Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.org ReportedBy: bana

...oline wins support = no wins proxy = no default case = lower preserve case = false short preserve case = false mangle case = no case sensitive = no oplocks = false -------------- next part -------------- *** SUID: ruid/euid/suid = 0 / 0 / 16152 *** *** SGID: rgid/egid/sgid = 0 / 0 / 160 *** poll(0xFFBEF3D0, 3, 60000) (sleeping...) poll(0xFFBEF3D0, 3, 60000) = 1 read(12, "\0\0\0 b", 4) = 4 read(12, "FF S M B\b\0\0\0\0180310".., 98) = 98 getuid() = 0 [0] getgid() = 0 [0] setgr...

I seem to have stumbled across another vulnerability in DIP. It appears to allow any user to gain control of arbitrary devices in /dev. For instance, I have successfully stolen keystrokes from a root login as follows... (I could also dump characters to the root console) $ whoami cesaro $ cat < /dev/tty1 <------ root login here bash: /dev/tty1: Permission denied

Hi, Is the http://xenbits.xensource.com/linux-2.6-xen.hg tree still being updated? if not, what''s the preferred Linux tree to track that has all of the Xen bits? Thanks, Muli _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel