search for: pr_emerg

...ctxt->fi.error_code; + int trapnr = ctxt->fi.vector; + + ctxt->regs->orig_ax = ctxt->fi.error_code; + + switch (trapnr) { + case X86_TRAP_GP: + do_general_protection(ctxt->regs, error_code); + break; + case X86_TRAP_UD: + do_invalid_op(ctxt->regs, 0); + break; + default: + pr_emerg("ERROR: Unsupported exception in #VC instruction emulation - can't continue\n"); + BUG(); + } +} + +dotraplinkage void do_vmm_communication(struct pt_regs *regs, + unsigned long exit_code) +{ + struct sev_es_runtime_data *data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data); + struct ghcb_state st...

...es.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c index f5bff4219f6f..d128a9397639 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c @@ -254,16 +254,16 @@ dotraplinkage void do_vmm_communication(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long exit finish_insn(&ctxt); break; case ES_UNSUPPORTED: - pr_emerg("Unsupported exit-code 0x%02lx in early #VC exception (IP: 0x%lx)\n", - exit_code, regs->ip); + pr_err_ratelimited("Unsupported exit-code 0x%02lx in early #VC exception (IP: 0x%lx)\n", + exit_code, regs->ip); goto fail; case ES_VMM_ERROR: - pr_emerg("P...

...handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long addr) goto no_kmmio; } - ctx = &get_cpu_var(kmmio_ctx); + ctx = this_cpu_ptr(&kmmio_ctx); if (ctx->active) { if (page_base == ctx->addr) { /* @@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ int kmmio_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long addr) pr_emerg("previous hit was at 0x%08lx.\n", ctx->addr); disarm_kmmio_fault_page(faultpage); } - goto no_kmmio_ctx; + goto no_kmmio; } ctx->active++; @@ -314,11 +314,8 @@ int kmmio_handler(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long addr) * the user should drop to single cpu before t...

Hi, here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes since the last version. What is SEV-ES ============== SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by

Hi, here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes since the last version. What is SEV-ES ============== SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by

Hi, here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete, but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.

Hi, here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete, but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.

Hi, This set of patches contains initial kexec/kdump implementation for Xen v2 (previous version were posted to few people by mistake; sorry for that). Currently only dom0 is supported, however, almost all infrustructure required for domU support is ready. Jan Beulich suggested to merge Xen x86 assembler code with baremetal x86 code. This could simplify and reduce a bit size of kernel code.

Hi, This set of patches contains initial kexec/kdump implementation for Xen v2 (previous version were posted to few people by mistake; sorry for that). Currently only dom0 is supported, however, almost all infrustructure required for domU support is ready. Jan Beulich suggested to merge Xen x86 assembler code with baremetal x86 code. This could simplify and reduce a bit size of kernel code.

Hi, This set of patches contains initial kexec/kdump implementation for Xen v2 (previous version were posted to few people by mistake; sorry for that). Currently only dom0 is supported, however, almost all infrustructure required for domU support is ready. Jan Beulich suggested to merge Xen x86 assembler code with baremetal x86 code. This could simplify and reduce a bit size of kernel code.

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a rebased version of the latest SEV-ES patches. They are now based on latest tip/master instead of upstream Linux and include the necessary changes. Changes to v4 are in particular: - Moved early IDT setup code to idt.c, because the idt_descr and the idt_table are now static - This required to make stack protector work early (or

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and rebased the code v5.8-rc5. The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the #VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big pile of entry code changes merged into

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and rebased the code v5.8-rc5. The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the #VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big pile of entry code changes merged into

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the new version of the SEV-ES client enabling patch-set. It is based on the latest tip/master branch and contains the necessary changes. In particular those ar: - Enabling CR4.FSGSBASE early on supported processors so that early #VC exceptions on APs can be handled. - Add another patch (patch 1) to fix a KVM frame-size build

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/ I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the discussions around it. Another important change is that the early IDT

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/ I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the discussions around it. Another important change is that the early IDT

Currently the blacklist is maintained by hand in kprobes.c which is separated from the function definition and is hard to catch up the kernel update. To solve this issue, I've tried to implement new NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() macro for making kprobe blacklist at build time. Since the NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() macros can be placed right after the function is defined, it is easy to maintain. This series

Currently the blacklist is maintained by hand in kprobes.c which is separated from the function definition and is hard to catch up the kernel update. To solve this issue, I've tried to implement new NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() macro for making kprobe blacklist at build time. Since the NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() macros can be placed right after the function is defined, it is easy to maintain. This series

Hi, Here is the version 3 of NOKPORBE_SYMBOL series. Currently the blacklist is maintained by hand in kprobes.c which is separated from the function definition and is hard to catch up the kernel update. To solve this issue, I've introduced NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() macro for making kprobe blacklist at build time. Since the NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() macros can be placed right after the function is defined

Hi, Here is the version 3 of NOKPORBE_SYMBOL series. Currently the blacklist is maintained by hand in kprobes.c which is separated from the function definition and is hard to catch up the kernel update. To solve this issue, I've introduced NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() macro for making kprobe blacklist at build time. Since the NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() macros can be placed right after the function is defined