Displaying 19 results from an estimated 19 matches for "paranoid_entri".
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paranoid_entry
2020 Sep 08
1
[PATCH v7 67/72] x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT
On Mon, Sep 07, 2020 at 03:16:08PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
>
> The IDT on 64bit contains vectors which use paranoid_entry() and/or IST
> stacks. To make these vectors work the TSS and the getcpu GDT entry need
> to be set up before the IDT is loaded.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
> ---
>
2020 Sep 07
0
[PATCH v7 67/72] x86/smpboot: Load TSS and getcpu GDT entry before loading IDT
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
The IDT on 64bit contains vectors which use paranoid_entry() and/or IST
stacks. To make these vectors work the TSS and the getcpu GDT entry need
to be set up before the IDT is loaded.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
2020 Aug 29
2
[PATCH v6 38/76] x86/head/64: Set CR4.FSGSBASE early
On Mon, Aug 24, 2020 at 10:54:33AM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
>
> Early exception handling will use rd/wrgsbase in paranoid_entry/exit.
> Enable the feature to avoid #UD exceptions on boot APs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200724160336.5435-38-joro at 8bytes.org
2020 Aug 29
2
[PATCH v6 38/76] x86/head/64: Set CR4.FSGSBASE early
On Mon, Aug 24, 2020 at 10:54:33AM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
>
> Early exception handling will use rd/wrgsbase in paranoid_entry/exit.
> Enable the feature to avoid #UD exceptions on boot APs.
>
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200724160336.5435-38-joro at 8bytes.org
2020 Aug 24
0
[PATCH v6 48/76] x86/entry/64: Add entry code for #VC handler
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
The #VC handler needs special entry code because:
1. It runs on an IST stack
2. It needs to be able to handle nested #VC exceptions
To make this work the entry code is implemented to pretend it doesn't
use an IST stack. When entered from user-mode or early SYSCALL entry
path it switches to the task stack, if entered from kernel-mode it
tries
2020 Aug 25
0
[PATCH v6 00/76] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi Mike,
On Tue, Aug 25, 2020 at 12:21:03AM +0000, Mike Stunes wrote:
> Thanks for the new update! I still see the same FSGSBASE behavior on our platform.
>
> That is, APs come up offline; masking out either FSGSBASE or RDPID from the
> guest's CPUID results in all CPUs online.
>
> Is that still expected with this patch set? (As you mentioned in an earlier reply,
> I?m
2020 Aug 24
0
[PATCH v6 38/76] x86/head/64: Set CR4.FSGSBASE early
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Early exception handling will use rd/wrgsbase in paranoid_entry/exit.
Enable the feature to avoid #UD exceptions on boot APs.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200724160336.5435-38-joro at 8bytes.org
---
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git
2020 Aug 31
0
[PATCH v6 38/76] x86/head/64: Set CR4.FSGSBASE early
On Sat, Aug 29, 2020 at 05:55:25PM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 24, 2020 at 10:54:33AM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> > From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
> >
> > Early exception handling will use rd/wrgsbase in paranoid_entry/exit.
> > Enable the feature to avoid #UD exceptions on boot APs.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel
2020 Feb 11
2
[RFC PATCH 00/62] Linux as SEV-ES Guest Support
On Tue, Feb 11, 2020 at 03:50:08PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> Oh gawd; so instead of improving the whole NMI situation, AMD went and
> made it worse still ?!?
Well, depends on how you want to see it. Under SEV-ES an IRET will not
re-open the NMI window, but the guest has to tell the hypervisor
explicitly when it is ready to receive new NMIs via the NMI_COMPLETE
message. NMIs stay
2020 Feb 11
2
[RFC PATCH 00/62] Linux as SEV-ES Guest Support
On Tue, Feb 11, 2020 at 03:50:08PM +0100, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> Oh gawd; so instead of improving the whole NMI situation, AMD went and
> made it worse still ?!?
Well, depends on how you want to see it. Under SEV-ES an IRET will not
re-open the NMI window, but the guest has to tell the hypervisor
explicitly when it is ready to receive new NMIs via the NMI_COMPLETE
message. NMIs stay
2020 Feb 11
0
[PATCH 62/62] x86/sev-es: Add NMI state tracking
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Keep NMI state in SEV-ES code so the kernel can re-enable NMIs for the
vCPU when it reaches IRET.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/asm/sev-es.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
2020 Sep 07
84
[PATCH v7 00/72] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The
previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/
I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the
discussions around it.
Another important change is that the early IDT
2020 Sep 07
84
[PATCH v7 00/72] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The
previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/
I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the
discussions around it.
Another important change is that the early IDT
2020 Jul 24
86
[PATCH v5 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a rebased version of the latest SEV-ES patches. They are now
based on latest tip/master instead of upstream Linux and include the
necessary changes.
Changes to v4 are in particular:
- Moved early IDT setup code to idt.c, because the idt_descr
and the idt_table are now static
- This required to make stack protector work early (or
2020 Aug 24
96
[PATCH v6 00/76] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the new version of the SEV-ES client enabling patch-set. It is
based on the latest tip/master branch and contains the necessary
changes. In particular those ar:
- Enabling CR4.FSGSBASE early on supported processors so that
early #VC exceptions on APs can be handled.
- Add another patch (patch 1) to fix a KVM frame-size build
2020 Jul 14
92
[PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I
addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and
rebased the code v5.8-rc5.
The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the
#VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big
pile of entry code changes merged into
2020 Jul 14
92
[PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I
addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and
rebased the code v5.8-rc5.
The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the
#VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big
pile of entry code changes merged into
2020 Feb 11
83
[RFC PATCH 00/62] Linux as SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run
under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete,
but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the
size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial
feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code
here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.
2020 Feb 11
83
[RFC PATCH 00/62] Linux as SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run
under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete,
but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the
size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial
feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code
here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.