search for: original_command

...ion *s, const char *command); void do_login(Session *s, const char *command); void do_child(Session *s, const char *command); void do_motd(void); *************** *** 270,286 **** command = NULL; packet_integrity_check(plen, 0, type); } ! if (forced_command != NULL) { ! original_command = command; ! command = forced_command; ! debug("Forced command '%.500s'", forced_command); ! } ! if (s->ttyfd != -1) ! do_exec_pty(s, command); ! else ! do_exec_no_pty(s, command); ! if (command != NULL) ! xfree(command); session_close(s);...

...with it, and find it superior to ssh-1.2.27 in many ways (thanks for the good work). I recently found one piece missing from the current release. I have used the 'command' option in the authorized_keys file to restrict access. Using ssh-1.2.27 the original command was placed in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND envrionment variable. If command is set to a wrapper script, it was able to parse contents of the variable, verify that any variable args are proper and legal, then execute a predefined program passing the appropriate args to that program. Without the environment variable there appears to be no w...

The previous version broke the case of internal-sftp without arguments. This is a fixed version. --- /var/tmp/session.c 2008-08-18 21:07:10.000000000 -0700 +++ session.c 2008-08-19 11:28:29.000000000 -0700 @@ -781,7 +781,7 @@ if (options.adm_forced_command) { original_command = command; command = options.adm_forced_command; - if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, command) == 0) + if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, command) == 0 || strncmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, command, strlen(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME)) == 0 && isspace(command[strlen(INTE...

...ork (current code in 5.1 would just end the session). Please consider for inclusion into mainline. Michael. --- /var/tmp/session.c 2008-08-18 21:07:10.000000000 -0700 +++ session.c 2008-08-18 21:12:51.000000000 -0700 @@ -781,7 +781,7 @@ if (options.adm_forced_command) { original_command = command; command = options.adm_forced_command; - if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, command) == 0) + if (strncmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, command, strlen(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME)) == 0 && isspace(command[strlen(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME)])) s...

...time); if (strchr(time_string, '\n')) @@ -678,6 +697,7 @@ printf("Last login: %s from %s\r\n", time_string, s->hostname); } +#endif /* ! _CRAY */ do_motd(); } @@ -916,7 +936,10 @@ if (original_command) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND", original_command); - +#ifdef _CRAY + if (cray_tmpdir[0] != '\0') + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir); +#endif /* _CRAY */ #i...

...HAVE_OSF_SIA */ +# endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ +#else + cray_setup(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name, command); +#endif /* _CRAY */ /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */ /* Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h" @@ -1245,6 +1268,10 @@ if (original_command) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND", original_command); +#ifdef _CRAY + if (cray_tmpdir[0] != '\0') + child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir); +#endif /* _CRAY */ #if...

...;chroot_users; + goto parse_flag; case sDeprecated: log("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s", *** session.c@@\main\1 Tue Oct 1 17:25:48 2002 --- session.c Tue Nov 5 09:59:14 2002 *************** *** 99,104 **** --- 99,111 ---- /* original command from peer. */ const char *original_command = NULL; + /* option to use filesystem snapshot */ + /* #define DO_SNAPSHOTS */ + #ifdef DO_SNAPSHOTS + /* snapshot name */ + char *snapshot = NULL; + #endif + /* data */ #define MAX_SESSIONS 10 Session sessions[MAX_SESSIONS]; *************** *** 1255,1260 **** --- 1262,1268 ---- const...

...const char *); @@ -147,6 +150,7 @@ extern int debug_flag; extern u_int utmp_len; extern int startup_pipe; extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); +extern void record_utmp_only(pid_t, const char *, const char *, const char *, struct sockaddr *); /* original command from peer. */ const char *original_command = NULL;

...1.orig/session.c Sun Dec 2 10:37:08 2001 +++ openssh-3.0.2p1/session.c Tue Feb 12 12:01:51 2002 @@ -151,6 +151,9 @@ extern int startup_pipe; extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); +/* Local Xauthority file. */ +static char *xauthfile = NULL; + /* original command from peer. */ const char *original_command = NULL; @@ -220,6 +223,28 @@ #endif } +xauthfile_cleanup_proc(void *_pw) +{ + struct passwd *pw = _pw; + + debug("xauthfile_cleanup_proc called"); + + if (xauthfile != NULL) { + char *p; + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + unlink(xauthfile); + p = strrchr(xauthfile, '/')...

...8 diff -u -r1.238 session.c --- session.c 3 Jun 2003 00:25:48 -0000 1.238 +++ session.c 5 Jul 2003 02:21:49 -0000 @@ -95,6 +95,7 @@ extern u_int utmp_len; extern int startup_pipe; extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); +extern Buffer loginmsg; /* original command from peer. */ const char *original_command = NULL; @@ -103,10 +104,6 @@ #define MAX_SESSIONS 10 Session sessions[MAX_SESSIONS]; -#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE -char *aixloginmsg; -#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */ - #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP login_cap_t *lc; #endif @@ -770,10 +767,13 @@ if (options.use_pam && !is_pam_password_cha...

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2681 Bug ID: 2681 Summary: postauth processes to log via monitor Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 7.4p1 Hardware: Other OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: sshd Assignee: unassigned-bugs at

...000 1.241 +++ session.c 9 Jul 2003 02:02:53 -0000 @@ -95,7 +95,9 @@ extern u_int utmp_len; extern int startup_pipe; extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); +extern int password_change_required; extern Buffer loginmsg; +extern Buffer expiremsg; /* original command from peer. */ const char *original_command = NULL; @@ -461,6 +463,9 @@ "TTY available"); } #endif /* USE_PAM */ + if (password_change_required) + packet_disconnect("Password change required but no " + "TTY available"); /* Fork the child. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { @@ -726,6 +731,7 @@...

...000 1.241 +++ session.c 9 Jul 2003 02:02:53 -0000 @@ -95,7 +95,9 @@ extern u_int utmp_len; extern int startup_pipe; extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); +extern int password_change_required; extern Buffer loginmsg; +extern Buffer expiremsg; /* original command from peer. */ const char *original_command = NULL; @@ -461,6 +463,9 @@ "TTY available"); } #endif /* USE_PAM */ + if (password_change_required) + packet_disconnect("Password change required but no " + "TTY available"); /* Fork the child. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { @@ -726,6 +731,7 @@...

Numerous how-tos all over the Internet show how one would set up a tunnel using ssh, e.g.: ssh -f -o Tunnel=ethernet <server_ip> true I was wondering if there's a way to subsequently acquire the names of the local and remote tun/tap interfaces (e.g., using the default "-w any:any") for subsequent automatic tunnel configuration, e.g.: ip link set $TapDev up ip link set

...EDS_UTMPX else do_pre_login(s); @@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ * to be forced, execute that instead. */ void - -do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) +do_exec(Session *s, const char *command, const char *realname) { if (forced_command) { original_command = command; @@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ } if (s->ttyfd != -1) - - do_exec_pty(s, command); + do_exec_pty(s, command, realname); else do_exec_no_pty(s, command); @@ -656,7 +656,7 @@ /* administrative, login(1)-like work */ void - -do...

OpenBSD tree is heading into a lock and this includes OpenSSH. So we are winding up for a 3.5 release. If we can get people to test the current snapshots and report any problems that would improve the odds that your platform won't be broke for 3.5. Issues I know off of right now. 1. I can't test NeXT. So I TRULY need someone in that community to test for me. Last I heard there was

Could everyone please test the latest snapshots as we will be making a new release soon. If you have any patches you would like us to consider, please resend them to the list ASAP. -d -- | Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org> \ ``E-mail attachments are the poor man's | http://www.mindrot.org / distributed filesystem'' - Dan Geer