search for: ntpwdhistory

..., and a grep for "password" on the generated logs: > passwordAttribute: pekList > passwordAttribute: msDS-ExecuteScriptPassword > passwordAttribute: clearTextPassword > passwordAttribute: userPassword > passwordAttribute: ntPwdHash > passwordAttribute: sambaNTPwdHistory > passwordAttribute: lmPwdHash > passwordAttribute: sambaLMPwdHistory > passwordAttribute: krb5key > passwordAttribute: dBCSPwd > passwordAttribute: unicodePwd > passwordAttribute: ntPwdHistory > passwordAttribute: lmPwdHistory > passwordAttribute: supplement...

...ass: ldbsearch -H $sam -b 'CN=SCHEMA,CN=CONFIGURATION,DC=AD,DC=EXAMPLE,DC=COM' '(&(objectClass=classSchema)(cn=user))' | egrep -i 'pass|pwd' systemMayContain: msDS-UserPasswordExpiryTimeComputed systemMayContain: unicodePwd systemMayContain: pwdLastSet systemMayContain: ntPwdHistory systemMayContain: lmPwdHistory systemMayContain: dBCSPwd systemMayContain: badPwdCount systemMayContain: badPasswordTime Now the password is "Sg4QWTYspPucd" and its hash is "COwwLgiqqaHRyhy4HxWp4A==". The hash seems to be base64 encoded because of the double ":" trail...

...ord" on the generated logs: > >> ? passwordAttribute: pekList >> ? passwordAttribute: msDS-ExecuteScriptPassword >> ? passwordAttribute: clearTextPassword >> ? passwordAttribute: userPassword >> ? passwordAttribute: ntPwdHash >> ? passwordAttribute: sambaNTPwdHistory >> ? passwordAttribute: lmPwdHash >> ? passwordAttribute: sambaLMPwdHistory >> ? passwordAttribute: krb5key >> ? passwordAttribute: dBCSPwd >> ? passwordAttribute: unicodePwd >> ? passwordAttribute: ntPwdHistory >> ? passwordAttribute: lmPwdHistory >>...

...homeDrive, lastLogoff, lastLogon, lmPwdHistory, localeID, loginShell, logonCount, logonHours, logonWorkstation, maxStorage, ntPwdHistory, ntHomeDirectory, o, operatorCount, otherLoginWorkstations, policyName, policyOptions, preferredOU, primaryGroupID, profilePath, pwdLastSet...

...Strange, if you read the release notes for 4.8.0rc2. you will find this: Encrypted secrets Attributes deemed to be sensitive are now encrypted on disk. The sensitive values are currently: pekList msDS-ExecuteScriptPassword currentValue dBCSPwd initialAuthIncoming initialAuthOutgoing lmPwdHistory ntPwdHistory priorValue supplementalCredentials trustAuthIncoming trustAuthOutgoing unicodePwd clearTextPassword This encryption is enabled by default on a new provision or join, it can be disabled at provision or join time with the new option '--plaintext-secrets'. However, an in-place upgrade will n...

...b 'CN=SCHEMA,CN=CONFIGURATION,DC=AD,DC=EXAMPLE,DC=COM' > '(&(objectClass=classSchema)(cn=user))' | egrep -i 'pass|pwd' > systemMayContain: msDS-UserPasswordExpiryTimeComputed > systemMayContain: unicodePwd > systemMayContain: pwdLastSet > systemMayContain: ntPwdHistory > systemMayContain: lmPwdHistory > systemMayContain: dBCSPwd > systemMayContain: badPwdCount > systemMayContain: badPasswordTime > > Now the password is "Sg4QWTYspPucd" and its hash is > "COwwLgiqqaHRyhy4HxWp4A==". The hash seems to be base64 encoded because...

Hi all, I was wondering what kind of password encryption is used into LDB file to store user's password. Our users are authenticating against some OpenLDAP tree to access their applications. We would like to add some field on this OpenLDAP to generate Samba4 valid password when users are connecting against it, to be able then to copy this field into our Samba4 users for they have same

Hi, First some background: ================== I had a test environment which had two samba DCs (running v 4.8.0rc2) and 1 Windows Server 2008R2 DC. The samba DCs had been upgraded from v 4.6x and the secrets database was not encrypted (as far as I know). I decided to downgrade one of the samba DCs to v 4.7.4. On re-starting samba after the downgrade the log shows: ldb: unable to dlopen

...ssword, as these keys derive their values from NT hashes. AES keys are stored by default for all deployments of Samba with Domain Functional Level 2008 or later, are supported by all modern clients, and are much more secure. Finally, also note that password history in Active Directory is stored in nTPwdHistory using a series of NT hash values.? Therefore the full password history feature is not available in this mode. To provide some protection against password re-use previous Kerberos hash values (the current, old and older values are already stored) are used, providing a history length of 3. There is...

...ssword, as these keys derive their values from NT hashes. AES keys are stored by default for all deployments of Samba with Domain Functional Level 2008 or later, are supported by all modern clients, and are much more secure. Finally, also note that password history in Active Directory is stored in nTPwdHistory using a series of NT hash values.? Therefore the full password history feature is not available in this mode. To provide some protection against password re-use previous Kerberos hash values (the current, old and older values are already stored) are used, providing a history length of 3. There is...

...llowing settings: 'mdns name = mdns' Encrypted secrets ----------------- Attributes deemed to be sensitive are now encrypted on disk. The sensitive values are currently: pekList msDS-ExecuteScriptPassword currentValue dBCSPwd initialAuthIncoming initialAuthOutgoing lmPwdHistory ntPwdHistory priorValue supplementalCredentials trustAuthIncoming trustAuthOutgoing unicodePwd clearTextPassword This encryption is enabled by default on a new provision or join, it can be disabled at provision or join time with the new option '--plaintext-secrets'. However, an in-place upgrade...

...llowing settings: 'mdns name = mdns' Encrypted secrets ----------------- Attributes deemed to be sensitive are now encrypted on disk. The sensitive values are currently: pekList msDS-ExecuteScriptPassword currentValue dBCSPwd initialAuthIncoming initialAuthOutgoing lmPwdHistory ntPwdHistory priorValue supplementalCredentials trustAuthIncoming trustAuthOutgoing unicodePwd clearTextPassword This encryption is enabled by default on a new provision or join, it can be disabled at provision or join time with the new option '--plaintext-secrets'. However, an in-place upgrade...

...] ../source4/dsdb/kcc/kcc_drs_replica_info.c:228(kccdrs_replica_get_info_obj_metadata2) attribute_id = 589914, attribute_name: unicodePwd [2015/10/12 22:48:12.273162, 0] ../source4/dsdb/kcc/kcc_drs_replica_info.c:228(kccdrs_replica_get_info_obj_metadata2) attribute_id = 589918, attribute_name: ntPwdHistory [2015/10/12 22:48:12.273601, 0] ../source4/dsdb/kcc/kcc_drs_replica_info.c:228(kccdrs_replica_get_info_obj_metadata2) attribute_id = 589920, attribute_name: pwdLastSet [2015/10/12 22:48:12.273928, 0] ../source4/dsdb/kcc/kcc_drs_replica_info.c:228(kccdrs_replica_get_info_obj_metadata2) attribu...

...llowing settings: 'mdns name = mdns' Encrypted secrets ----------------- Attributes deemed to be sensitive are now encrypted on disk. The sensitive values are currently: pekList msDS-ExecuteScriptPassword currentValue dBCSPwd initialAuthIncoming initialAuthOutgoing lmPwdHistory ntPwdHistory priorValue supplementalCredentials trustAuthIncoming trustAuthOutgoing unicodePwd clearTextPassword This encryption is enabled by default on a new provision or join, it can be disabled at provision or join time with the new option '--plaintext-secrets'. However, an in-place upgrade...

...llowing settings: 'mdns name = mdns' Encrypted secrets ----------------- Attributes deemed to be sensitive are now encrypted on disk. The sensitive values are currently: pekList msDS-ExecuteScriptPassword currentValue dBCSPwd initialAuthIncoming initialAuthOutgoing lmPwdHistory ntPwdHistory priorValue supplementalCredentials trustAuthIncoming trustAuthOutgoing unicodePwd clearTextPassword This encryption is enabled by default on a new provision or join, it can be disabled at provision or join time with the new option '--plaintext-secrets'. However, an in-place upgrade...

...llowing settings: 'mdns name = mdns' Encrypted secrets ----------------- Attributes deemed to be sensitive are now encrypted on disk. The sensitive values are currently: pekList msDS-ExecuteScriptPassword currentValue dBCSPwd initialAuthIncoming initialAuthOutgoing lmPwdHistory ntPwdHistory priorValue supplementalCredentials trustAuthIncoming trustAuthOutgoing unicodePwd clearTextPassword This encryption is enabled by default on a new provision or join, it can be disabled at provision or join time with the new option '--plaintext-secrets'. However, an in-place upgrade...

...llowing settings: 'mdns name = mdns' Encrypted secrets ----------------- Attributes deemed to be sensitive are now encrypted on disk. The sensitive values are currently: pekList msDS-ExecuteScriptPassword currentValue dBCSPwd initialAuthIncoming initialAuthOutgoing lmPwdHistory ntPwdHistory priorValue supplementalCredentials trustAuthIncoming trustAuthOutgoing unicodePwd clearTextPassword This encryption is enabled by default on a new provision or join, it can be disabled at provision or join time with the new option '--plaintext-secrets'. However, an in-place upgrade...

...ssword, as these keys derive their values from NT hashes. AES keys are stored by default for all deployments of Samba with Domain Functional Level 2008 or later, are supported by all modern clients, and are much more secure. Finally, also note that password history in Active Directory is stored in nTPwdHistory using a series of NT hash values.? Therefore the full password history feature is not available in this mode. To provide some protection against password re-use previous Kerberos hash values (the current, old and older values are already stored) are used, providing a history length of 3. There is...

...ssword, as these keys derive their values from NT hashes. AES keys are stored by default for all deployments of Samba with Domain Functional Level 2008 or later, are supported by all modern clients, and are much more secure. Finally, also note that password history in Active Directory is stored in nTPwdHistory using a series of NT hash values.? Therefore the full password history feature is not available in this mode. To provide some protection against password re-use previous Kerberos hash values (the current, old and older values are already stored) are used, providing a history length of 3. There is...

...ssword, as these keys derive their values from NT hashes. AES keys are stored by default for all deployments of Samba with Domain Functional Level 2008 or later, are supported by all modern clients, and are much more secure. Finally, also note that password history in Active Directory is stored in nTPwdHistory using a series of NT hash values.? Therefore the full password history feature is not available in this mode. To provide some protection against password re-use previous Kerberos hash values (the current, old and older values are already stored) are used, providing a history length of 3. There is...