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no_new_privs
2013 Feb 02
2
Relaxing strict chroot checks on recent Linux kernels?
At the risk of beating a dead horse, I'd like to see the chroot
security checks relaxed a bit. On newer Linux kernels, there's a
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) that prevents privilege
elevation (via setuid binaries, etc) for the caller and all of its
descendants. That means that chroot(untrusted directory),
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0), setreuid(uid, uid), execve(a
shell) is safe [1], even if the user can hardlink setuid programs...