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...policies I write this! semanage fcontext -a -t httpd_sys_rw_content_t "/var/www/html(/.*)?/ typo3conf(/.*)?" I have more instances from typo3 I found this construct in the selinux policies "/var/www/html(/.*)?/uploads(/.*)?" but my is not working ? and I have only errors? neverallow check failed at /etc/selinux/targeted/tmp/modules/100/selinuxutil/ cil:244 (neverallow selinuxutil_typeattr_1 semanage_store_t (file (relabelto))) <root> allow at /etc/selinux/targeted/tmp/modules/100/selinuxutil/cil:675 (allow restorecond_t non_auth_file_type (file (getattr r...

...ttpd_sys_rw_content_t "/var/www/html(/.*)?/ > > typo3conf(/.*)?" > > OK. Did you get an error? I have only Errors ;-). when I like to set this Rule ? semanage fcontext -a -t httpd_sys_rw_content_t "/var/www/html(/.*)?/ typo3conf(/.*)?" This Errors are displayd ? neverallow check failed at /etc/selinux/targeted/tmp/modules/100/selinuxutil/ cil:244 (neverallow selinuxutil_typeattr_1 semanage_store_t (file (relabelto))) <root> allow at /etc/selinux/targeted/tmp/modules/100/selinuxutil/cil:675 (allow restorecond_t non_auth_file_type (file (getattr r...

...en generating the final linked and expanded policy, by default > # semanage will set the policy version to POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX, as > # given in <sepol/policydb.h>.  Change this setting if a different > # version is necessary. > #policy-version = 19 > > # expand-check check neverallow rules when executing all > semanage commands. > # Large penalty in time if you turn this on. > expand-check=0 > > # By default, semanage will generate policies for the SELinux target. > # To build policies for Xen, uncomment the following line. > #target-platform = xen >...

...from the semanage command? Are files not labeled correctly? After setting context rules, you can "restorecon -R -v /var/www/html/" to fix the labels of any existing files. You can see their current labels using "ls -lZ /var/www/html". > and I have only errors? > > neverallow check failed at /etc/selinux/targeted/tmp/modules/100/selinuxutil/ > cil:244 When do you see that error?

On 04/30/2017 07:24 PM, G?nther J. Niederwimmer wrote: > when I like to set this Rule ? > semanage fcontext -a -t httpd_sys_rw_content_t "/var/www/html(/.*)?/ > typo3conf(/.*)?" > > This Errors are displayd ? > neverallow check failed at /etc/selinux/targeted/tmp/modules/100/selinuxutil/ > cil:244 I see, now. What happens if you run "find /etc/selinux/targeted/tmp"? I'm not sure if you're getting an error because a tmp file was left behind earlier, or because something is wrong with the com...

I followed this guide: the user who gives permission to the network share is without problems but at the file system level I do not understand the user using the acl. What should I do? Il 24/01/2019 18:32, Rowland Penny via samba ha scritto: > On Thu, 24 Jan 2019 18:19:45 +0100 > marco pirola via samba <samba at lists.samba.org> wrote: > >> This is my smb.conf of the member

...2. module-store = direct # When generating the final linked and expanded policy, by default # semanage will set the policy version to POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX, as # given in <sepol/policydb.h>.  Change this setting if a different # version is necessary. #policy-version = 19 # expand-check check neverallow rules when executing all semanage commands. # Large penalty in time if you turn this on. expand-check=0 # By default, semanage will generate policies for the SELinux target. # To build policies for Xen, uncomment the following line. #target-platform = xen the other files are ok, otherwise I would...

...linked and expanded policy, by default >> # semanage will set the policy version to POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX, as >> # given in <sepol/policydb.h>.  Change this setting if a different >> # version is necessary. >> #policy-version = 19 >> >> # expand-check check neverallow rules when executing all >> semanage commands. >> # Large penalty in time if you turn this on. >> expand-check=0 >> >> # By default, semanage will generate policies for the SELinux target. >> # To build policies for Xen, uncomment the following line. >> #ta...

This patch set adds XSM security labels to useful debugging output locations, and fixes some assumptions that all interrupts behaved like GSI interrupts (which had useful non-dynamic IDs). It also cleans up the policy build process and adds an example of how to use the user field in the security context. Debug output: [PATCH 01/10] xsm: Add security labels to event-channel dump [PATCH 02/10] xsm: