Displaying 4 results from an estimated 4 matches for "name_pattern".
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base_pattern
2007 Nov 02
1
[Patch, enh] Permit host and IP addresses in (Allow|Deny)Groups
...9;s groups is matched by a group pattern AND
+ * (access allowed from anywhere OR access is from allowed host /
network).
+ * Return 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+ga_match_host_and_ip(char * const *patterns, int npatterns,
+ const char *hostname, const char *ipaddr)
+{
+ char *host_pattern;
+ char *name_pattern;
+ int found;
+ int i, j;
+
+ found = 0;
+ for (i = 0; !found && i < npatterns; i++) {
+ name_pattern = xstrdup(patterns[i]);
+ host_pattern = strchr(name_pattern, '@');
+ if (host_pattern)
+ *host_pattern++ = '\0';
+ for (j = 0;...
2002 Jan 24
1
PATCH: krb4/krb5/... names/patterns in auth_keys entries
..., ":%s", key->name_type);
+ else
+ fprintf(f, " \"%s\"", key->name);
}
return success;
}
@@ -515,6 +654,12 @@
case KEY_DSA:
return "DSA";
break;
+ case KEY_NAME:
+ return "Named";
+ break;
+ case KEY_NAME_PAT:
+ return "Name_Pattern";
+ break;
}
return "unknown";
}
@@ -528,6 +673,12 @@
case KEY_DSA:
return "ssh-dss";
break;
+ case KEY_NAME:
+ return "ssh-named";
+ break;
+ case KEY_NAME_PAT:
+ return "ssh-name-pat";
+ break;
}
return "ssh-unknown";
}...
2001 Aug 15
0
[ossh patch] principal name/patterns in authorized_keys2
...ey->name_type);
+ else
+ fprintf(f, " \"%.*s\"", key->name, key->name_len);
}
return success;
}
@@ -514,6 +655,12 @@
case KEY_DSA:
return "DSA";
break;
+ case KEY_NAME:
+ return "Named";
+ break;
+ case KEY_NAME_PAT:
+ return "Name_Pattern";
+ break;
}
return "unknown";
}
@@ -527,6 +674,12 @@
case KEY_DSA:
return "ssh-dss";
break;
+ case KEY_NAME:
+ return "ssh-ext-named";
+ break;
+ case KEY_NAME_PAT:
+ return "ssh-ext-name-pat";
+ break;
}
return "ssh-unknown&q...
2011 Nov 22
4
A "strict Arel" mode for ActiveRecord to prevent SQL injection vulnerabilities
...s don’t particularly stand out in
code reviews. For example,
Customer.where("name like "%#{params[:id]}%")
is vulnerable, while
Customer.where("name = ?”, params[:id])
Customer.where(name => params[:id])
Customer.where(Customer.arel_table[:name].matches(''%#{name_pattern}%'')
etc are safe.
While a careful security code review would likely spot this type of bug,
there is still a significant risk that it’d be missed, in particular in an
agile project with frequent releases that can’t afford to do an in-depth
security review between each release.
Propos...