Displaying 5 results from an estimated 5 matches for "mroe_bitmap".
2018 Jul 19
0
[PATCH 3/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE
...ect_mroe(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+ bool pt_protect,
+ struct kvm_write_access_data *d)
+{
+ u64 *sptep;
+ struct rmap_iterator iter;
+ bool prot;
+ bool flush = false;
+
+ for_each_rmap_spte(rmap_head, &iter, sptep) {
+ prot = !test_bit(d->i, d->memslot->mroe_bitmap) && pt_protect;
+ flush |= spte_write_protect(sptep, prot);
+ d->i++;
+ }
+ return flush;
+}
+#endif
+
+static bool __rmap_write_protect(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+ bool pt_protect,
+ struct kvm_write_access_data *d)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MROE
+ if (d != NU...
2018 Jul 20
0
[PATCH RFC V4 3/3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE
...ect_mroe(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+ bool pt_protect,
+ struct kvm_write_access_data *d)
+{
+ u64 *sptep;
+ struct rmap_iterator iter;
+ bool prot;
+ bool flush = false;
+
+ for_each_rmap_spte(rmap_head, &iter, sptep) {
+ prot = !test_bit(d->i, d->memslot->mroe_bitmap) && pt_protect;
+ flush |= spte_write_protect(sptep, prot);
+ d->i++;
+ }
+ return flush;
+}
+#endif
+
+static bool __rmap_write_protect(struct kvm *kvm,
+ struct kvm_rmap_head *rmap_head,
+ bool pt_protect,
+ struct kvm_write_access_data *d)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_MROE
+ if (d != NU...
2018 Jul 20
4
Memory Read Only Enforcement: VMM assisted kernel rootkit mitigation for KVM V4
Here is change log from V3 To V4:
- Fixing spelling/grammar mistakes suggested by Randy Dunlap
- Changing the hypercall interface to be able to process multiple pages
per one hypercall also suggested by Randy Dunlap. It turns out that
this will save lots of vmexist/memory slot flushes when protecting many
pages.
[PATCH RFC V4 1/3] KVM: X86: Memory ROE documentation
[PATCH RFC V4 2/3] KVM:
2018 Jul 19
8
Memory Read Only Enforcement: VMM assisted kernel rootkit mitigation for KVM
Hi,
This is my first set of patches that works as I would expect, and the
third revision I sent to mailing lists.
Following up with my previous discussions about kernel rootkit mitigation
via placing R/O protection on critical data structure, static data,
privileged registers with static content. These patches present the
first part where it is only possible to place these protections on
memory
2018 Jul 19
8
Memory Read Only Enforcement: VMM assisted kernel rootkit mitigation for KVM
Hi,
This is my first set of patches that works as I would expect, and the
third revision I sent to mailing lists.
Following up with my previous discussions about kernel rootkit mitigation
via placing R/O protection on critical data structure, static data,
privileged registers with static content. These patches present the
first part where it is only possible to place these protections on
memory