search for: mfn_valid

Noticed that on change set 12568, we change the valid_mfn to be in fact the mfn_valid(). Then on change set 12572, we change the shadow_set_p2m_entry() to use mfn_valid(). I''m a bit confused by this change. I think current meaning of mfn_valid() is to check if the mfn is valid RAM. It is ok for page table pages. But for p2m table, considering shadow for driver domain or con...

.../arch/x86/mm.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c Wed Jul 25 14:03:08 2007 +0100 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c Wed Jul 25 14:03:12 2007 +0100 @@ -594,6 +594,14 @@ get_##level##_linear_pagetable( return 1; \ } + +int iomem_page_test(unsigned long mfn, struct page_info *page) +{ + return unlikely(!mfn_valid(mfn)) || + unlikely(page_get_owner(page) == dom_io); +} + + int get_page_from_l1e( l1_pgentry_t l1e, struct domain *d) @@ -611,8 +619,7 @@ get_page_from_l1e( return 0; } - if ( unlikely(!mfn_valid(mfn)) || - unlikely(page_get_owner(page) == dom_io) ) + if...

...gs *a) } else { - page = alloc_domheap_pages(d, a->extent_order, a->memflags); +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM + if ( d == dom0 && platform_has_quirk(PLATFORM_QUIRK_DOM0_MAPPING_11) ) + { + mfn = gpfn; + if (!mfn_valid(mfn)) + { + gdprintk(XENLOG_INFO, "Invalid mfn 0x%"PRI_xen_pfn"\n", + mfn); + goto out; + } + + page = mfn_to_page(mfn); + if ( !get_page(page, d) ) +...

...} in @@ -2595,34 +2624,39 @@ struct page_info *page; p2m_type_t p2mt; mfn_t mfn; - + int ret; + p2m_lock(d->arch.p2m); /* Get mfn */ - mfn = gfn_to_mfn(d, gfn, &p2mt); + mfn = gfn_to_mfn_query(d, gfn, &p2mt); + + ret = -EINVAL; if ( unlikely(!mfn_valid(mfn)) ) - return -EINVAL; + goto out; if (p2mt != p2m_ram_paging_out) { printk("p2m_mem_paging_evict type %d\n", p2mt); - return -EINVAL; + goto out; } /* Get the page so it doesn''t get modified under Xen'&...

This patch series includes a series of bugs related to p2m, ept, and PoD code which were found as part of our XenServer product testing. Each of these fixes actual bugs, and the 3.4-based version of the patch has been tested thoroughly. (There may be bugs in porting the patches, but most of them are simple enough as to make it unlikely.) Each patch is conceptually independent, so they can each

...0 +0200 +++ 2007-05-14/xen/arch/x86/mm.c 2007-05-14 13:44:25.000000000 +0200 @@ -3238,13 +3238,14 @@ static int ptwr_emulated_update( /* We are looking only for read-only mappings of p.t. pages. */ ASSERT((l1e_get_flags(pte) & (_PAGE_RW|_PAGE_PRESENT)) == _PAGE_PRESENT); + ASSERT(mfn_valid(mfn)); ASSERT((page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_type_mask) == PGT_l1_page_table); ASSERT((page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_count_mask) != 0); ASSERT(page_get_owner(page) == d); /* Check the new PTE. */ nl1e = l1e_from_intpte(val); - if ( unlikely(!get_page_from...

...; + return _mfn(BAD_GVA_TO_GFN); + } + + /* Translate the GFN to an MFN */ + mfn = gfn_to_mfn(v->domain, gfn, &p2mt); + + if ( p2mt == p2m_ram_ro ) + return _mfn(READONLY_GFN); + if ( !p2m_is_ram(p2mt) ) + return _mfn(BAD_GFN_TO_MFN); + + ASSERT(mfn_valid(mfn_x(mfn))); + + return mfn; +} + +/* Check that the user is allowed to perform this write. + * Returns a mapped pointer to write to, or NULL for error. */ +#define MAPPING_UNHANDLEABLE ((void *)(unsigned long)X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE) +#define MAPPING_EXCEPTION ((void *)(unsigned long)X86EMUL_...

Populate-on-demand: Check pages being returned by the balloon driver This patch series is the second result of my work last summer on decreasing fragmentation of superpages in a guests'' p2m when using populate-on-demand. This patch series is against 4.1; I''m posting it to get feedback on the viability of getting a ported version of this patch into 4.2. As with the previous

Hi, V6: The only change from V5 is in patch #6: - changed comment to reflect autoxlate - removed a redundant ASSERT - reworked logic a bit so that get_page_from_gfn() is called with NULL for p2m type as before. arm has ASSERT wanting it to be NULL. Tim: patch 4 needs your approval. Daniel: patch 5 needs your approval. These patches implement PVH dom0. Patches 1 and 2

There has been some progress, but still no joy. Definitely not intended for inclusion at this point. Tim, Wei, I added a Xen command line toggle to disable IOMMU and P2M table sharing. Tim, I verified that changes to p2m-pt.c don''t break shadow mode (64bit hypervisor and Win 7 guest). Hongkaixing, I incorporated your suggestion in patch 2, so I should add your Signed-off-by eventually.

ging_prep ensures that an mfn is backing the paged-out gfn, and transitions to the next state in the paging state machine for this page. Foreign mappings of the gfn will now succeed. This is the key idea, as it allows the pager to now map the gfn and fill in its contents. Unfortunately, it also allows any other foreign mapper to map the gfn and read its contents. This is particularly dangerous

A number of build problems crept in once again. Fix them. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> --- a/xen/common/memory.c +++ b/xen/common/memory.c @@ -683,7 +683,7 @@ long do_memory_op(unsigned long cmd, XEN mfn = get_gfn_untyped(d, xrfp.gpfn); if ( mfn_valid(mfn) ) - guest_physmap_remove_page(d, xrfp.gpfn, mfn, PAGE_ORDER_4K); + guest_physmap_remove_page(d, xrfp.gpfn, mfn, 0); else rc = -ENOENT; --- a/xen/include/asm-ia64/linux-xen/asm/irq.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-ia64/linux-xen/asm/irq.h @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ e...

...s detected, paging should skip selecting this page. The pseudo-code of step 3 can be written as follow: int p2m_mem_paging_nominate(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn) { mfn = gfn_to_mfn_noreference(d, gfn, &p2mt); -----> avoid saving timestamp and access tag if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) ) goto out; clear_access_tag(); ----------> clear the access tag of this page if (test_page_hot()) goto out; ------> if the page is accessed recently, go to out ........ set_p2m_entry(d, gfn, mfn, 0, p2m_ram_paging_out); if ( test_ac...

...*/ - if ( !page_is_ram_type(i, RAM_TYPE_CONVENTIONAL) && - (!iommu_inclusive_mapping || - page_is_ram_type(i, RAM_TYPE_UNUSABLE)) ) + unsigned long pfn = pdx_to_pfn(i); + + if ( pfn > (0xffffffffUL >> PAGE_SHIFT) ? + (!mfn_valid(pfn) || + !page_is_ram_type(pfn, RAM_TYPE_CONVENTIONAL)) : + iommu_inclusive_mapping ? + page_is_ram_type(pfn, RAM_TYPE_UNUSABLE) : + !page_is_ram_type(pfn, RAM_TYPE_CONVENTIONAL) ) continue; /* Exclude Xen bits */ - if...

-- Advanced Micro Devices GmbH Sitz: Dornach, Gemeinde Aschheim, Landkreis München Registergericht München, HRB Nr. 43632 WEEE-Reg-Nr: DE 12919551 Geschäftsführer: Alberto Bozzo, Andrew Bowd _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

These two patches were originally part of the XSM series that I have posted, and remain prerequisites for that series. However, they are independent of the XSM changes and are a useful simplification regardless of the use of XSM. The Acked-bys on these patches were provided before rebasing them over the copyback changes in 26268:1b72138bddda, which had minor conflicts that I resolved. [PATCH

The following two patches allow the parallel use of memsharing, xenpaging and xen-access by using an independent ring buffer for each feature. Please review. v2: - update mem_event_check_ring arguments, check domain rather than domain_id - check ring_full first because its value was just evaluated - check if ring buffer is initialized before calling mem_access_domctl/mem_paging_domctl

Dear All: I am pretty new to xen-devel, please correct me in the following. Assume we have the following terms GPT: guest page table SPT: shadow page table (Question a) When guest OS is running, is it always using SPT for address translation? If it is the case, how does guest OS refer and modify its own GPT content? It seems that there is a page table entry in SPT for the GPT page. (Question

This patch series restores the use of superpages when restoring or migrating a VM, while retaining efficient batching of 4k pages when superpages are not appropriate or available. Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

...(1GiB or 2MiB), - * the intermediate tables will be freed below after the ept flush */ + * the intermediate tables will be freed below after the ept flush + * + * Read-then-write is OK because we hold the p2m lock. */ old_entry = *ept_entry; if ( mfn_valid(mfn_x(mfn)) || direct_mmio || p2m_is_paged(p2mt) || @@ -390,10 +392,10 @@ new_entry.access = p2ma; new_entry.rsvd2_snp = (iommu_enabled && iommu_snoop); - if ( new_entry.mfn == mfn_x(mfn) ) + new_entry.mfn = mfn_x(mfn); + + if ( o...