search for: mfn_t

Dear All: I am pretty new to xen-devel, please correct me in the following. Assume we have the following terms GPT: guest page table SPT: shadow page table (Question a) When guest OS is running, is it always using SPT for address translation? If it is the case, how does guest OS refer and modify its own GPT content? It seems that there is a page table entry in SPT for the GPT page. (Question

Populate-on-demand: Check pages being returned by the balloon driver This patch series is the second result of my work last summer on decreasing fragmentation of superpages in a guests'' p2m when using populate-on-demand. This patch series is against 4.1; I''m posting it to get feedback on the viability of getting a ported version of this patch into 4.2. As with the previous

The following two patches allow the parallel use of memsharing, xenpaging and xen-access by using an independent ring buffer for each feature. Please review. v2: - update mem_event_check_ring arguments, check domain rather than domain_id - check ring_full first because its value was just evaluated - check if ring buffer is initialized before calling mem_access_domctl/mem_paging_domctl

...:15 2009 +0100 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c Thu Aug 06 11:39:37 2009 +0100 @@ -520,6 +520,183 @@ return X86EMUL_OKAY; } +/* Translate a VA to an MFN, injecting a page-fault if we fail */ +#define BAD_GVA_TO_GFN (~0UL) +#define BAD_GFN_TO_MFN (~1UL) +#define READONLY_GFN (~2UL) +static mfn_t emulate_gva_to_mfn( + struct vcpu *v, + unsigned long vaddr) +{ + unsigned long gfn; + mfn_t mfn; + p2m_type_t p2mt; + uint32_t pfec = PFEC_page_present | PFEC_write_access; + + /* Translate the VA to a GFN */ + gfn = paging_gva_to_gfn(v, vaddr, &pfec); + if ( gfn ==...

...change p2m type p2m_unlock put_page() the result is a page is added to the pod list,and then it''s removed from the list by put_page. my suggestion is to extend the range of the p2m lock to contain the p2m check. in p2m_mem_paging_nominate() function @@ -2532,7 +2561,8 @@ mfn_t mfn; int ret; - mfn = gfn_to_mfn(d, gfn, &p2mt); + p2m_lock(d->arch.p2m); + mfn = gfn_to_mfn_query(d, gfn, &p2mt); /* Check if mfn is valid */ ret = -EINVAL; @@ -2580,13 +2610,12 @@ goto out; /* Fix p2m entry */ - p2m_lock(d->arch.p2m);...

Hi, V6: The only change from V5 is in patch #6: - changed comment to reflect autoxlate - removed a redundant ASSERT - reworked logic a bit so that get_page_from_gfn() is called with NULL for p2m type as before. arm has ASSERT wanting it to be NULL. Tim: patch 4 needs your approval. Daniel: patch 5 needs your approval. These patches implement PVH dom0. Patches 1 and 2

ging_prep ensures that an mfn is backing the paged-out gfn, and transitions to the next state in the paging state machine for this page. Foreign mappings of the gfn will now succeed. This is the key idea, as it allows the pager to now map the gfn and fill in its contents. Unfortunately, it also allows any other foreign mapper to map the gfn and read its contents. This is particularly dangerous

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From: Zhang Xiantao <xiantao.zhang@intel.com> With virtual EPT support, L1 hyerpvisor can use EPT hardware for L2 guest''s memory virtualization. In this way, L2 guest''s performance can be improved sharply. According to our testing, some benchmarks can show > 5x performance gain. Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiantao <xiantao.zhang@intel.com> Zhang Xiantao (11):

...> diff -r bfd1157dd315 xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c Thu Sep 11 08:06:48 2008 +0900 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/shadow/common.c Thu Sep 11 09:25:28 2008 +0900 @@ -701,7 +701,8 @@ static void _sh_resync(struct vcpu *v, m ASSERT(!sh_page_has_multiple_shadows(mfn_to_page(gmfn))); SHADOW_PRINTK("d=%d, v=%d, gmfn=%05lx, va=%lx\n", - v->domain->domain_id, v->vcpu_id, mfn_x(gmfn), va); + v->domain->domain_id, v->vcpu_id, mfn_x(gmfn), + sh_map_domain_page(gmfn)); /* Need to...

..._lo, unsigned long old_hi, unsigned long new_lo, unsigned long new_hi, struct sh_emulate_ctxt *sh_ctxt); +#endif mfn_t (*make_monitor_table )(struct vcpu *v); void (*destroy_monitor_table )(struct vcpu *v, mfn_t mmfn); int (*guess_wrmap )(struct vcpu *v, Index: 2008-04-15/xen/include/asm-x86/x86_emulate.h ============================================================...

In sh_page_fault(), there are some code like following, why we think it is mmio only when paging_vcpu_mode_translate(v)? Thanks Yunhong Jiang /* What mfn is the guest trying to access? */ gfn = guest_l1e_get_gfn(gw.eff_l1e); gmfn = vcpu_gfn_to_mfn(v, gfn); mmio = (is_hvm_domain(d) && paging_vcpu_mode_translate(v) &&

The following two patches are about how to speed up in xenpaging when page in pages. On suse11-64 with 4G memory,if we page out 2G pages,it will cost about 15.5 seconds, but take 2088 seconds to finish paging in.If page-in costs too much time,it will cause unmesurable problems when vm or dom0 access the paged_out page,such as BSOD,crash. What鈥檚 more,the dom0 is always in high I/O pressure.

These two patches were originally part of the XSM series that I have posted, and remain prerequisites for that series. However, they are independent of the XSM changes and are a useful simplification regardless of the use of XSM. The Acked-bys on these patches were provided before rebasing them over the copyback changes in 26268:1b72138bddda, which had minor conflicts that I resolved. [PATCH

The patch deals with the situation which guest OS uses unused page table pages as data pages and write data to them. The pages will still be grabbed by Xen as page table pages, and lots of unnecessary page faults occur. The patch will check if the data guest writes to the page table contains valid mfn or not, if not, we believe it is a data page now and then unshadow the page. The patch

Hello, I''m new to Xen and especially to the hypervisor code. I''m working off a 3.0.4.1 base and have the following questions regarding the memory management code for an x86, 32-bit platform (capable of supporting PAE). I''m doing some research into providing grant table hypercall support from a Windows 2003 HVM. I have made all the necessary changes to allow the

Another bundle of issues from Coverity triage. The first one is in x86/mm, and looks scarier than it is. The others are all in xen/drivers and AFAICT are pretty minor. Cheers, Tim.

There has been some progress, but still no joy. Definitely not intended for inclusion at this point. Tim, Wei, I added a Xen command line toggle to disable IOMMU and P2M table sharing. Tim, I verified that changes to p2m-pt.c don''t break shadow mode (64bit hypervisor and Win 7 guest). Hongkaixing, I incorporated your suggestion in patch 2, so I should add your Signed-off-by eventually.

Patrick, there following patches fix xenpaging for me. Granttable handling is incomplete. If a page is gone, a GNTST_eagain should be returned to the caller to inidcate the hypercall has to be retried after a while, until the page is available again. Please review. Olaf _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com

This series of patches fix the mistake for debug exception(#DB), overflow exception(#OF) and INT3(#BP), INTn instruction emulation. Introduce new function vmx_inject_sw_exception() which deliver the software excetion, software interrupt and privileged software exception. Split hardware exception as a seperate function(old function vmx_inject_hw_exception()). Also Passed down intruction length