search for: memblocks

....c >> @@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ void *xc_dom_malloc(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t size) >> return NULL; >> } >> memset(block, 0, sizeof(*block) + size); >> + block->type = XC_DOM_MEM_TYPE_MALLOC_INTERNAL; >> block->next = dom->memblocks; >> dom->memblocks = block; >> dom->alloc_malloc += sizeof(*block) + size; >> @@ -151,23 +152,45 @@ void *xc_dom_malloc_page_aligned(struct xc_dom_image *dom, size_t size) >> return NULL; >> } >> memset(block, 0, sizeof(*bl...

CS is now launching. This is an log from console: Code: ~$ wine c:\\CS16v26\\hl.exe -32bpp fixme:win:EnumDisplayDevicesW ((null),0,0x32f524,0x00000000), stub! fixme:gl_compat:add_gl_compat_wrappers GL implementation supports GL_ARB_fragment_program but not GL_EXT_fog_coord fixme:gl_compat:add_gl_compat_wrappers The fog coord emulation will most likely fail E: shm.c: mmap() failed: Cannot

On Tue, 7 Jul 2020 10:44:37 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > S390, protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host access > needs to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the use of > VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1 and VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. Hm... what about: "If protected virtualization is active on s390, the virtio queues are not accessible to the

On Tue, 7 Jul 2020 10:44:37 +0200 Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > S390, protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host access > needs to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the use of > VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1 and VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. Hm... what about: "If protected virtualization is active on s390, the virtio queues are not accessible to the

On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 06:33:13PM -0700, Bo Gan wrote: > On 4/15/20 8:53 AM, Joerg Roedel wrote: > > Hi Mike, > > > > On Tue, Apr 14, 2020 at 07:03:44PM +0000, Mike Stunes wrote: > > > set_memory_decrypted needs to check the return value. I see it > > > consistently return ENOMEM. I've traced that back to split_large_page > > > in

On 07.07.20 10:44, Pierre Morel wrote: > S390, protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host access > needs to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the use of > VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1 and VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> > --- > arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 25

When populate pages across a mem boundary at bootup, the page count populated isn't correct. This is due to mem populated to non-mem region and ignored. Pfn range is also wrongly aligned when mem boundary isn't page aligned. Also need consider the rare case when xen_do_chunk fail(populate). For a dom0 booted with dom_mem=3368952K(0xcd9ff000-4k) dmesg diff is: [ 0.000000] Freeing

When populate pages across a mem boundary at bootup, the page count populated isn't correct. This is due to mem populated to non-mem region and ignored. Pfn range is also wrongly aligned when mem boundary isn't page aligned. Also need consider the rare case when xen_do_chunk fail(populate). For a dom0 booted with dom_mem=3368952K(0xcd9ff000-4k) dmesg diff is: [ 0.000000] Freeing

From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap at infradead.org> Currently <linux/slab.h> #includes <linux/kmemleak.h> for no obvious reason. It looks like it's only a convenience, so remove kmemleak.h from slab.h and add <linux/kmemleak.h> to any users of kmemleak_* that don't already #include it. Also remove <linux/kmemleak.h> from source files that do not use it. This is

From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap at infradead.org> Currently <linux/slab.h> #includes <linux/kmemleak.h> for no obvious reason. It looks like it's only a convenience, so remove kmemleak.h from slab.h and add <linux/kmemleak.h> to any users of kmemleak_* that don't already #include it. Also remove <linux/kmemleak.h> from source files that do not use it. This is

Hi all, I changed the patch subject to reflect the content, becoming more general. 1) I removed the ack from Christian and Jason even far as I understand they gave it for the functionality more than for the implementation. @Jason, @Christian, please can I get back your acked-by with these changes? 2) previous patch had another name: [PATCH v3 0/1] s390: virtio: let arch choose to

Hi Linus, This is a huge set of several partly interrelated (and concurrently developed) changes, which is why the branch history is messier than one would like. The *really* big items are two humonguous patchsets mostly developed by Yinghai Lu at my request, which completely revamps the way we create initial page tables. In particular, rather than estimating how much memory we will need for

Hi Linus, This is a huge set of several partly interrelated (and concurrently developed) changes, which is why the branch history is messier than one would like. The *really* big items are two humonguous patchsets mostly developed by Yinghai Lu at my request, which completely revamps the way we create initial page tables. In particular, rather than estimating how much memory we will need for

Hi Linus, This is a huge set of several partly interrelated (and concurrently developed) changes, which is why the branch history is messier than one would like. The *really* big items are two humonguous patchsets mostly developed by Yinghai Lu at my request, which completely revamps the way we create initial page tables. In particular, rather than estimating how much memory we will need for

On Sun, Jul 22, 2012 at 03:34:42PM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote: > Linus, > > Please pull the latest timers-core-for-linus git tree from: > > git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git timers-core-for-linus > > HEAD: eec19d1a0d04c80e66eef634f7b8f460f2ca5643 Merge branch ''linus'' into timers/core > > Continued cleanups of the core

The jazzdma ops implement support for a very basic IOMMU. Thus we really should not use the dma-direct code that takes physical address limits into account. This survived through the great MIPS DMA ops cleanup mostly because I was lazy, but now it is time to fully split the implementations. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch at lst.de> --- arch/mips/jazz/jazzdma.c | 32

S390, protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host access needs to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the use of VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1 and VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> --- arch/s390/kernel/uv.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c index

On Tue, Jul 07, 2020 at 11:46:33AM +0200, Cornelia Huck wrote: > On Tue, 7 Jul 2020 10:44:37 +0200 > Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > > > S390, protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host access > > needs to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the use of > > VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1 and VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Hm... what

On 2020-07-07 11:46, Cornelia Huck wrote: > On Tue, 7 Jul 2020 10:44:37 +0200 > Pierre Morel <pmorel at linux.ibm.com> wrote: > >> S390, protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host access >> needs to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the use of >> VIRTIO_F_VERSION_1 and VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM. > > Hm... what about: > > "If

On 28.07.20 15:48, Baoquan He wrote: > On 06/30/20 at 04:26pm, David Hildenbrand wrote: >> Let's move the split comment regarding bootmem allocations and memory >> holes, especially in the context of ZONE_MOVABLE, to the PageReserved() >> check. >> >> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm at linux-foundation.org> >> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko at suse.com>