search for: l1e_get_pfn

This patch series restores the use of superpages when restoring or migrating a VM, while retaining efficient batching of 4k pages when superpages are not appropriate or available. Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

There has been some progress, but still no joy. Definitely not intended for inclusion at this point. Tim, Wei, I added a Xen command line toggle to disable IOMMU and P2M table sharing. Tim, I verified that changes to p2m-pt.c don''t break shadow mode (64bit hypervisor and Win 7 guest). Hongkaixing, I incorporated your suggestion in patch 2, so I should add your Signed-off-by eventually.

...> > do_mmu_update > ->mod_l1_entry > -> if ( !p2m_is_ram(p2mt) || unlikely(mfn == INVALID_MFN) ) > return -EINVAL; > > mfn==INVALID_MFN, because : > > mod_l1_entry > ->gfn_to_mfn(p2m_get_hostp2m(pg_dom), l1e_get_pfn(nl1e), &p2mt)); > ->p2m->get_entry > ->p2m_gfn_to_mfn > -> if ( gfn > p2m->max_mapped_pfn ) > /* This pfn is higher than the > highest the p2m map currently h...

Today is my day! This is with Xen 4.4 (pulled today) when I build a kernel in dom0 and have two guests launching at the same time. This is what I get: (XEN) Assertion ''l1e_get_pfn(MAPCACHE_L1ENT(hashent->idx)) == hashent->mfn'' failed at domain_page.c:203 and it blows up. Here is the full log: \ \/ /___ _ __ | || | | || | _ _ _ __ ___| |_ __ _| |__ | | ___ \ // _ \ ''_ \ | || |_| || |_ __| | | | ''_ \/ __| __/ _` | ''_...

This patch series includes a series of bugs related to p2m, ept, and PoD code which were found as part of our XenServer product testing. Each of these fixes actual bugs, and the 3.4-based version of the patch has been tested thoroughly. (There may be bugs in porting the patches, but most of them are simple enough as to make it unlikely.) Each patch is conceptually independent, so they can each

ging_prep ensures that an mfn is backing the paged-out gfn, and transitions to the next state in the paging state machine for this page. Foreign mappings of the gfn will now succeed. This is the key idea, as it allows the pager to now map the gfn and fill in its contents. Unfortunately, it also allows any other foreign mapper to map the gfn and read its contents. This is particularly dangerous

...gt;       ->mod_l1_entry >>              ->  if ( !p2m_is_ram(p2mt) || unlikely(mfn == INVALID_MFN) ) >>                          return -EINVAL; >> >>    mfn==INVALID_MFN, because : >> >> mod_l1_entry >>       ->gfn_to_mfn(p2m_get_hostp2m(pg_dom), l1e_get_pfn(nl1e), &p2mt)); >>               ->p2m->get_entry >>                         ->p2m_gfn_to_mfn >>                                -> if ( gfn > p2m->max_mapped_pfn ) >>                                    /* This pfn is higher than the >> highest the...

..., addr, &pte); - if ( !(l1e_get_flags(pte) & _PAGE_PRESENT) ) - goto bail; page = l1e_get_page(pte); /* We are looking only for read-only mappings of p.t. pages. */ if ( ((l1e_get_flags(pte) & (_PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_RW)) != _PAGE_PRESENT) || + !mfn_valid(l1e_get_pfn(pte)) || ((page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_type_mask) != PGT_l1_page_table) || ((page->u.inuse.type_info & PGT_count_mask) == 0) || (page_get_owner(page) != d) ) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xens...

-- Advanced Micro Devices GmbH Sitz: Dornach, Gemeinde Aschheim, Landkreis München Registergericht München, HRB Nr. 43632 WEEE-Reg-Nr: DE 12919551 Geschäftsführer: Alberto Bozzo, Andrew Bowd _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

The following two patches allow the parallel use of memsharing, xenpaging and xen-access by using an independent ring buffer for each feature. Please review. v2: - update mem_event_check_ring arguments, check domain rather than domain_id - check ring_full first because its value was just evaluated - check if ring buffer is initialized before calling mem_access_domctl/mem_paging_domctl

...MEM_ACCESS_READWRITE); rc |= irqs_permit_access(dom0, 0, NR_IRQS-1); /* diff -r b58bcd6551e2 xen/arch/x86/mm.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c Fri Dec 01 16:21:46 2006 +0000 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c Fri Dec 01 16:22:41 2006 +0000 @@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ get_page_from_l1e( { unsigned long mfn = l1e_get_pfn(l1e); struct page_info *page = mfn_to_page(mfn); - int okay; + int okay, access; if ( !(l1e_get_flags(l1e) & _PAGE_PRESENT) ) return 1; @@ -570,11 +570,19 @@ get_page_from_l1e( if ( d == dom_io ) d = current->domain; - if ( !iomem_acc...

Hi, V6: The only change from V5 is in patch #6: - changed comment to reflect autoxlate - removed a redundant ASSERT - reworked logic a bit so that get_page_from_gfn() is called with NULL for p2m type as before. arm has ASSERT wanting it to be NULL. Tim: patch 4 needs your approval. Daniel: patch 5 needs your approval. These patches implement PVH dom0. Patches 1 and 2

This patch set adds XSM security labels to useful debugging output locations, and fixes some assumptions that all interrupts behaved like GSI interrupts (which had useful non-dynamic IDs). It also cleans up the policy build process and adds an example of how to use the user field in the security context. Debug output: [PATCH 01/10] xsm: Add security labels to event-channel dump [PATCH 02/10] xsm: