Displaying 4 results from an estimated 4 matches for "kvm_exit_mmio".
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kvm_exit_io
2018 Jul 20
0
[PATCH 3/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE
...ch dependent stuff (the
mechanism implementation) is kept in arch/*/kvm folder and with minimal
modifications to virt/kvm/* after setting a kconfig variable to enable ROE.
But I left room for the user space app using kvm to decide the rightful policy
for handling ROE violations. The way it works by KVM_EXIT_MMIO error to user
space, keeping all the architectural details hidden away from user space.
A last note is that I didn't create this from scratch, instead I extended
KVM_MEM_READONLY implementation to also allow R/O per page instead
R/O per whole slot which is already done in kernel space.
2018 Jul 20
0
[PATCH 3/3] [RFC V3] KVM: X86: Adding skeleton for Memory ROE
...hanism implementation) is kept in arch/*/kvm folder and with minimal
>> modifications to virt/kvm/* after setting a kconfig variable to enable ROE.
>> But I left room for the user space app using kvm to decide the rightful policy
>> for handling ROE violations. The way it works by KVM_EXIT_MMIO error to user
>> space, keeping all the architectural details hidden away from user space.
>>
>> A last note is that I didn't create this from scratch, instead I extended
>> KVM_MEM_READONLY implementation to also allow R/O per page instead
>> R/O per whole slot wh...
2018 Jul 19
8
Memory Read Only Enforcement: VMM assisted kernel rootkit mitigation for KVM
Hi,
This is my first set of patches that works as I would expect, and the
third revision I sent to mailing lists.
Following up with my previous discussions about kernel rootkit mitigation
via placing R/O protection on critical data structure, static data,
privileged registers with static content. These patches present the
first part where it is only possible to place these protections on
memory
2018 Jul 19
8
Memory Read Only Enforcement: VMM assisted kernel rootkit mitigation for KVM
Hi,
This is my first set of patches that works as I would expect, and the
third revision I sent to mailing lists.
Following up with my previous discussions about kernel rootkit mitigation
via placing R/O protection on critical data structure, static data,
privileged registers with static content. These patches present the
first part where it is only possible to place these protections on
memory