search for: kerneld

...nsity values at the points and draw the contour of the density which >includes 95% of the points (at a level computed from the sorted values via >quantile()). > >-- >Brian D. Ripley >(...) -- Example: x <- rnorm(1000, mean = 0, sd = 1) y <- rnorm(1000, mean = 1, sd = 1.3) kerneld <- kde2d(x, y, n = 200, lims = c(-1.0, 1.0, 0.0, 2.0)) confidencebound <- quantile(kerneld$z, probs= 0.95) plot(x, y, pch=19, cex=0.5) contour(kerneld, levels = confidencebound, col="red", add = TRUE) -- How can I calculate the right contour containing 95% of the values? Thank...

Here''s a neat trick for a machine running kerneld: not_root@machine$ /sbin/ifconfig isofs loads ''/lib/modules/(kernel version here)/fs/isofs.o''. /sbin/ifconfig when run as non-root queries a network interface for its configuration. However, if the interface is unknown it also tries to load the module that implements that int...

...river should prevent opening the sound driver again while another app holds mappings open to it) But there''s a more serious problem: even though the mapping still exists, the reference count of the sound module has dropped to 0, thus allowing it to be removed either by explicit rmmod or by kerneld. The sound driver then frees the DMA buffer memory, but the application still has the mapping to that memory. But since the memory is now considered free, nothing prevents it from being reused for an arbitrary kernel data structure. That way, the application can overwrite kernel memory. I have no...

...f02e (0x60575608) 8 0x7bc5fe6d (0x605756a8) 9 0x7bc60102 (0x60575f78) 10 0x9213e075 (0x60575fc8) 11 0x9213df32 (0x60575fec) 0x7b82f581: movl 0xfffffff4(%ebp),%ecx Modules: Module Address Debug info Name (5 modules) PE 460000- 461c00 Deferred kerneld.wnt PE 60160000-60164000 Deferred advapi32 PE 60580000-60584000 Deferred msvcrt PE 7b810000-7b87c000 Export kernel32 PE 7bc10000-7bc14000 Deferred ntdll Threads: process tid prio (all id:s are in hex) 00000010 (D) c:\wi...

Many of the security problems we''ve had to deal with recently have been where one program invokes another when no good level of trust exists between them. Currently solutions to this requirement are produced on an ad-hoc basis, usually involving set-id programs (often setuid root), superuser daemons calling user programs for `upcalls'', or both. There are problems with this

As halflife demonstrated in Phrack 50 with his linspy project, it is trivial to patch any system call under Linux from within a module. This means that once your system has been compromised at the root level, it is possible for an intruder to hide completely _without_ modifying any binaries or leaving any visible backdoors behind. Because such tools are likely to be in use within the hacker

I''d like to hear some suggestions about securely administering a system remotely. Here''s the application: a project is going to scatter some server machines around the US. The server machines will be running Linux, with the only network servers being a custom application. Ignoring the separate question of physical security, how can I remotely check the system''s