Displaying 14 results from an estimated 14 matches for "kallsyms_token_t".
2007 Apr 18
1
[PATCH] lguest32 kallsyms backtrace of guest.
...be_init(void);
extern void lguest_iret(void);
+/* For back tracing from the HV */
+extern const unsigned long kallsyms_addresses[] __attribute__((weak));
+extern const unsigned long kallsyms_num_syms __attribute__((weak));
+extern const u8 kallsyms_names[] __attribute__((weak));
+extern const u8 kallsyms_token_table[] __attribute__((weak));
+extern const u16 kallsyms_token_index[] __attribute__((weak));
+extern const unsigned long kallsyms_markers[] __attribute__((weak));
+
struct lguest_data lguest_data = {
.hcall_status = { [0 ... LHCALL_RING_SIZE-1] = 0xFF },
.noirq_start = (u32)lguest_noirq_start,...
2007 Apr 18
1
[PATCH] lguest32 kallsyms backtrace of guest.
...be_init(void);
extern void lguest_iret(void);
+/* For back tracing from the HV */
+extern const unsigned long kallsyms_addresses[] __attribute__((weak));
+extern const unsigned long kallsyms_num_syms __attribute__((weak));
+extern const u8 kallsyms_names[] __attribute__((weak));
+extern const u8 kallsyms_token_table[] __attribute__((weak));
+extern const u16 kallsyms_token_index[] __attribute__((weak));
+extern const unsigned long kallsyms_markers[] __attribute__((weak));
+
struct lguest_data lguest_data = {
.hcall_status = { [0 ... LHCALL_RING_SIZE-1] = 0xFF },
.noirq_start = (u32)lguest_noirq_start,...
2017 Oct 11
0
[PATCH v1 15/27] compiler: Option to default to hidden symbols
...".rodata")));
+__attribute__((weak, section(".rodata"))) __default_visibility;
extern const unsigned long kallsyms_relative_base
-__attribute__((weak, section(".rodata")));
+__attribute__((weak, section(".rodata"))) __default_visibility;
-extern const u8 kallsyms_token_table[] __weak;
-extern const u16 kallsyms_token_index[] __weak;
+extern const u8 kallsyms_token_table[] __weak __default_visibility;
+extern const u16 kallsyms_token_index[] __weak __default_visibility;
-extern const unsigned long kallsyms_markers[] __weak;
+extern const unsigned long kallsyms_mar...
2007 Apr 18
0
[RFC/PATCH LGUEST X86_64 04/13] Useful debugging
...addresses = (unsigned long*)lhread_u64(vcpu, (u64)&data->kallsyms_addresses);
+ kstuff.num_syms = lhread_u64(vcpu, (u64)&data->kallsyms_num_syms);
+ kstuff.names = (u8*)lhread_u64(vcpu, (u64)&data->kallsyms_names);
+ kstuff.token_table = (u8*)lhread_u64(vcpu, (u64)&data->kallsyms_token_table);
+ kstuff.token_index = (u16*)lhread_u64(vcpu, (u64)&data->kallsyms_token_index);
+ kstuff.markers = (unsigned long*)lhread_u64(vcpu, (u64)&data->kallsyms_markers);
+
+ if (!kstuff.addresses || !kstuff.num_syms || !kstuff.names ||
+ !kstuff.token_table || !kstuff.token_index...
2007 Apr 18
0
[RFC/PATCH LGUEST X86_64 04/13] Useful debugging
...addresses = (unsigned long*)lhread_u64(vcpu, (u64)&data->kallsyms_addresses);
+ kstuff.num_syms = lhread_u64(vcpu, (u64)&data->kallsyms_num_syms);
+ kstuff.names = (u8*)lhread_u64(vcpu, (u64)&data->kallsyms_names);
+ kstuff.token_table = (u8*)lhread_u64(vcpu, (u64)&data->kallsyms_token_table);
+ kstuff.token_index = (u16*)lhread_u64(vcpu, (u64)&data->kallsyms_token_index);
+ kstuff.markers = (unsigned long*)lhread_u64(vcpu, (u64)&data->kallsyms_markers);
+
+ if (!kstuff.addresses || !kstuff.num_syms || !kstuff.names ||
+ !kstuff.token_table || !kstuff.token_index...
2007 Apr 18
1
[RFC/PATCH LGUEST X86_64 03/13] lguest64 core
...uct lguest_text_ptr code_stack[2];
+extern int acpi_disabled;
+extern int acpi_ht;
+
+extern const unsigned long kallsyms_addresses[] __attribute__((weak));
+extern const unsigned long kallsyms_num_syms __attribute__((weak));
+extern const u8 kallsyms_names[] __attribute__((weak));
+extern const u8 kallsyms_token_table[] __attribute__((weak));
+extern const u16 kallsyms_token_index[] __attribute__((weak));
+extern const unsigned long kallsyms_markers[] __attribute__((weak));
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(hcall_print_lock);
+#define HCALL_BUFF_SIZ 1024
+static char hcall_buff[HCALL_BUFF_SIZ];
+
+/* Set to true whe...
2007 Apr 18
1
[RFC/PATCH LGUEST X86_64 03/13] lguest64 core
...uct lguest_text_ptr code_stack[2];
+extern int acpi_disabled;
+extern int acpi_ht;
+
+extern const unsigned long kallsyms_addresses[] __attribute__((weak));
+extern const unsigned long kallsyms_num_syms __attribute__((weak));
+extern const u8 kallsyms_names[] __attribute__((weak));
+extern const u8 kallsyms_token_table[] __attribute__((weak));
+extern const u16 kallsyms_token_index[] __attribute__((weak));
+extern const unsigned long kallsyms_markers[] __attribute__((weak));
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(hcall_print_lock);
+#define HCALL_BUFF_SIZ 1024
+static char hcall_buff[HCALL_BUFF_SIZ];
+
+/* Set to true whe...
2018 Mar 13
32
[PATCH v2 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
Changes:
- patch v2:
- Adapt patch to work post KPTI and compiler changes
- Redo all performance testing with latest configs and compilers
- Simplify mov macro on PIE (MOVABS now)
- Reduce GOT footprint
- patch v1:
- Simplify ftrace implementation.
- Use gcc mstack-protector-guard-reg=%gs with PIE when possible.
- rfc v3:
- Use --emit-relocs instead of -pie to reduce
2018 Mar 13
32
[PATCH v2 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
Changes:
- patch v2:
- Adapt patch to work post KPTI and compiler changes
- Redo all performance testing with latest configs and compilers
- Simplify mov macro on PIE (MOVABS now)
- Reduce GOT footprint
- patch v1:
- Simplify ftrace implementation.
- Use gcc mstack-protector-guard-reg=%gs with PIE when possible.
- rfc v3:
- Use --emit-relocs instead of -pie to reduce
2017 Oct 04
28
x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
These patches make the changes necessary to build the kernel as Position
Independent Executable (PIE) on x86_64. A PIE kernel can be relocated below
the top 2G of the virtual address space. It allows to optionally extend the
KASLR randomization range from 1G to 3G.
Thanks a lot to Ard Biesheuvel & Kees Cook on their feedback on compiler
changes, PIE support and KASLR in general. Thanks to
2017 Oct 04
28
x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
These patches make the changes necessary to build the kernel as Position
Independent Executable (PIE) on x86_64. A PIE kernel can be relocated below
the top 2G of the virtual address space. It allows to optionally extend the
KASLR randomization range from 1G to 3G.
Thanks a lot to Ard Biesheuvel & Kees Cook on their feedback on compiler
changes, PIE support and KASLR in general. Thanks to
2018 May 23
33
[PATCH v3 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
Changes:
- patch v3:
- Update on message to describe longer term PIE goal.
- Minor change on ftrace if condition.
- Changed code using xchgq.
- patch v2:
- Adapt patch to work post KPTI and compiler changes
- Redo all performance testing with latest configs and compilers
- Simplify mov macro on PIE (MOVABS now)
- Reduce GOT footprint
- patch v1:
- Simplify ftrace
2017 Oct 11
32
[PATCH v1 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
Changes:
- patch v1:
- Simplify ftrace implementation.
- Use gcc mstack-protector-guard-reg=%gs with PIE when possible.
- rfc v3:
- Use --emit-relocs instead of -pie to reduce dynamic relocation space on
mapped memory. It also simplifies the relocation process.
- Move the start the module section next to the kernel. Remove the need for
-mcmodel=large on modules. Extends
2017 Oct 11
32
[PATCH v1 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
Changes:
- patch v1:
- Simplify ftrace implementation.
- Use gcc mstack-protector-guard-reg=%gs with PIE when possible.
- rfc v3:
- Use --emit-relocs instead of -pie to reduce dynamic relocation space on
mapped memory. It also simplifies the relocation process.
- Move the start the module section next to the kernel. Remove the need for
-mcmodel=large on modules. Extends