search for: is_priv_for

...721b2766c1 xen/arch/x86/irq.c --- a/xen/arch/x86/irq.c Wed Jan 07 11:25:00 2009 +0000 +++ b/xen/arch/x86/irq.c Thu Jan 08 18:58:36 2009 +0900 @@ -857,7 +857,7 @@ int map_domain_pirq( if ( type == MAP_PIRQ_TYPE_MSI ) return -EINVAL; - if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) ) + if ( !IS_PRIV_FOR(current->domain, d) ) return -EPERM; if ( pirq < 0 || pirq >= NR_IRQS || vector < 0 || vector >= NR_VECTORS ) @@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ int unmap_domain_pirq(struct domain *d, if ( (pirq < 0) || (pirq >= NR_IRQS) ) return -EINVAL; - if ( !IS_PRIV(c...

Hi, All Intel QA conducted a full validation for xen 4.1 rc1, it includes VT-x, VT-d, SRIOV, RAS, TXT and xl tools testing. 24 issues were exposed. Refer the bug list, please. We already assigned 14 bugs to Intel developers (which has an ''Intel'' tag in the bug title), most of the rest 10 bugs are related xl command. For the these bugs, need community''s help to fix

These two patches were originally part of the XSM series that I have posted, and remain prerequisites for that series. However, they are independent of the XSM changes and are a useful simplification regardless of the use of XSM. The Acked-bys on these patches were provided before rebasing them over the copyback changes in 26268:1b72138bddda, which had minor conflicts that I resolved. [PATCH

2011/7/19 Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>: > CC''ing Tim and xen-devel > > On Mon, 18 Jul 2011, Jiageng Yu wrote: >> 2011/7/16 Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>: >> > On Fri, 15 Jul 2011, Jiageng Yu wrote: >> >> 2011/7/15 Jiageng Yu <yujiageng734@gmail.com>: >> >> > 2011/7/15

This patch set adds XSM security labels to useful debugging output locations, and fixes some assumptions that all interrupts behaved like GSI interrupts (which had useful non-dynamic IDs). It also cleans up the policy build process and adds an example of how to use the user field in the security context. Debug output: [PATCH 01/10] xsm: Add security labels to event-channel dump [PATCH 02/10] xsm: