Displaying 20 results from an estimated 22 matches for "init_per_cpu_var".
2018 May 23
0
[PATCH v3 18/27] xen: Adapt assembly for PIE support
...P
+ _ASM_MOVABS $xen_start_info, %_ASM_AX
+ _ASM_MOV %_ASM_SI, (%_ASM_AX)
+ _ASM_MOVABS $init_thread_union+THREAD_SIZE, %_ASM_SP
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/* Set up %gs.
@@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ ENTRY(startup_xen)
* init data section till per cpu areas are set up.
*/
movl $MSR_GS_BASE,%ecx
- movq $INIT_PER_CPU_VAR(irq_stack_union),%rax
+ movabsq $INIT_PER_CPU_VAR(irq_stack_union),%rax
cdq
wrmsr
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-pvh.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-pvh.S
index e1a5fbeae08d..43e234c7c2de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-pvh.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-pvh.S
@@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ ENTRY(pvh_start_xen)
cal...
2020 May 18
2
[PATCH v3 31/75] x86/head/64: Install boot GDT
On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 05:16:41PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> @@ -480,6 +500,22 @@ SYM_DATA_LOCAL(early_gdt_descr_base, .quad INIT_PER_CPU_VAR(gdt_page))
> SYM_DATA(phys_base, .quad 0x0)
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(phys_base)
>
> +/* Boot GDT used when kernel addresses are not mapped yet */
> +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(boot_gdt_descr, .word boot_gdt_end - boot_gdt)
> +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(boot_gdt_base, .quad 0)
> +SYM_DATA_START(boot_gdt)
&g...
2020 May 18
2
[PATCH v3 31/75] x86/head/64: Install boot GDT
On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 05:16:41PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> @@ -480,6 +500,22 @@ SYM_DATA_LOCAL(early_gdt_descr_base, .quad INIT_PER_CPU_VAR(gdt_page))
> SYM_DATA(phys_base, .quad 0x0)
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(phys_base)
>
> +/* Boot GDT used when kernel addresses are not mapped yet */
> +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(boot_gdt_descr, .word boot_gdt_end - boot_gdt)
> +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(boot_gdt_base, .quad 0)
> +SYM_DATA_START(boot_gdt)
&g...
2020 Feb 11
0
[PATCH 25/62] x86/head/64: Install boot GDT
.../* GDT loaded - switch to __KERNEL_CS so IRET works reliably */
+ pushq $__KERNEL_CS
+ leaq .Lon_kernel_cs(%rip), %rax
+ pushq %rax
+ lretq
+
+.Lon_kernel_cs:
+ UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+
/* Sanitize CPU configuration */
call verify_cpu
@@ -480,6 +494,18 @@ SYM_DATA_LOCAL(early_gdt_descr_base, .quad INIT_PER_CPU_VAR(gdt_page))
SYM_DATA(phys_base, .quad 0x0)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(phys_base)
+/* Boot GDT used when kernel addresses are not mapped yet */
+SYM_DATA_LOCAL(boot_gdt_descr, .word boot_gdt_end - boot_gdt)
+SYM_DATA_LOCAL(boot_gdt_base, .quad 0)
+SYM_DATA_START(boot_gdt)
+ .quad 0
+ .quad 0x00cf9a000000f...
2020 Apr 28
0
[PATCH v3 31/75] x86/head/64: Install boot GDT
...%es
+
+ /* Now switch to __KERNEL_CS so IRET works reliably */
+ pushq $__KERNEL_CS
+ leaq .Lon_kernel_cs(%rip), %rax
+ pushq %rax
+ lretq
+
+.Lon_kernel_cs:
+ UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
+
/* Sanitize CPU configuration */
call verify_cpu
@@ -480,6 +500,22 @@ SYM_DATA_LOCAL(early_gdt_descr_base, .quad INIT_PER_CPU_VAR(gdt_page))
SYM_DATA(phys_base, .quad 0x0)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(phys_base)
+/* Boot GDT used when kernel addresses are not mapped yet */
+SYM_DATA_LOCAL(boot_gdt_descr, .word boot_gdt_end - boot_gdt)
+SYM_DATA_LOCAL(boot_gdt_base, .quad 0)
+SYM_DATA_START(boot_gdt)
+ .quad 0
+ .quad 0x00cf9a000000f...
2020 Jun 04
0
[PATCH v3 31/75] x86/head/64: Install boot GDT
On Mon, May 18, 2020 at 10:23:13AM +0200, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 05:16:41PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote:
> > @@ -480,6 +500,22 @@ SYM_DATA_LOCAL(early_gdt_descr_base, .quad INIT_PER_CPU_VAR(gdt_page))
> > SYM_DATA(phys_base, .quad 0x0)
> > EXPORT_SYMBOL(phys_base)
> >
> > +/* Boot GDT used when kernel addresses are not mapped yet */
> > +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(boot_gdt_descr, .word boot_gdt_end - boot_gdt)
> > +SYM_DATA_LOCAL(boot_gdt_base, .quad 0)
>...
2020 Sep 07
0
[PATCH v7 40/72] x86/sev-es: Setup GHCB based boot #VC handler
...ret required here - don't use INTERRUPT_RETURN */
+ iretq
+SYM_CODE_END(vc_boot_ghcb)
#endif
/* Both SMP bootup and ACPI suspend change these variables */
@@ -286,6 +317,9 @@ SYM_CODE_END(start_cpu0)
.balign 8
SYM_DATA(initial_code, .quad x86_64_start_kernel)
SYM_DATA(initial_gs, .quad INIT_PER_CPU_VAR(fixed_percpu_data))
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+SYM_DATA(initial_vc_handler, .quad handle_vc_boot_ghcb)
+#endif
/*
* The SIZEOF_PTREGS gap is a convention which helps the in-kernel unwinder
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c
index 18619279a46f..a...
2018 Mar 13
32
[PATCH v2 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
Changes:
- patch v2:
- Adapt patch to work post KPTI and compiler changes
- Redo all performance testing with latest configs and compilers
- Simplify mov macro on PIE (MOVABS now)
- Reduce GOT footprint
- patch v1:
- Simplify ftrace implementation.
- Use gcc mstack-protector-guard-reg=%gs with PIE when possible.
- rfc v3:
- Use --emit-relocs instead of -pie to reduce
2018 Mar 13
32
[PATCH v2 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
Changes:
- patch v2:
- Adapt patch to work post KPTI and compiler changes
- Redo all performance testing with latest configs and compilers
- Simplify mov macro on PIE (MOVABS now)
- Reduce GOT footprint
- patch v1:
- Simplify ftrace implementation.
- Use gcc mstack-protector-guard-reg=%gs with PIE when possible.
- rfc v3:
- Use --emit-relocs instead of -pie to reduce
2018 May 23
33
[PATCH v3 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
Changes:
- patch v3:
- Update on message to describe longer term PIE goal.
- Minor change on ftrace if condition.
- Changed code using xchgq.
- patch v2:
- Adapt patch to work post KPTI and compiler changes
- Redo all performance testing with latest configs and compilers
- Simplify mov macro on PIE (MOVABS now)
- Reduce GOT footprint
- patch v1:
- Simplify ftrace
2020 Sep 07
84
[PATCH v7 00/72] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The
previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/
I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the
discussions around it.
Another important change is that the early IDT
2020 Sep 07
84
[PATCH v7 00/72] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The
previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/
I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the
discussions around it.
Another important change is that the early IDT
2020 Feb 11
83
[RFC PATCH 00/62] Linux as SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run
under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete,
but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the
size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial
feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code
here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.
2020 Feb 11
83
[RFC PATCH 00/62] Linux as SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run
under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete,
but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the
size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial
feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code
here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.
2017 Oct 04
28
x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
These patches make the changes necessary to build the kernel as Position
Independent Executable (PIE) on x86_64. A PIE kernel can be relocated below
the top 2G of the virtual address space. It allows to optionally extend the
KASLR randomization range from 1G to 3G.
Thanks a lot to Ard Biesheuvel & Kees Cook on their feedback on compiler
changes, PIE support and KASLR in general. Thanks to
2017 Oct 04
28
x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
These patches make the changes necessary to build the kernel as Position
Independent Executable (PIE) on x86_64. A PIE kernel can be relocated below
the top 2G of the virtual address space. It allows to optionally extend the
KASLR randomization range from 1G to 3G.
Thanks a lot to Ard Biesheuvel & Kees Cook on their feedback on compiler
changes, PIE support and KASLR in general. Thanks to
2020 Apr 28
116
[PATCH v3 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES
guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes
since the last version.
What is SEV-ES
==============
SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted
State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the
register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by
2020 Apr 28
116
[PATCH v3 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES
guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes
since the last version.
What is SEV-ES
==============
SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted
State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the
register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by
2017 Oct 11
32
[PATCH v1 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
Changes:
- patch v1:
- Simplify ftrace implementation.
- Use gcc mstack-protector-guard-reg=%gs with PIE when possible.
- rfc v3:
- Use --emit-relocs instead of -pie to reduce dynamic relocation space on
mapped memory. It also simplifies the relocation process.
- Move the start the module section next to the kernel. Remove the need for
-mcmodel=large on modules. Extends
2017 Oct 11
32
[PATCH v1 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
Changes:
- patch v1:
- Simplify ftrace implementation.
- Use gcc mstack-protector-guard-reg=%gs with PIE when possible.
- rfc v3:
- Use --emit-relocs instead of -pie to reduce dynamic relocation space on
mapped memory. It also simplifies the relocation process.
- Move the start the module section next to the kernel. Remove the need for
-mcmodel=large on modules. Extends