search for: identifize

Hello Everyone, Are these indications of attacks on this system? I specifically have port 22 disabled at all times and only port forward it to server when I access SSH for a minute or so. Shouldn't UNKNOWN be an actual IP address? */var/log/secure:* May 14 00:35:39 pbx sshd[9011]: Did not receive identification string from UNKNOWN May 14 00:36:09 pbx sshd[9040]: Did not receive

>From the fedora 19 host: [root@fedora ~]# sg_inq /dev/sdc standard INQUIRY: PQual=0 Device_type=0 RMB=0 version=0x05 [SPC-3] [AERC=0] [TrmTsk=0] NormACA=0 HiSUP=0 Resp_data_format=0 SCCS=1 ACC=0 TPGS=1 3PC=0 Protect=0 [BQue=0] EncServ=0 MultiP=0 [MChngr=0] [ACKREQQ=0] Addr16=0 [RelAdr=0] WBus16=1 Sync=1 Linked=0 [TranDis=0] CmdQue=1 length=36 (0x24)

On 09/03/2015 22:36, Rowland Penny wrote: > Hmm, everything looks ok and it shouldn't matter whether you use the > standard 3.6 from debian or 4.1.17 from backports except for the fact > that 3.6 isn't just old, it is EOL , so you may have to rely on debian > backporting any security updates themselves. > > I take it that the three nameservers in the clients

I was using a Samba server under a SUNOS 5.5.1 operative system. This SUN machine was the server of a number of Lynux (Mandrake) and Windows (95,98, XP) computers in a TCP/IP network with fixed IP numbers. We were oblied to change to DHCP recently. As our network has a huge number of computers I am running the smbd and nmbd daemos of the Samba with an identification in such a way that only those

Hello, I am trying to apply the "called party identification" patch (patch 8824) and managed to make it work with a static data. Where do I take the name of the called person (the "equivalent" of CALLERID, but the other way...)? BTW, one note to the above patch: To make it work the device should have the parameter sendrpid set to true.

Package: logcheck-database Version: 1.2.45 Severity: normal Tags: patch pending confirmed My bad, sorry. --- rulefiles/linux/ignore.d.server/ssh 6 Jul 2006 10:16:41 -0000 1.18 +++ rulefiles/linux/ignore.d.server/ssh 7 Jul 2006 19:35:19 -0000 @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ ^\w{3} [ :0-9]{11} [._[:alnum:]-]+ sshd\[[0-9]+\]: refused connect from [:[:alnum:].]+ \([:[:alnum:].]+\)$ ^\w{3} [ :0-9]{11}

I'm seeing lines like the following in my security logs: Oct 14 06:56:32 srv sshd[41370]: Bad protocol version identification '\200b\001\003\001' from 24.203.221.239 From what I've read, this is a buffer overflow attack on the sshd whereby the attacker triggers the overflow before the identification string is sent then attempts commands to see if elevated priveleges were

Hi, I'm writing a little API in java that read/write ogg's comments (in the comment header), as well as reading the information header. All the "read" part is done and is working well, but I am having a little problem while coding the "write" part of the API. In the docs (I use http://www.xiph.org/ogg/vorbis/doc/Vorbis_I_spec.html#id4726648), I founded everything

I am working on a proxy which can be hosted on a single IP address and dispatch requests to different backends depending on which hostname the client used to connect to this IP address. Currently such a proxy can be build to support HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, and DNS. However SSH support is impossible due to the ssh client not sending the information such a proxy would need. I am not the first to want

Hi everybody, I've connected Asterisk 1.2.5 (libpri 1.2.2, zaptel 1.2.4, Linux 2.6.13.2) to an Avaya-Tenovis PBX via a PRI/E1-line. Calls from SIP-phones via * to the PBX work fine. However, incoming calls to * only result in: -- XXX Missing handling for mandatory IE 24 (cs0, Channel Identification) XXX -- which seems to be an * problem, because a Windows-fax-machine works fine on a PRI

Hi, How does LLVM identify induction variables of a loop? Is the algorithm based on SSA graphs? I have a complicated loop and I need to do some analysis around it. Can anyone please point me to source of identification part? -- *Disclaimer: Views, concerns, thoughts, questions, ideas expressed in this mail are of my own and my employer has no take in it. * Thank You. Madhur D. Amilkanthwar

We received a notice from our pci-dss auditors respecting this: CVE-2002-0510 The UDP implementation in Linux 2.4.x kernels keeps the IP Identification field at 0 for all non-fragmented packets, which could allow remote attackers to determine that a target system is running Linux. The NVD entry for which contains this note: CHANGE> [Cox changed vote from REVIEWING to NOOP] Cox> So I

Dear R users, I need to fit an ARMA model. As far as I've seen, EACF (extended ACF) is not available in R. 1. Let's say I fit a series of ARMA models in a loop. Given the code/output included below, how do I pull 'Model' and 'Fit' (AIC) from each summary() so that I can combine them into an array/data frame to be sorted by AIC? 2. Apart from EACF, are you aware perhaps

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=537 Summary: Identification should depend on port number Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 3.5p1 Platform: Other OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: minor Priority: P2 Component: ssh AssignedTo: openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ReportedBy:

Does * support Called Party Identification? Say for example, I dial extension 2000, SIP sends back John Doe from the sip.conf file where extension 2000 is defined? Would this violate the SIP RFC? - Brent

Hi, While creating identification header in the function * theora_encode_heade*r in *encoder_toplevel.c*, it assigns bits not mentioned in the current theora spec released on Octomber 29, 2007 (page 40 &41). But this implementation in function* theora_encode_heade*r is correct according to the *Figure 6.2 (page 42)*. But not according to the *table mentioned in pages 40 &

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1246 Summary: Protocol version identification errors don't log the sender IP anymore, always UNKNOWN Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 4.4p1 Platform: ix86 OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: minor Priority: P2 Component: sshd

On Wed, 2013-08-21 at 11:09 +0200, Paolo Bonzini wrote: > Il 21/08/2013 04:11, Timon Wang ha scritto: > > From the fedora 19 host: > > [root@fedora ~]# sg_inq /dev/sdc > > standard INQUIRY: > > PQual=0 Device_type=0 RMB=0 version=0x05 [SPC-3] > > [AERC=0] [TrmTsk=0] NormACA=0 HiSUP=0 Resp_data_format=0 > > SCCS=1 ACC=0 TPGS=1 3PC=0 Protect=0

Greetings, The Polycom SIP 1.5 Admin Guide says this: "3.1.8 Connected Party Identification Where possible, the identity of the remote party to which the user has connected is displayed and logged. The connected party identity is derived from the network signaling. In some cases the remote party will be different from the called party identity due to network call diversion."

Hello all, We got a report [1], that we miss "p1" suffix in the sshd identification strings in Fedora. I dig in and found out that it is also missing from portable usptream since 2004, when you were rewriting version.h header file with this information. Debian somehow patched this information back during the time in some places (ssh_api.c is missing). It does not look like