search for: honeypots

>>> Perhaps if there was a Asterisk RBL we could all contribute to; for >>> which we could then hook into and drop any connection where a >>> source IP is listed ? -- Thanks, Phil >>> >> >> I love the idea of a RBL... count me in for contributing. >> >> Especially considering the ridiculous response I received from >> Amazon.

Am 02.03.2015 um 18:56 schrieb Robert Schetterer: > perhaps and i mean really "perhaps" go this way > > https://sys4.de/de/blog/2014/03/27/fighting-smtp-auth-brute-force-attacks/ > > https://sys4.de/de/blog/2012/12/28/botnets-mit-rsyslog-und-iptables-recent-modul-abwehren/ > > 45K+ IPs will work in a recent table > i have them too but for smtp only like > >

The results of a security experiment were published this week, in which an Asterisk PBX was set out in the wild to see who would attack it and how: http://www.telium.ca/?honeypot1 What I find particularly interesting is that people/bots are scraping support websites looking for valid IP's of PBX's, and valid credentials! A good reminder to everyone on this list to not publish the IP

Hi All, I'm not the first to try to start a VOIP blacklist but currently working on a project for the next 12 hours, hopefully I can get it up soon. What I intend to do is to work with a few reliable Harvester to gather the logs. A simple script to parse it then extract the list of attackers IP, compile them and send them out to the list. If any of you are kind enough to zip and send me a

...t this idea? Simply setting up a fake server > with a hostname similar to a common could encourage password > harvesting. > > It would be much safer to simply avoid activating debugging tools that > can be so abused. What part of "actively supporting honeypots is a bad idea" is unclear to you, sir? This kind of built-in feature can, and will, be used by malicious people to activate passphrase theft. By activating it directly in the source code, it also makes it that much more difficult to detect when someone can and has enabled such...

after having my own dnsbl feeded by a honeypot and even mod_security supports it for webservers i think dovecot sould support the same to prevent dictionary attacks from known bad hosts, in our case that blacklist is 100% trustable and blocks before SMTP-Auth while normal RBL's are after SASL i admit that i am not a C/C++-programmer, but i think doing the DNS request and in case it has a

I have tow vectors one is the subset of another x is a subset of X Both are vectors with n elements X[X %in% x] would give me x again rite because it is a subset but i want all those are not in x from X. X[which(X != x)] should this do that Thanks Ramya -- View this message in context: http://n4.nabble.com/vector-help-tp960277p960277.html Sent from the R help mailing list archive at

Buen d?a Solo una pregunta de curiosidad, pues ya busque en Google PRD no termino de entender para que sirve en la practica normal. Que es y cual es su prop?sito de un Honeypot SSH o cualquier otro servicio??? Mario Villela Larraza Cel. 04455 12 5919 26 Tel. 56 32 8687

Also, if password-based auth is not allowed, WTF would you want to log passwords? This whole idea is ugly, and smacks of a teenage-level prank attempt. I would strongly object against any such modification of the main source (though I'm sure the maintainers are sane enough to never let such a crap in). Of course the original poster is free to hack his own copy in whatever way he wants.?

hi all I've been reading this thread with interest. As a rather novice programmer. I'm not being humble here, I really am not very good, I can do stuff, but it takes a LONG time. My spaghetti code even has meatballs in it ! Not being a great programmer I'm not really able to code something up, but it occurred to me something could be scripted, are the other posters suggesting

Hi, Given the recent increase in SIP brute force attacks, I've had a little idea. The standard scripts that block after X attempts work well to prevent you actually being compromised, but once you've been 'found' then the attempts seem to keep coming for quite some time. Older versions of sipvicious don't appear to stop once you start sending un-reachables (or straight

Dear list members, I want to extend the logging of the openssh-server, so it also logs the entered passwords in plaintext, and yes I know that this is a security issue, but relax, Password Authentication is disabled. ;) The logging is only used for collecting data on my honeypots. After digging through the source, I?ve found a file called ?auth.c" auth.c: #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed && (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 || strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 || str...

On 03/03/2015 11:03 PM, Earl Killian wrote: > On 2015/3/2 10:03, Reindl Harald wrote: >> >> that is all nice >> >> but the main benefit of RBL's is always ignored: >> >> * centralized >> * no log parsing at all >> * honeypot data are "delivered" to any host >> * it's cheap >> * it's easy to maintain >> * it

Not sure if there is an R way to do this or a regular express way, but here is what I am trying to do. I've got lots of data where the format is HH:MM:SS, but I need to format it like HH:MM:00, i.e. round the second down to zero. What is the best way to do this? Thanks again. Jason

On 2015/3/2 10:03, Reindl Harald wrote: > > that is all nice > > but the main benefit of RBL's is always ignored: > > * centralized > * no log parsing at all > * honeypot data are "delivered" to any host > * it's cheap > * it's easy to maintain > * it don't need any root privileges anywhere > > we have a small honeypot network with a

Am 04.03.2015 um 20:12 schrieb Michael Orlitzky: > On 03/03/2015 11:03 PM, Earl Killian wrote: >> On 2015/3/2 10:03, Reindl Harald wrote: >>> >>> that is all nice >>> >>> but the main benefit of RBL's is always ignored: >>> >>> * centralized >>> * no log parsing at all >>> * honeypot data are "delivered"

> Yes, I''m still working on it. The focus of that work was copy-on-write > sharing of memory for the purposes of building a (virtual) network of > honeypot systems. We have a paper in SOSP this year, talking about that > work and the copy-on-write memory implementation. See > http://www.cs.ucsd.edu/~mvrable/papers/2005-sosp-potemkin.pdf > for some information.

I got the data working, but now I got another problem with KSVM: line search fails -2.793708 -0.5831701 1.870406e-05 -5.728611e-06 -5.059796e-08 -3.761822e-08 -7.308871e-13Error in prob.model(object)[[p]]$A : $ operator is invalid for atomic vectors On Tue, Jul 7, 2009 at 6:45 PM, Steve Lianoglou<mailinglist.honeypot at gmail.com> wrote: > Hi, > > On Jul 7, 2009, at 6:44 PM,

Most of you have needed at one time or another to sniff network traffic for trouble shooting purposes. Today I noticed that one of my SIP phone's web interface worked much faster with Opera, so I wanted to see what exactly was going on. I set up Wireshark and toook a look, but I got distracted by the fact that I saw a bunch of strange things coming from "FreeboxS_nn". I know my

On 05/17/2018 11:38 AM, Frank Vanoni wrote: > On Thu, 2018-05-17 at 11:18 -0400, sean darcy wrote: > >> 3. How do I set up the server to block these ? >> >> 4. Can I stop the retransmitting of the 401 Unauthorized packets ? > > I'm happy with Fail2Ban protecting my Asterisk 13. Here is my > configuration: > > in /etc/asterisk/logger.conf: > >