Displaying 20 results from an estimated 35 matches for "has_error_cod".
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has_error_code
2017 May 19
0
[PATCH 03/10] xen: move interrupt handling for pv guests under CONFIG_XEN_PV umbrella
...entry_64.S
index 607d72c4a485..cd47214ff402 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -902,7 +902,7 @@ ENTRY(do_softirq_own_stack)
ret
END(do_softirq_own_stack)
-#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
idtentry xen_hypervisor_callback xen_do_hypervisor_callback has_error_code=0
/*
@@ -983,7 +983,9 @@ ENTRY(xen_failsafe_callback)
ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER
jmp error_exit
END(xen_failsafe_callback)
+#endif /* CONFIG_XEN_PV */
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
apicinterrupt3 HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR \
xen_hvm_callback_vector xen_evtchn_do_upcall
@@ -998,7 +1000,7 @@ idtentry...
2020 Apr 24
3
[PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace
...ion intercept set
potentially needs to be able to tolerate a #VC? Those instruction
intercepts are under the control of the (untrusted relative to the
guest) hypervisor, right?
>From the main sev-es series:
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+idtentry vmm_communication do_vmm_communication has_error_code=1
+#endif
Since this is set as non-paranoid, that both limits the instructions
that can be used in entry paths *and* limits the future architecture
from being able add instructions that a current SEV-ES guest doesn't
know about. Does SEV-ES have versioning so guests can tell if they
might be...
2020 Apr 24
3
[PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace
...ion intercept set
potentially needs to be able to tolerate a #VC? Those instruction
intercepts are under the control of the (untrusted relative to the
guest) hypervisor, right?
>From the main sev-es series:
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+idtentry vmm_communication do_vmm_communication has_error_code=1
+#endif
Since this is set as non-paranoid, that both limits the instructions
that can be used in entry paths *and* limits the future architecture
from being able add instructions that a current SEV-ES guest doesn't
know about. Does SEV-ES have versioning so guests can tell if they
might be...
2020 Jul 21
0
[PATCH v9 29/84] KVM: x86: export kvm_inject_pending_exception()
...ic void update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kvm_x86_ops.update_cr8_intercept(vcpu, tpr, max_irr);
}
+bool kvm_inject_pending_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (vcpu->arch.exception.pending) {
+ trace_kvm_inj_exception(vcpu->arch.exception.nr,
+ vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code,
+ vcpu->arch.exception.error_code);
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.exception.injected);
+ vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
+ vcpu->arch.exception.injected = true;
+
+ if (exception_type(vcpu->arch.exception.nr) == EXCPT_FAULT)
+ __kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, kvm_get_rflags(vcp...
2020 Apr 28
0
[PATCH v3 47/75] x86/sev-es: Add Runtime #VC Exception Handler
...+++++-
4 files changed, 180 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 0e9504fabe52..4c392eb2f063 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1210,6 +1210,10 @@ idtentry async_page_fault do_async_page_fault has_error_code=1 read_cr2=1
idtentry machine_check do_mce has_error_code=0 paranoid=1
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+idtentry vmm_communication do_vmm_communication has_error_code=1 paranoid=1 shift_ist=IST_INDEX_VC ist_offset=VC_STACK_OFFSET
+#endif
+
/*
* Save all registers in pt_regs, and sw...
2020 Feb 07
0
[RFC PATCH v7 28/78] KVM: x86: export kvm_inject_pending_exception()
...oid update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
kvm_x86_ops->update_cr8_intercept(vcpu, tpr, max_irr);
}
+void kvm_inject_pending_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ if (vcpu->arch.exception.pending) {
+ trace_kvm_inj_exception(vcpu->arch.exception.nr,
+ vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code,
+ vcpu->arch.exception.error_code);
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->arch.exception.injected);
+ vcpu->arch.exception.pending = false;
+ vcpu->arch.exception.injected = true;
+
+ if (exception_type(vcpu->arch.exception.nr) == EXCPT_FAULT)
+ __kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, kvm_get_rflags(vcp...
2020 Apr 25
0
[PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace
...to be able to tolerate a #VC? Those instruction
> intercepts are under the control of the (untrusted relative to the
> guest) hypervisor, right?
>
> >From the main sev-es series:
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> +idtentry vmm_communication do_vmm_communication has_error_code=1
> +#endif
The next version of the patch-set (which I will hopefully have ready
next week) will have this changed. The #VC exception handler uses an IST
stack and is set to paranoid=1 and shift_ist. The IST stacks for the #VC
handler are only allocated when SEV-ES is active.
> That's...
2020 Apr 24
2
[PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace
On 4/24/20 2:03 PM, Mike Stunes wrote:
> I needed to allow RDTSC(P) from userspace and in early boot in order to
> get userspace started properly. Patch below.
>
> ---
> SEV-ES guests will need to execute rdtsc and rdtscp from userspace and
> during early boot. Move the rdtsc(p) #VC handler into common code and
> extend the #VC handlers.
Do SEV-ES guests _always_ #VC on
2020 Apr 24
2
[PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace
On 4/24/20 2:03 PM, Mike Stunes wrote:
> I needed to allow RDTSC(P) from userspace and in early boot in order to
> get userspace started properly. Patch below.
>
> ---
> SEV-ES guests will need to execute rdtsc and rdtscp from userspace and
> during early boot. Move the rdtsc(p) #VC handler into common code and
> extend the #VC handlers.
Do SEV-ES guests _always_ #VC on
2020 Apr 25
2
[PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace
...hose instruction
> > intercepts are under the control of the (untrusted relative to the
> > guest) hypervisor, right?
> >
> > >From the main sev-es series:
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> > +idtentry vmm_communication do_vmm_communication has_error_code=1
> > +#endif
>
> The next version of the patch-set (which I will hopefully have ready
> next week) will have this changed. The #VC exception handler uses an IST
> stack and is set to paranoid=1 and shift_ist. The IST stacks for the #VC
> handler are only allocated when SEV-ES...
2020 Apr 25
2
[PATCH] Allow RDTSC and RDTSCP from userspace
...hose instruction
> > intercepts are under the control of the (untrusted relative to the
> > guest) hypervisor, right?
> >
> > >From the main sev-es series:
> >
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
> > +idtentry vmm_communication do_vmm_communication has_error_code=1
> > +#endif
>
> The next version of the patch-set (which I will hopefully have ready
> next week) will have this changed. The #VC exception handler uses an IST
> stack and is set to paranoid=1 and shift_ist. The IST stacks for the #VC
> handler are only allocated when SEV-ES...
2020 Aug 24
0
[PATCH v6 48/76] x86/entry/64: Add entry code for #VC handler
...stack. The current stack is either
+ * identical to the stack in the IRET frame or the VC fall-back stack,
+ * so it is definitly mapped even with PTI enabled.
+ */
+ jmp paranoid_exit
+
+ /* Switch to the regular task stack */
+.Lfrom_usermode_switch_stack_\@:
+ idtentry_body safe_stack_\cfunc, has_error_code=1
+
+_ASM_NOKPROBE(\asmsym)
+SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym)
+.endm
+
/*
* Double fault entry. Straight paranoid. No checks from which context
* this comes because for the espfix induced #DF this would do the wrong
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
index 337...
2017 May 19
13
[PATCH 00/10] paravirt: make amount of paravirtualization configurable
Today paravirtualization is a all-or-nothing game: either a kernel is
compiled with no paravirtualization support at all, or it is supporting
paravirtualized environments like Xen pv-guests or lguest additionally
to some paravirtualized tuning for KVM, Hyperv, VMWare or Xen
HVM-guests.
As support of pv-guests requires quite intrusive pv-hooks (e.g. all
access functions to page table entries,
2017 May 19
13
[PATCH 00/10] paravirt: make amount of paravirtualization configurable
Today paravirtualization is a all-or-nothing game: either a kernel is
compiled with no paravirtualization support at all, or it is supporting
paravirtualized environments like Xen pv-guests or lguest additionally
to some paravirtualized tuning for KVM, Hyperv, VMWare or Xen
HVM-guests.
As support of pv-guests requires quite intrusive pv-hooks (e.g. all
access functions to page table entries,
2020 Feb 11
83
[RFC PATCH 00/62] Linux as SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run
under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete,
but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the
size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial
feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code
here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.
2020 Feb 11
83
[RFC PATCH 00/62] Linux as SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run
under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete,
but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the
size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial
feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code
here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.
2019 Aug 09
117
[RFC PATCH v6 00/92] VM introspection
The KVM introspection subsystem provides a facility for applications running
on the host or in a separate VM, to control the execution of other VM-s
(pause, resume, shutdown), query the state of the vCPUs (GPRs, MSRs etc.),
alter the page access bits in the shadow page tables (only for the hardware
backed ones, eg. Intel's EPT) and receive notifications when events of
interest have taken place
2019 Aug 09
117
[RFC PATCH v6 00/92] VM introspection
The KVM introspection subsystem provides a facility for applications running
on the host or in a separate VM, to control the execution of other VM-s
(pause, resume, shutdown), query the state of the vCPUs (GPRs, MSRs etc.),
alter the page access bits in the shadow page tables (only for the hardware
backed ones, eg. Intel's EPT) and receive notifications when events of
interest have taken place
2018 Mar 13
32
[PATCH v2 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
Changes:
- patch v2:
- Adapt patch to work post KPTI and compiler changes
- Redo all performance testing with latest configs and compilers
- Simplify mov macro on PIE (MOVABS now)
- Reduce GOT footprint
- patch v1:
- Simplify ftrace implementation.
- Use gcc mstack-protector-guard-reg=%gs with PIE when possible.
- rfc v3:
- Use --emit-relocs instead of -pie to reduce
2018 Mar 13
32
[PATCH v2 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
Changes:
- patch v2:
- Adapt patch to work post KPTI and compiler changes
- Redo all performance testing with latest configs and compilers
- Simplify mov macro on PIE (MOVABS now)
- Reduce GOT footprint
- patch v1:
- Simplify ftrace implementation.
- Use gcc mstack-protector-guard-reg=%gs with PIE when possible.
- rfc v3:
- Use --emit-relocs instead of -pie to reduce