search for: ghcb_set_rdx

...struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt) > +{ > + phys_addr_t monitor_pa; > + pgd_t *pgd; > + > + pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa()); > + monitor_pa = vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt->regs->ax); > + > + ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, monitor_pa); > + ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->cx); > + ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->dx); > + > + return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MONITOR, 0, 0); Why? If SVM has the same behavior as VMX, the MONITOR will be disarmed on VM-Enter, i.e. the VMM can't do anything useful for MONITOR/MWAIT. I assume that's the case given that KVM...

...struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt) > +{ > + phys_addr_t monitor_pa; > + pgd_t *pgd; > + > + pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa()); > + monitor_pa = vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt->regs->ax); > + > + ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, monitor_pa); > + ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->cx); > + ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->dx); > + > + return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MONITOR, 0, 0); Why? If SVM has the same behavior as VMX, the MONITOR will be disarmed on VM-Enter, i.e. the VMM can't do anything useful for MONITOR/MWAIT. I assume that's the case given that KVM...

...t; + pgd_t *pgd; > > > + > > > + pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa()); > > > + monitor_pa = vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt->regs->ax); > > > + > > > + ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, monitor_pa); > > > + ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->cx); > > > + ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->dx); > > > + > > > + return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MONITOR, 0, 0); > > > > Why? If SVM has the same behavior as VMX, the MONITOR will be disarmed on > > VM-Enter, i.e. the VMM can't do anything useful for MONITOR/MW...

...t; + pgd_t *pgd; > > > + > > > + pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa()); > > > + monitor_pa = vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt->regs->ax); > > > + > > > + ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, monitor_pa); > > > + ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->cx); > > > + ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->dx); > > > + > > > + return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MONITOR, 0, 0); > > > > Why? If SVM has the same behavior as VMX, the MONITOR will be disarmed on > > VM-Enter, i.e. the VMM can't do anything useful for MONITOR/MW...

...lt handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt) +{ + struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs; + enum es_result ret; + bool write; + u64 exit_info_1; + + write = (ctxt->insn.opcode.bytes[1] == 0x30); + + ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx); + if (write) { + ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, regs->ax); + ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, regs->dx); + exit_info_1 = 1; + } else { + exit_info_1 = 0; + } + + ret = ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MSR, exit_info_1, 0); + if (ret != ES_OK) + return ret; + else if (!write) { + regs->ax = ghcb->save.rax; + regs->dx = ghcb->save.rdx; + } + + return ret; +} + /*...

...es_result vc_handle_monitor(struct ghcb *ghcb, + struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt) +{ + phys_addr_t monitor_pa; + pgd_t *pgd; + + pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa()); + monitor_pa = vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt->regs->ax); + + ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, monitor_pa); + ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->cx); + ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->dx); + + return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MONITOR, 0, 0); +} + static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, struct ghcb *ghcb, unsigned long exit_code) @@ -860,6 +876,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_exitcode(struct es_e...

...dle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt) +{ + struct pt_regs *regs = ctxt->regs; + enum es_result ret; + u64 exit_info_1; + + exit_info_1 = (ctxt->insn.opcode.bytes[1] == 0x30) ? 1 : 0; + + ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx); + if (exit_info_1) { + ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, regs->ax); + ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, regs->dx); + exit_info_1 = 1; + } + + ret = sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MSR, exit_info_1, 0); + + if ((ret == ES_OK) && (!exit_info_1)) { + regs->ax = ghcb->save.rax; + regs->dx = ghcb->save.rdx; + } + + return ret; +} + /* * This function runs on the...

...0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +static void vmware_sev_es_hcall_prepare(struct ghcb *ghcb, + struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + /* Copy VMWARE specific Hypercall parameters to the GHCB */ + ghcb_set_rip(ghcb, regs->ip); + ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, regs->bx); + ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx); + ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, regs->dx); + ghcb_set_rsi(ghcb, regs->si); + ghcb_set_rdi(ghcb, regs->di); + ghcb_set_rbp(ghcb, regs->bp); +} + +static bool vmware_sev_es_hcall_finish(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + if (!(ghcb_is_valid_rbx(ghcb) && + ghcb_is_valid_rcx(ghcb) &&...

...; + phys_addr_t monitor_pa; > > + pgd_t *pgd; > > + > > + pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa()); > > + monitor_pa = vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt->regs->ax); > > + > > + ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, monitor_pa); > > + ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->cx); > > + ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->dx); > > + > > + return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MONITOR, 0, 0); > > Why? If SVM has the same behavior as VMX, the MONITOR will be disarmed on > VM-Enter, i.e. the VMM can't do anything useful for MONITOR/MWAIT. I > assume that&...

...d; >>>> + >>>> + pgd = __va(read_cr3_pa()); >>>> + monitor_pa = vc_slow_virt_to_phys(ghcb, ctxt->regs->ax); >>>> + >>>> + ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, monitor_pa); >>>> + ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->cx); >>>> + ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, ctxt->regs->dx); >>>> + >>>> + return sev_es_ghcb_hv_call(ghcb, ctxt, SVM_EXIT_MONITOR, 0, 0); >>> >>> Why? If SVM has the same behavior as VMX, the MONITOR will be disarmed on >>> VM-Enter, i.e. the VMM can't do anything useful fo...

Hi, here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete, but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.

Hi, here is the first public post of the patch-set to enable Linux to run under SEV-ES enabled hypervisors. The code is mostly feature-complete, but there are still a couple of bugs to fix. Nevertheless, given the size of the patch-set, I think it is about time to ask for initial feedback of the changes that come with it. To better understand the code here is a quick explanation of SEV-ES first.

Hi, here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes since the last version. What is SEV-ES ============== SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by

Hi, here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes since the last version. What is SEV-ES ============== SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a rebased version of the latest SEV-ES patches. They are now based on latest tip/master instead of upstream Linux and include the necessary changes. Changes to v4 are in particular: - Moved early IDT setup code to idt.c, because the idt_descr and the idt_table are now static - This required to make stack protector work early (or

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and rebased the code v5.8-rc5. The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the #VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big pile of entry code changes merged into

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and rebased the code v5.8-rc5. The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the #VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big pile of entry code changes merged into

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the new version of the SEV-ES client enabling patch-set. It is based on the latest tip/master branch and contains the necessary changes. In particular those ar: - Enabling CR4.FSGSBASE early on supported processors so that early #VC exceptions on APs can be handled. - Add another patch (patch 1) to fix a KVM frame-size build

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/ I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the discussions around it. Another important change is that the early IDT

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/ I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the discussions around it. Another important change is that the early IDT