search for: ghcb_activ

.../* Reserve on page per CPU as backup storage for the unencrypted GHCB */ + struct ghcb backup_ghcb; + + /* + * Mark the per-cpu GHCBs as in-use to detect nested #VC exceptions. + * There is no need for it to be atomic, because nothing is written to + * the GHCB between the read and the write of ghcb_active. So it is safe + * to use it when a nested #VC exception happens before the write. + */ + bool ghcb_active; + bool backup_ghcb_active; }; static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_es_runtime_data*, runtime_data); +struct ghcb_state { + struct ghcb *ghcb; +}; + /* * Shift/Unshift the IST entry fo...

...t ghcb backup_ghcb; I could use some text explaining what those backups are for? > + /* > + * Mark the per-cpu GHCBs as in-use to detect nested #VC exceptions. > + * There is no need for it to be atomic, because nothing is written to > + * the GHCB between the read and the write of ghcb_active. So it is safe > + * to use it when a nested #VC exception happens before the write. > + */ Looks liks that is that text... support for nested #VC exceptions. I'm sure this has come up already but why do we even want to support nested #VCs? IOW, can we do without them first or are the...

...t ghcb backup_ghcb; I could use some text explaining what those backups are for? > + /* > + * Mark the per-cpu GHCBs as in-use to detect nested #VC exceptions. > + * There is no need for it to be atomic, because nothing is written to > + * the GHCB between the read and the write of ghcb_active. So it is safe > + * to use it when a nested #VC exception happens before the write. > + */ Looks liks that is that text... support for nested #VC exceptions. I'm sure this has come up already but why do we even want to support nested #VCs? IOW, can we do without them first or are the...

...On Tue, Apr 28, 2020 at 05:16:57PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote: > > + /* > > + * Mark the per-cpu GHCBs as in-use to detect nested #VC exceptions. > > + * There is no need for it to be atomic, because nothing is written to > > + * the GHCB between the read and the write of ghcb_active. So it is safe > > + * to use it when a nested #VC exception happens before the write. > > + */ > > Looks liks that is that text... support for nested #VC exceptions. > I'm sure this has come up already but why do we even want to support > nested #VCs? IOW, can we do...

...0 at 05:16:57PM +0200, Joerg Roedel wrote: > > > + /* > > > + * Mark the per-cpu GHCBs as in-use to detect nested #VC exceptions. > > > + * There is no need for it to be atomic, because nothing is written to > > > + * the GHCB between the read and the write of ghcb_active. So it is safe > > > + * to use it when a nested #VC exception happens before the write. > > > + */ > > > > Looks liks that is that text... support for nested #VC exceptions. > > I'm sure this has come up already but why do we even want to support > &g...

...e <asm/traps.h> #include <asm/svm.h> +#define DR7_RESET_VALUE 0x400 + /* For early boot hypervisor communication in SEV-ES enabled guests */ static struct ghcb boot_ghcb_page __bss_decrypted __aligned(PAGE_SIZE); @@ -61,6 +63,13 @@ struct sev_es_runtime_data { */ bool ghcb_active; bool backup_ghcb_active; + + /* + * Cached DR7 value - write it on DR7 writes and return it on reads. + * That value will never make it to the real hardware DR7 as debugging + * is currently unsupported in SEV-ES guests. + */ + unsigned long dr7; }; static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_es_r...

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a rebased version of the latest SEV-ES patches. They are now based on latest tip/master instead of upstream Linux and include the necessary changes. Changes to v4 are in particular: - Moved early IDT setup code to idt.c, because the idt_descr and the idt_table are now static - This required to make stack protector work early (or

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and rebased the code v5.8-rc5. The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the #VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big pile of entry code changes merged into

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and rebased the code v5.8-rc5. The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the #VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big pile of entry code changes merged into

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is the new version of the SEV-ES client enabling patch-set. It is based on the latest tip/master branch and contains the necessary changes. In particular those ar: - Enabling CR4.FSGSBASE early on supported processors so that early #VC exceptions on APs can be handled. - Add another patch (patch 1) to fix a KVM frame-size build

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/ I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the discussions around it. Another important change is that the early IDT

From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de> Hi, here is a new version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches for x86. The previous versions can be found as a linked list starting here: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200824085511.7553-1-joro at 8bytes.org/ I updated the patch-set based on ther review comments I got and the discussions around it. Another important change is that the early IDT

Hi, here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes since the last version. What is SEV-ES ============== SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by

Hi, here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes since the last version. What is SEV-ES ============== SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by