search for: gfn

The following two patches are about how to speed up in xenpaging when page in pages. On suse11-64 with 4G memory,if we page out 2G pages,it will cost about 15.5 seconds, but take 2088 seconds to finish paging in.If page-in costs too much time,it will cause unmesurable problems when vm or dom0 access the paged_out page,such as BSOD,crash. What鈥檚 more,the dom0 is always in high I/O pressure.

ging_prep ensures that an mfn is backing the paged-out gfn, and transitions to the next state in the paging state machine for this page. Foreign mappings of the gfn will now succeed. This is the key idea, as it allows the pager to now map the gfn and fill in its contents. Unfortunately, it also allows any other foreign mapper to map the gfn and read its...

.../drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_map.c 2009-01-30 08:43:35.000000000 +0100 +++ 2009-01-27/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_map.c 2009-01-30 08:46:29.000000000 +0100 @@ -461,8 +461,8 @@ int amd_iommu_map_page(struct domain *d, iommu_l2e = iommu_l2e_from_pfn(hd->root_table, hd->paging_mode, gfn); if ( iommu_l2e == 0 ) { - amd_iov_error("Invalid IO pagetable entry gfn = %lx\n", gfn); spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hd->mapping_lock, flags); + amd_iov_error("Invalid IO pagetable entry gfn = %lx\n", gfn); return -EFAULT; }...

-- Advanced Micro Devices GmbH Sitz: Dornach, Gemeinde Aschheim, Landkreis München Registergericht München, HRB Nr. 43632 WEEE-Reg-Nr: DE 12919551 Geschäftsführer: Alberto Bozzo, Andrew Bowd _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

The following two patches allow the parallel use of memsharing, xenpaging and xen-access by using an independent ring buffer for each feature. Please review. v2: - update mem_event_check_ring arguments, check domain rather than domain_id - check ring_full first because its value was just evaluated - check if ring buffer is initialized before calling mem_access_domctl/mem_paging_domctl

Hi Jan, Attached patch dumps io page fault flags. The flags show the reason of the fault and tell us if this is an unmapped interrupt fault or a DMA fault. Thanks, Wei signed-off-by: Wei Wang <wei.wang2@amd.com> _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xen.org http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel

...ed to be be able to access kvm memory slot and + * have track of the number of current PTE when doing shadow PTE walk + */ +struct kvm_write_access_data { + int i; + struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot; +}; + /* * the pages used as guest page table on soft mmu are tracked by * kvm_memory_slot.arch.gfn_track which is 16 bits, so the role bits used @@ -1130,7 +1139,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(u64 user_mask, u64 accessed_mask, u64 acc_track_mask, u64 me_mask); void kvm_mmu_reset_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); -void kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(struct kvm *kvm, +void kvm_mmu_slot_appl...

...vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa, gva_t gva); void kvm_page_track_flush_slot(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot); #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h index 444bb9c54548..e2c0518af750 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h @@ -222,6 +222,10 @@ void kvm_mmu_gfn_disallow_lpage(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn); void kvm_mmu_gfn_allow_lpage(struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, gfn_t gfn); bool kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_write_protect(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_memory_slot *slot, u64 gfn); +bool kvm_mmu_slot_gfn_read_protect(struct kvm *kvm, + struct...

...;guest_paging_levels, ri->extra_words * 4); dump_unexpected_and_exit(ri); @@ -7086,7 +7086,7 @@ printf(" %s set_p2m_entry d%d o%d g %llx m %llx\n", ri->dump_header, r->d, r->order, - r->gfn, r->mfn); + (unsigned long long)r->gfn, (unsigned long long)r->mfn); } } @@ -7104,7 +7104,7 @@ printf(" %s pod_populate d%d o%d g %llx m %llx\n", ri->dump_header, r->d, r->order, - r->gfn, r-...

...00000e0000 - 0000000000100000 (reserved) BIOS-e820: 0000000000100000 - 00000000f0000000 (usable) BIOS-e820: 00000000fc000000 - 0000000100000000 (reserved) BIOS-e820: 0000000100000000 - 000000030f000000 (usable) I see that the highest usable gpa is over 12GB due to the reserved slots and the max gfn is 30f000. If I use xc_domain_getinfolist() and look at max_pages, it returns 300100 which correctly reflects 12GB. But is there a way for me to find out the max gfn that is reflected in the guest using libxc? Thanks, AP

...rate: SSL_connect returned=1 errno=0 state=SSLv3 read server session ticket A: tlsv1 alert unknown ca err: /File[/var/lib/puppet/lib]: Could not evaluate: SSL_connect returned=1 errno=0 state=SSLv3 read server session ticket A: tlsv1 alert unknown ca Could not retrieve file metadata for puppet://gfn-puppetmaster/plugins: SSL_connect returned=1 errno=0 state=SSLv3 read server session ticket A: tlsv1 alert unknown ca err: Could not retrieve catalog from remote server: SSL_connect returned=1 errno=0 state=SSLv3 read server session ticket A: tlsv1 alert unknown ca warning: Not using cache on fa...

...000000 (XEN) [2013-07-17 19:10:12] HVM17: pci dev 02:0 bar 10 size 002000000: 0f0000008 (XEN) [2013-07-17 19:10:12] HVM17: pci dev 03:0 bar 14 size 001000000: 0f2000008 (XEN) [2013-07-17 19:10:12] HVM17: pci dev 06:0 bar 10 size 000200000: 0f3000004 (XEN) [2013-07-17 19:10:12] memory_map:add: dom17 gfn=f3000 mfn=f9a00 nr=200 (XEN) [2013-07-17 19:10:12] HVM17: pci dev 04:0 bar 10 size 000020000: 0f3200000 (XEN) [2013-07-17 19:10:12] HVM17: pci dev 04:0 bar 30 size 000020000: 0f3220000 (XEN) [2013-07-17 19:10:12] HVM17: pci dev 02:0 bar 30 size 000010000: 0f3240000 (XEN) [2013-07-17 19:10:12] HVM17...

...ram--; + } + /* for other ram types */ else if ( steal_for_cache && p2m_is_ram(t) ) { struct page_info *page; 2) fix the race between POD and xenpaging situation can be described as the follow xenpaging POD mfn = gfn_to_mfn() mfn = gfn_to_mfn() check p2m type check p2mt p2m_lock change p2m type p2m_unlock add to pod list p2m_lock() change p2m type p2m_unlock put_pa...

...the pages are being monitored: xc_hvm_set_mem_access(xch, domain_id, HVMMEM_access_rx, ~0ull, 0); xc_hvm_set_mem_access(xch, domain_id, HVMMEM_access_rx, 0, xenaccess->domain_info->max_pages); Then, after an event is received: xc_hvm_set_mem_access(xch, domain_id, HVMMEM_access_rwx, req.gfn, 1); thus allowing ''rwx'' access to 1 page starting at req.gfn. This strategy indeed allows me to inspect writes to any page of the guest OS, however I can only do this once per page. Once the page is allowed HVMMEM_access_rwx access, any subsequent writes to it become unavail...

This patch series is based on the VM introspection patches (https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20200721210922.7646-1-alazar at bitdefender.com/), extending the introspection API with EPT Views and Virtualization Exceptions (#VE) support. The purpose of this series is to get an initial feedback and to see if we are on the right track, especially because the changes made to add the EPT views are not small

...re also kept in a radix tree in order to filter out the #PF events which are of no interest to the introspection tool. The access restrictions for pages that are not visible to the guest are silently ignored by default (the tool might set restrictions for the whole memory, based on KVMI_VM_GET_MAX_GFN). Signed-off-by: Mihai Don?u <mdontu at bitdefender.com> Co-developed-by: Adalbert Laz?r <alazar at bitdefender.com> Signed-off-by: Adalbert Laz?r <alazar at bitdefender.com> --- Documentation/virt/kvm/kvmi.rst | 60 ++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h...

Here is change log from V3 To V4: - Fixing spelling/grammar mistakes suggested by Randy Dunlap - Changing the hypercall interface to be able to process multiple pages per one hypercall also suggested by Randy Dunlap. It turns out that this will save lots of vmexist/memory slot flushes when protecting many pages. [PATCH RFC V4 1/3] KVM: X86: Memory ROE documentation [PATCH RFC V4 2/3] KVM:

...a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c > index 65b6acba82da..fd64cf1115da 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c > @@ -2660,6 +2660,9 @@ static void clear_sp_write_flooding_count(u64 *spte) > static unsigned int kvm_mmu_page_track_acc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, > unsigned int acc) > { > + if (!kvmi_tracked_gfn(vcpu, gfn)) > + return acc; > + > if (kvm_page_track_is_active(vcpu, gfn, KVM_PAGE_TRACK_PREREAD)) > acc &= ~ACC_USER_MASK; > if (kvm_page_track_is_active(vcpu, gfn, KVM_PAGE_TRACK_PREWRITE) || &g...

Dear All: I am pretty new to xen-devel, please correct me in the following. Assume we have the following terms GPT: guest page table SPT: shadow page table (Question a) When guest OS is running, is it always using SPT for address translation? If it is the case, how does guest OS refer and modify its own GPT content? It seems that there is a page table entry in SPT for the GPT page. (Question

...ed to be be able to access kvm memory slot and + * have track of the number of current PTE when doing shadow PTE walk + */ +struct kvm_write_access_data { + int i; + struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot; +}; + /* * the pages used as guest page table on soft mmu are tracked by * kvm_memory_slot.arch.gfn_track which is 16 bits, so the role bits used @@ -1130,7 +1139,7 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(u64 user_mask, u64 accessed_mask, u64 acc_track_mask, u64 me_mask); void kvm_mmu_reset_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu); -void kvm_mmu_slot_remove_write_access(struct kvm *kvm, +void kvm_mmu_slot_appl...