search for: getpwnamallow

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1710 Summary: aix_setauthdb/aix_restoredb are not called in getpwnamallow() causing permanently_set_uid() to fail Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.3p1 Platform: PPC OS/Version: AIX Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.or...

I find it annoying that openssh takes active part in the authentication process when using PAM. Namely, SSH doesn't pass the user's password if the getpwent for the user returns NULL. I use a clever PAM setup that allows nonexisting users to log in if they are succesfully authenticated against a Samba server. When the user logs in for the first time, he's added to the user database

...Platform: Other OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: PAM support AssignedTo: bitbucket at mindrot.org ReportedBy: openbsd at priv.de If the sshd gets no entry for the user trying to login with getpwnamallow, or if it is not allowed to login, pam is still consulted to authenticate. This is done for hiding if the user exists or not, to hide if the password is right and to hide if he is only blocked in config and the password was right (pam would not delay if the password was right). The call of pam req...

...n attempt by an unknown user (eg via telnet) normally gets logged as: syslog: pts/4: failed login attempt for UNKNOWN_USER from my.host.com This is generated by a call to loginfailed(), which substitutes UNKNOWN_HOST for the username if it doesn't exist. AIX never finds out about it because getpwnamallow returns as soon as it finds no passwd entry. Following patch calls loginfailed before returning. It generates: syslog: ssh: failed login attempt for UNKNOWN_USER from my.host.com ------- You are receiving this mail because: ------- You are the assignee for the bug, or are watching the assigne...

Hello all, I have a question about the design of the privilege separation aspect of openSSH. From what I understand, the interface between the privileged process and the unprivileged one is implemented as a set of well-defined operations with only a small subset of these operations enabled at any given time. These operations are enabled and disabled depending on the task at hand. What I am

...es "#010#012#015#177INCORRECT" as the password (and discards the password entered by the user) to the libpam_sqlite module. Then obviously the libpam_sqlite3 denies access to the user because the password is incorrect! When looked into the OpenSSH code, I found that getpwnam() in auth.c::getpwnamallow() sets pw = NULL and so the following message appears! debug3: mm_answer_pwnamallow: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: 0 Invalid user XXXXXX from A.B.C.D Now, to the questions: 1. Why does OpenSSH replaces the password entered by the user with the bad password - "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT" wh...

...#39;: auth.c:403: warning: passing arg 2 of `loginfailed' discards qualifiers from pointer target type auth.c:403: too few arguments to function `loginfailed' auth.c: In function `expand_filename': auth.c:481: warning: implicit declaration of function `snprintf' auth.c: In function `getpwnamallow': auth.c:630: warning: passing arg 1 of `loginfailed' discards qualifiers from pointer target type auth.c:630: warning: passing arg 2 of `loginfailed' discards qualifiers from pointer target type auth.c:630: too few arguments to function `loginfailed' auth.c: In function `auth_debug...

...e fakepw() routine is called to create the user credentials (and, of course, I'll need to modify this to point to my captive acct that I want to use). In auth2.c, there is code to start the PAM authentication in this fakepw case which all seems to make sense: authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user)); if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) { authctxt->valid = 1; #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt->pw->pw_name)); #endif } else { a...

...ave a conversation with the (illegal) user (in order to get the password) sshd throws out the authentication context. Is this necessary? Or is it just that no one in their right mind ought to be trying to do this anyway? If I have done my homework correctly: - a user is "illegal" if getpwnamallow says so - this will happen, in particular, if getpwnam returns NULL - an "illegal" user results in a non-valid authctxt - MUCH later, when the PAM auth module is running, it calls back into the sshd function input_userauth_info_response as part of the attempt to get a password from...

...pam_user; + + if (pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, + (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user) != PAM_SUCCESS) + return PAM_AUTH_ERR; + + if (strcmp(authctxt->user, pam_user)) { + char *user = strdup(pam_user); + struct passwd *pw; + + if (!user) + return PAM_AUTH_ERR; + + if (!(pw = getpwnamallow(user))) { + free(user); + return PAM_AUTH_ERR; + } + + free(authctxt->pw); + authctxt->pw = pw; + free(authctxt->user); + authctxt->user = user; + } + return PAM_SUCCESS; +} + +/* * Conversation function for authentication thread. */ static int @@ -469,6 +502,10 @@ if (s...

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2245 Bug ID: 2245 Summary: Multiple USER_LOGIN messages when linux audit support is enabled on bad login Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.6p1 Hardware: Other OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P5

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2358 Bug ID: 2358 Summary: allow sshd to "redirect" to another local user Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.7p1 Hardware: All OS: All Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: sshd Assignee:

Hi All. For various reasons, we're currently looking at extending (or even overhauling) the config parser used for sshd_config. Right now the syntax I'm looking at is a cumulative "Match" keyword that matches when all of the specified criteria are met. This would be similar the the Host directive used in ssh_config, although it's still limiting (eg you can't easily

Hi, I'm in the position of having to support a fix for a bad interaction between sshd and winbind/Active Directory. It's solved by a small patch against openssh, but it would be nice to have the solution generally available. The problem has previously been described on this list by Andreas Schneider, see: https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-dev/2019-February/037556.html

...;, - buf); - break; - } - /* - * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, - * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too - */ - if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) - break; - } - return 0; -} - struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user) { === modified file 'auth.h' --- auth.h 2007-07-30 09:54:36 +0000 +++ auth.h 2007-08-02 12:02:24 +0000 @@ -166,8 +166,6 @@ char *authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *); char *authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *); -int -secure_filename(FILE *, const char *, struct pa...

Windows usernames are case-insensitive and almost any Unicode character is allowed in a username. The user should be able to login with her username given in any case and not be refused. However, this opens up a security problem in terms of the sshd_config Match rules. The match rules for user and group names have to operate case-insensitive as well, otherwise the user can override her settings

Hi all, After the memory leaks (bug 1967 <https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1967>) I reported in bugzilla are fixed, I also applied melton(http://lcs.ios.ac.cn/~xuzb/melton.html) to detect the potential bugs in sshd (openssh-5.9p1). The url below is the index of bug reports that are checked as real bugs manually.

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=938 Summary: "AllowGroups" option and secondary user's groups limit Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 3.9p1 Platform: ix86 OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: major Priority: P2 Component: PAM support AssignedTo: openssh-bugs at

...44 in copy_set_server_options (dst=0x7f75aec0 <options>, src=0xbecbf3a8, preauth=0) at servconf.c:2546 #10 0x7f66a418 in parse_server_match_config (options=0x7f75aec0 <options>, includes=0x7f759050 <includes>, connectinfo=0x7f759b10 <ci>) at servconf.c:2428 #11 0x7f6721ac in getpwnamallow (ssh=0x7fff8a88, user=0x7ffeeab0 "root") at auth.c:575 #12 0x7f688d34 in mm_answer_pwnamallow (ssh=0x7fff8a88, sock=6, m=0x7fffa1e8) at monitor.c:732 #13 0x7f687f40 in monitor_read (ssh=0x7fff8a88, pmonitor=0x7ffef670, ent=0x7f759644 <mon_dispatch_proto20+24>, pent=0xbecc0648) at mo...

...#39;\0'; +#endif + if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) *style++ = '\0'; authctxt->user = user; authctxt->style = style; +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX + authctxt->role = role; +#endif /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */ if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL) diff -u --new-file --recursive openssh-3.9p1_vanilla/auth2.c openssh-3.9p1_selinux/auth2.c --- openssh-3.9p1_vanilla/auth2.c 2004-08-12 14:40:25.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh-3.9p1_selinux/auth2.c 2004-09-07 18:06:25.000000000 +0200 @@ -133,6 +133,9 @@ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;...