search for: footgun

Displaying 13 results from an estimated 13 matches for "footgun".

2023 May 29
1
command [argument ...] in ssh(1): a footgun
raf wrote: > Not knowing the details of each user's login shell is > precisely the reason that ssh couldn't ever do the > quoting itself. The footgun is unrelated to shells. The SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST protocol message for "exec" (RFC 4254) channels which are used to run a single remote command contains exactly one string for the command. sshd (see bottom of do_child() in session.c) runs that command string as: remote_users_shell -c...
2023 May 29
1
command [argument ...] in ssh(1): a footgun
On Mon, May 29, 2023 at 06:35:34PM +0000, Peter Stuge <peter at stuge.se> wrote: > raf wrote: > > Not knowing the details of each user's login shell is > > precisely the reason that ssh couldn't ever do the > > quoting itself. > > The footgun is unrelated to shells. > > The SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST protocol message for "exec" (RFC 4254) > channels which are used to run a single remote command contains > exactly one string for the command. > > sshd (see bottom of do_child() in session.c) runs that command str...
2023 May 27
1
command [argument ...] in ssh(1): a footgun
On 27/05/2023 01:45, Thorsten Glaser wrote: >> ssh user at host "ls -l a\ b" > This one, incidentally, sends 'ls -l a b' to the remote shell. > ssh user at host "ls -l a\\ b" > has the effect you want; the first backslash is eaten by the > local shell. > Or is it? $ echo "ls -l a\ b" ls -l a\ b $ This is with bash 5.2.15. From the
2023 May 26
1
command [argument ...] in ssh(1): a footgun
Hi, ssh(1) currently affords an argument-passing functionality, but as the manpage states, all arguments are simply concatenated by space. This behavior is non-obvious for those reading only the synopsis: one would expect something that takes argv input to somehow preserve the argument boundary and not, say, let a semicolon ruin all the fun. This is probably old news for all of you. I have
2023 May 30
1
command [argument ...] in ssh(1): a footgun
On 27.05.23 00:08, Thorsten Glaser wrote: > On Fri, 26 May 2023, Mingye Wang (Artoria2e5) wrote: >> The less modest one is we throw out the "[argument ...]" part altogether. It > > Absolutely not. This will break about all uses of ssh in existence. You are confusing "ssh(1) does (not) distinguish between 'command' and 'argument(s)'" with
2023 May 27
2
command [argument ...] in ssh(1): a footgun
On Sat, May 27, 2023 at 12:08:43AM +0200, Thorsten Glaser <t.glaser at tarent.de> wrote: > On Fri, 26 May 2023, Mingye Wang (Artoria2e5) wrote: > > > ssh(1) currently affords an argument-passing functionality, but as the manpage > > states, all arguments are simply concatenated by space. > > How else would it do that? The arguments are processed by the > shell
2023 May 26
1
command [argument ...] in ssh(1): a footgun
On Fri, 26 May 2023, Mingye Wang (Artoria2e5) wrote: > ssh(1) currently affords an argument-passing functionality, but as the manpage > states, all arguments are simply concatenated by space. How else would it do that? The arguments are processed by the shell first then passed as an array of NUL-terminated strings. > The modest proposal is that we put a giant CAVEATS section in the
2023 May 28
1
command [argument ...] in ssh(1): a footgun
On Sat, May 27, 2023 at 02:45:34AM +0200, Thorsten Glaser <t.glaser at tarent.de> wrote: > On Sat, 27 May 2023, raf wrote: > > >So, perhaps this could be added to the existing > >sentence/paragraph: > > > > "so any spaces in individual arguments must be > > Must they? No, a single space will do just fine. They do if you want the receiving shell
2023 May 27
2
command [argument ...] in ssh(1): a footgun
On Sat, 27 May 2023, raf wrote: >So, perhaps this could be added to the existing >sentence/paragraph: > > "so any spaces in individual arguments must be Must they? No, a single space will do just fine. > quoted using the syntax of the destination > user's login shell". ? keeping in mind the source shell?s quoting as well. >If an example were needed,
2024 Jan 26
3
[Bug 3660] New: Prevent disastrous unintended local copying
https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3660 Bug ID: 3660 Summary: Prevent disastrous unintended local copying Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 9.6p1 Hardware: Other OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: scp Assignee: unassigned-bugs at
2020 Aug 30
3
Proposal to remove MMX support.
...lues, then you, the *programmer* are required to call _mm_empty() before using any x87 floating point instructions or leaving the function. I was aware that this was required at the assembly-level, but not that the compiler forced users to deal with this when using intrinsics. This is a real nasty footgun -- if you get this wrong, your program doesn't crash -- no, that would be too easy! Instead, every x87 instruction will simply result in a NaN value. Even more unfortunately than all that, it is currently impossible to correctly use _mm_empty() to resolve the problem, because the compiler has...
2020 Aug 31
2
Proposal to remove MMX support.
...t; required to call _mm_empty() before using any x87 floating point > instructions or leaving the function. I was aware that this was required at > the assembly-level, but not that the compiler forced users to deal with > this when using intrinsics. > > > > This is a real nasty footgun -- if you get this wrong, your program > doesn't crash -- no, that would be too easy! Instead, every x87 instruction > will simply result in a NaN value. > > > > Even more unfortunately than all that, it is currently impossible to > correctly use _mm_empty() to resolve the...
2013 Mar 22
52
[Bug 2081] New: extend the parameters to the AuthorizedKeysCommand
https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2081 Bug ID: 2081 Summary: extend the parameters to the AuthorizedKeysCommand Classification: Unclassified Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.2p1 Hardware: All OS: All Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: sshd