search for: fix_btmap_end

Displaying 9 results from an estimated 9 matches for "fix_btmap_end".

[PATCH, experimental] i386 Allow the fixmap to be relocated at boot time
2007 Apr 18
1
[PATCH, experimental] i386 Allow the fixmap to be relocated at boot time
This most curious patch allows the fixmap on i386 to be unfixed. The = result is that we can create a dynamically sizable hole at the top of = kernel linear address space. I know at least some virtualization = developers are interested in being able to achieve this to achieve = run-time sizing of a hole in which a hypervisor can live, or at least to = test out the performance
[PATCH, experimental] i386 Allow the fixmap to be relocated at boot time
2007 Apr 18
1
[PATCH, experimental] i386 Allow the fixmap to be relocated at boot time
This most curious patch allows the fixmap on i386 to be unfixed. The = result is that we can create a dynamically sizable hole at the top of = kernel linear address space. I know at least some virtualization = developers are interested in being able to achieve this to achieve = run-time sizing of a hole in which a hypervisor can live, or at least to = test out the performance
[PATCH v3] x86: use a read-only IDT alias on all CPUs
2013 Apr 10
1
[PATCH v3] x86: use a read-only IDT alias on all CPUs
...any external CPU state: */ cpu_init(); diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c index 6afbb2c..8bc4dec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c @@ -2039,9 +2039,7 @@ static void xen_set_fixmap(unsigned idx, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot) switch (idx) { case FIX_BTMAP_END ... FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN: -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG - case FIX_F00F_IDT: -#endif + case FIX_RO_IDT: #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 case FIX_WP_TEST: case FIX_VDSO: -- 1.7.9.5 -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
[PATCH v3] x86: use a read-only IDT alias on all CPUs
2013 Apr 10
1
[PATCH v3] x86: use a read-only IDT alias on all CPUs
...any external CPU state: */ cpu_init(); diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c index 6afbb2c..8bc4dec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c @@ -2039,9 +2039,7 @@ static void xen_set_fixmap(unsigned idx, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot) switch (idx) { case FIX_BTMAP_END ... FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN: -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG - case FIX_F00F_IDT: -#endif + case FIX_RO_IDT: #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 case FIX_WP_TEST: case FIX_VDSO: -- 1.7.9.5 -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
[PATCH 8/8] 2.6.17: scan DMI early
2007 Feb 14
2
[PATCH 8/8] 2.6.17: scan DMI early
...0000000 +0100 @@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ enum fixed_addresses { #define NR_FIX_ISAMAPS 256 FIX_ISAMAP_END, FIX_ISAMAP_BEGIN = FIX_ISAMAP_END + NR_FIX_ISAMAPS - 1, + __end_of_permanent_fixed_addresses, + /* temporary boot-time mappings, used before ioremap() is functional */ +#define NR_FIX_BTMAPS 16 + FIX_BTMAP_END = __end_of_permanent_fixed_addresses, + FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN = FIX_BTMAP_END + NR_FIX_BTMAPS - 1, __end_of_fixed_addresses }; _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
[PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only
2013 Apr 08
3
[PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only
...any external CPU state: */ cpu_init(); diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c index 6afbb2c..8bc4dec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c @@ -2039,9 +2039,7 @@ static void xen_set_fixmap(unsigned idx, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot) switch (idx) { case FIX_BTMAP_END ... FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN: -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG - case FIX_F00F_IDT: -#endif + case FIX_RO_IDT: #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 case FIX_WP_TEST: case FIX_VDSO: -- 1.7.9.5 -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
[PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only
2013 Apr 08
3
[PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only
...any external CPU state: */ cpu_init(); diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c index 6afbb2c..8bc4dec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c @@ -2039,9 +2039,7 @@ static void xen_set_fixmap(unsigned idx, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot) switch (idx) { case FIX_BTMAP_END ... FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN: -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG - case FIX_F00F_IDT: -#endif + case FIX_RO_IDT: #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 case FIX_WP_TEST: case FIX_VDSO: -- 1.7.9.5 -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
[PATCH v2] x86: use fixed read-only IDT
2013 Apr 09
2
[PATCH v2] x86: use fixed read-only IDT
...any external CPU state: */ cpu_init(); diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c index 6afbb2c..8bc4dec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c @@ -2039,9 +2039,7 @@ static void xen_set_fixmap(unsigned idx, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot) switch (idx) { case FIX_BTMAP_END ... FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN: -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG - case FIX_F00F_IDT: -#endif + case FIX_RO_IDT: #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 case FIX_WP_TEST: case FIX_VDSO: -- 1.7.9.5 -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
[PATCH v2] x86: use fixed read-only IDT
2013 Apr 09
2
[PATCH v2] x86: use fixed read-only IDT
...any external CPU state: */ cpu_init(); diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c index 6afbb2c..8bc4dec 100644 --- a/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/xen/mmu.c @@ -2039,9 +2039,7 @@ static void xen_set_fixmap(unsigned idx, phys_addr_t phys, pgprot_t prot) switch (idx) { case FIX_BTMAP_END ... FIX_BTMAP_BEGIN: -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG - case FIX_F00F_IDT: -#endif + case FIX_RO_IDT: #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32 case FIX_WP_TEST: case FIX_VDSO: -- 1.7.9.5 -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security