Displaying 3 results from an estimated 3 matches for "fd2deeb1".
2019 Oct 03
2
Re: [nbdkit PATCH 3/4] server: Close backends if a filter's .open fails
$ ./nbdkit -s memory 1M < fuzzing/testcase_dir/newstyle-cflags
NBDMAGICIHAVEOPTnbdkit: plugins.c:274: plugin_close: Assertion `connection_get_handle (conn, 0)' failed.
Aborted (core dumped)
git bisect implicates this patch:
2f80ce1209d5898cb9a567c0b29e7736ff4d03eb is the first bad commit
Rich.
--
Richard Jones, Virtualization Group, Red Hat http://people.redhat.com/~rjones
Read my
2019 Sep 23
0
Re: [PATCH nbdkit] server: public: Add nbdkit_parse_* functions for safely parsing integers.
...dkit_parse_ssize_t is not used. nbdkit_parse_size_t is used for a
> single case, ‘xz-max-depth’ which is genuinely an array length, so
> size_t is (albeit marginally) useful here.
It's also an array length where a misconfigured input can cause the
filter to be non-functional; see commit fd2deeb1 where I abused it to
intentionally cause calloc() failure to prove what happens when a filter
.open() fails. Do we really need that much flexibility, or can we get
away with stating that the max depth has to fit within 32 bits, even if
it does populate an array length later? (Here, I'm not as...
2019 Sep 23
2
Re: [PATCH nbdkit] server: public: Add nbdkit_parse_* functions for safely parsing integers.
On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 12:05:11PM -0500, Eric Blake wrote:
> > + int nbdkit_parse_long (const char *what, const char *str, long *r);
> > + int nbdkit_parse_unsigned_long (const char *what,
> > + const char *str, unsigned long *r);
>
> Do we really want to encourage the use of parse_long and
> parse_unsigned_long? Those differ between