search for: exfiltrates

On 02/04/2015 02:08 PM, Lamar Owen wrote: > > 3.) Attacker uses a large graphics card's GPU power, harnessed with > CUDA or similar, to run millions of bruteforce attempts per second on > the exfiltrated /etc/shadow, on their computer (not yours). > 4.) After a few hours, attacker has your password (or at least a > password that hashes to the same value as your password),

...r connecting to your system only once. Now, there are the slow bruteforcers running out there, but those are not the droids this change is looking for. By being 'encouraged' to have a difficult to bruteforce password from the very first, you have better security even when the attacker exfiltrates /etc/shadow or other password hash table (I say 'when' and not 'if' here). And the bar for what qualifies as a secure password (from the point of view that the attacker has your hashed password in hand and is bruteforcing on their equipment) is continually rising as compute pow...

On Thu, 26 Oct 2017, James Bottomley wrote: > Engine keys are keys whose file format is understood by a specific > engine rather than by openssl itself. Since these keys are file > based, the pkcs11 interface isn't appropriate for them because they > don't actually represent tokens. What sort of keys do you have in mind here that can't be represented via PKCS#11? -d

On 2018-04-04T17:27, mlrx <openssh-unix-dev at 18informatique.com> wrote: > Le 04/04/2018 ? 13:32, Jan Bergner a ?crit?: > > Good day! > > > > Is it possible to achieve this without nasty workarounds like wrapper > > scripts monitoring the very-verbose output of SSH or doing DPI? > > Alternatively, would it be possible to add a config option, allowing an

On Thu, 2 Nov 2017, James Bottomley wrote: > On Fri, 2017-11-03 at 13:11 +1100, Damien Miller wrote: > > On Thu, 26 Oct 2017, James Bottomley wrote: > > > > > > > > Engine keys are keys whose file format is understood by a specific > > > engine rather than by openssl itself.??Since these keys are file > > > based, the pkcs11 interface isn't

On Wed, February 4, 2015 16:55, Warren Young wrote: >> On Feb 4, 2015, at 12:16 PM, Lamar Owen <lowen at pari.edu> wrote: >> >> Again, the real bruteforce danger is when your /etc/shadow is >> exfiltrated by a security vulnerability > > Unless you have misconfigured your system, anyone who can copy > /etc/shadow already has root privileges. They do not need

On Apr 4 13:58, Nico Kadel-Garcia wrote: > On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 11:43 AM, Alexander Wuerstlein > <snalwuer at cip.informatik.uni-erlangen.de> wrote: > > On 2018-04-04T17:27, mlrx <openssh-unix-dev at 18informatique.com> wrote: > >> Le 04/04/2018 ? 13:32, Jan Bergner a ?crit : > >> > Good day! > >> > > >> > Is it possible to

> On Feb 4, 2015, at 12:16 PM, Lamar Owen <lowen at pari.edu> wrote: > > Again, the real bruteforce danger is when your /etc/shadow is exfiltrated by a security vulnerability Unless you have misconfigured your system, anyone who can copy /etc/shadow already has root privileges. They don?t need to crack your passwords now. You?re already boned.

On Thu, February 5, 2015 9:06 am, James B. Byrne wrote: > > On Wed, February 4, 2015 16:55, Warren Young wrote: >>> On Feb 4, 2015, at 12:16 PM, Lamar Owen <lowen at pari.edu> wrote: >>> >>> Again, the real bruteforce danger is when your /etc/shadow is >>> exfiltrated by a security vulnerability >> >> Unless you have misconfigured your

On 02/11/2015 09:27 AM, James B. Byrne wrote: > PDFs are known vectors for malware. They have been exploited in the > past and no doubt will be exploited in the future. ... > That said, I readily admit that the risk posed by this particular > example is low. But, it is not zero. As an example, I found and downloaded a spec sheet several years back for a ADVA FSP-II upstream

On Feb 9, 2017, at 2:03 PM, Leonard den Ottolander <leonard at den.ottolander.nl> wrote: > > On Thu, 2017-02-02 at 13:40 -0800, Gordon Messmer wrote: >> Escalation *requires* attacking a program in a security context other >> than your own. > > Not necessarily. Suppose the adversary is aware of a root > exploit/privilege escalation in a random library. There

Portable OpenSSH 5.8p2 has just been released. It will be available from the mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/ shortly. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol version 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support of the project, especially those who contributed code or

On Wed, 2015-02-04 at 14:55 -0700, Warren Young wrote: > > On Feb 4, 2015, at 12:16 PM, Lamar Owen <lowen at pari.edu> wrote: > > > > Again, the real bruteforce danger is when your /etc/shadow is exfiltrated by a security vulnerability > > Unless you have misconfigured your system, anyone who can copy /etc/shadow already has root privileges. They don?t need to

On Thu, June 16, 2016 14:23, Valeri Galtsev wrote: > > On Thu, June 16, 2016 1:09 pm, Gordon Messmer wrote: >> >> I doubt that most users check the dates on SSL certificates, >> unless they are familiar enough with TLS to understand that >> a shorter validity period is better for security. > > Oh, this is what he meant: Cert validity period. Though I agree >

> > If you feel like it, you could write a VFS module that adds better support > for > this on FreeBSD, but what is the use case? > I've noticed in online forums that occasionally home NAS users will for various reasons have streams_xattr enabled and receive 'access denied' errors when trying to write files with large alternate datastreams. These are typically on media

On Fri, Jul 3, 2020 at 12:34 PM Catangiu, Adrian Costin <acatan at amazon.com> wrote: > Cryptographic libraries carry pseudo random number generators to > quickly provide randomness when needed. If such a random pool gets > cloned, secrets may get revealed, as the same random number may get > used multiple times. For fork, this was fixed using the WIPEONFORK > madvise flag

On Thu, 2017-02-02 at 13:40 -0800, Gordon Messmer wrote: > Escalation *requires* attacking a program in a security context other > than your own. Not necessarily. Suppose the adversary is aware of a root exploit/privilege escalation in a random library. Then the heap spraying allows this attacker to easily trigger this exploit because he is able to initialize the entire contents of the

Good day! A few weeks ago, we had a security breach in the company I'm working for, because employees used "ssh -R" to expose systems from our internal network to some SSH server in the outer world. Of course, this is a breach of our internal security policy, but lead us to wonder, whether there is a technical solution to prevent our users from creating SSH-reverse-tunnels. After

Hi! > Cryptographic libraries carry pseudo random number generators to > quickly provide randomness when needed. If such a random pool gets > cloned, secrets may get revealed, as the same random number may get > used multiple times. For fork, this was fixed using the WIPEONFORK > madvise flag [1]. > Unfortunately, the same problem surfaces when a virtual machine gets >

Hi! > Cryptographic libraries carry pseudo random number generators to > quickly provide randomness when needed. If such a random pool gets > cloned, secrets may get revealed, as the same random number may get > used multiple times. For fork, this was fixed using the WIPEONFORK > madvise flag [1]. > Unfortunately, the same problem surfaces when a virtual machine gets >