search for: escalate

On Thu, 2017-02-02 at 12:18 -0800, Gordon Messmer wrote: > I apologize if my intent was unclear. I was providing you with the text > that you should use in your bug report. I am not explaining the problem > to you, I am showing you a clear way to explain the problem in the bug > report. You should use the appropriate parts of the text I provided, > and basically nothing else.

Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2013-007 Product Asterisk Summary Asterisk Manager User Dialplan Permission Escalation Nature of Advisory Permission Escalation Susceptibility Remote Authenticated Sessions Severity Minor

Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2013-007 Product Asterisk Summary Asterisk Manager User Dialplan Permission Escalation Nature of Advisory Permission Escalation Susceptibility Remote Authenticated Sessions Severity Minor

On Thu, 2017-02-02 at 13:40 -0800, Gordon Messmer wrote: > Escalation *requires* attacking a program in a security context other > than your own. Not necessarily. Suppose the adversary is aware of a root exploit/privilege escalation in a random library. Then the heap spraying allows this attacker to easily trigger this exploit because he is able to initialize the entire contents of the

Source: xen Version: 4.1.2-2 Severity: critical Tags: security Justification: allows PV domains to escape into the dom0 context Hi, I realize you're most likely pretty well aware of that problem already, but Debian's Xen versions are vulnerable to a PV privilege escalation [1]. The issue is tracked as CVE-2012-0217 and public as of today. Therefore I am filing this bug for coordination

...ectly. Escalation *requires* attacking a program in a security context other than your own. If you have a SUID binary, you can initiate the execution of code which operates in the security context of the user to which it is SUID. If you can cause it to execute arbitrary code, then you've escalated your privileges by gaining a new security context. You might also escalate privileges by attacking a daemon that runs in a different security context. If you can cause it to execute arbitrary code, you have your security rights plus whatever rights the daemon has. That's an escalation....

Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2014-018 Product Asterisk Summary AMI permission escalation through DB dialplan function Nature of Advisory Permission Escalation Susceptibility Remote

Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2014-018 Product Asterisk Summary AMI permission escalation through DB dialplan function Nature of Advisory Permission Escalation Susceptibility Remote

Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2014-017 Product Asterisk Summary Permission escalation through ConfBridge actions/dialplan functions Nature of Advisory Permission Escalation Susceptibility Remote

Asterisk Project Security Advisory - AST-2014-017 Product Asterisk Summary Permission escalation through ConfBridge actions/dialplan functions Nature of Advisory Permission Escalation Susceptibility Remote

https://bugzilla.netfilter.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1467 Bug ID: 1467 Summary: [sets] support adaptive (escalating) rule(s) Product: nftables Version: unspecified Hardware: All OS: All Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: nft Assignee: pablo at netfilter.org

...user permissions to read shadow. > > The concept in play here is privilege escalation. > > An exploit may not give you all that root can do, but may be limited > to, say, tricking the system to change file permission. > From there an attacker could use that and other exploits to escalate privileges. How could file permission modification of /etc/shadow be used to "escalate privileges" ? Thanks. -- Regards, Paul. England, EU. Je suis Charlie.

hey.. I talked to my sysadmins about getting access to the dtrace_kernel role, and they said they were hesitant to give this out because they thought it was a security risk - ie: that you could use it for privilege escalation. How true is this? Is there a way to make it user safe? If not, why is it offered as an option for regular users? Thanks much, Ed -- This message posted from

Hello everyone, The bugpoint is changed to escalate remote client return status 255 (per discussion - Re: [llvm-commits] [llvm] r75665 - /llvm/trunk/tools/bugpoint/ToolRunner.cpp) Please find the patch attached. -Viktor -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: ToolRunner.diff Type: application/octet-stre...

Howdy, have working realtime queues using queue_members looking something like; queuea|Local/101@context|0 queuea|Local/102@context|1 queuea|Local/103@context|10 Regardless of what strategy is used in the queues (roundrobin,rrmemory,ringall etc) it wont escalate on NOANSWER Asterisk SVN-branch-1.2-r33841 Any clues are appreciated! /Danny

Hi, I am running Nagios on CentOS release 5.5 (Final). Any clue about the below warning? Please let me know if any one needs any additional information. /usr/sbin/nagios -v /etc/nagios/nagios.cfg Nagios 2.12 Copyright (c) 1999-2007 Ethan Galstad (http://www.nagios.org) Last Modified: 05-19-2008 License: GPL Reading configuration data... Running pre-flight check on configuration data...

Package: xen-unstable Severity: grave Tags: security patch Hi, the following CVE (Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures) id was published for xen-unstable. CVE-2008-0928[0]: | Qemu 0.9.1 and earlier does not perform range checks for block device | read or write requests, which allows guest host users with root | privileges to access arbitrary memory and escape the virtual machine. If you fix

The following kernel has been built while waiting for upstream to release a new kernel that addresses CVE-2013-2224: http://people.centos.org/hughesjr/c6kernel/2.6.32-358.11.1.el6.cve20132224/ Please see this upstream bug for details: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=979936 ========================= Note: This kernel has been minimally tested and is provided as is for people who

xen-4.4.2-2, available from the virt6-testing repository, includes the fix for this issue. Note that Xen actually does attempt to disable the floppy disk for HVM domains by default, but due to a bug in qemu, the floppy disk only partially disabled; enough functionality to exploit this bug remains. This should be available from the normal xen4 repositories sometime this afternoon. -George

Affected product: Dovecot IMAP Server Internal reference: DOV-5320 Vulnerability type: Improper Access Control (CWE-284) Vulnerable version: 2.2 Vulnerable component: submission Report confidence: Confirmed Solution status: Fixed in main Researcher credits: Julian Brook (julezman) Vendor notification: 2022-05-06 CVE reference: CVE-2022-30550 CVSS: 6.8