search for: err_dma_area

...ev); > - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > - } > + if (!io_priv) > + goto err_priv; > + io_priv->dma_area = dma_alloc_coherent(&sch->dev, > + sizeof(*io_priv->dma_area), > + &io_priv->dma_area_dma, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!io_priv->dma_area) > + goto err_dma_area; > set_io_private(sch, io_priv); > cdev = io_subchannel_create_ccwdev(sch); > if (IS_ERR(cdev)) { > put_device(&sch->dev); > + dma_free_coherent(&sch->dev, sizeof(*io_priv->dma_area), > + io_priv->dma_area, io_priv->dma_area_dma); > kfre...

...ev); > - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > - } > + if (!io_priv) > + goto err_priv; > + io_priv->dma_area = dma_alloc_coherent(&sch->dev, > + sizeof(*io_priv->dma_area), > + &io_priv->dma_area_dma, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!io_priv->dma_area) > + goto err_dma_area; > set_io_private(sch, io_priv); > cdev = io_subchannel_create_ccwdev(sch); > if (IS_ERR(cdev)) { > put_device(&sch->dev); > + dma_free_coherent(&sch->dev, sizeof(*io_priv->dma_area), > + io_priv->dma_area, io_priv->dma_area_dma); > kfre...

...if (!io_priv) > >> + goto err_priv; > >> + io_priv->dma_area = dma_alloc_coherent(&sch->dev, > >> + sizeof(*io_priv->dma_area), > >> + &io_priv->dma_area_dma, GFP_KERNEL); > >> + if (!io_priv->dma_area) > >> + goto err_dma_area; > >> set_io_private(sch, io_priv); > >> cdev = io_subchannel_create_ccwdev(sch); > >> if (IS_ERR(cdev)) { > >> put_device(&sch->dev); > >> + dma_free_coherent(&sch->dev, sizeof(*io_priv->dma_area), > >> + io_...

...MEM); >> - } >> + if (!io_priv) >> + goto err_priv; >> + io_priv->dma_area = dma_alloc_coherent(&sch->dev, >> + sizeof(*io_priv->dma_area), >> + &io_priv->dma_area_dma, GFP_KERNEL); >> + if (!io_priv->dma_area) >> + goto err_dma_area; >> set_io_private(sch, io_priv); >> cdev = io_subchannel_create_ccwdev(sch); >> if (IS_ERR(cdev)) { >> put_device(&sch->dev); >> + dma_free_coherent(&sch->dev, sizeof(*io_priv->dma_area), >> + io_priv->dma_area, io_priv-&gt...

...device interacts in any way with the memory encryption interface? [Does basic recognition work if you start a protected virt guest with a 3270 console? I realize that the console is unlikely to work, but that should at least exercise this code path.] > + if (!io_priv->dma_area) > + goto err_dma_area; > set_io_private(sch, io_priv); > cdev = io_subchannel_create_ccwdev(sch); > if (IS_ERR(cdev)) { > put_device(&sch->dev); > + dma_free_coherent(&sch->dev, sizeof(*io_priv->dma_area), > + io_priv->dma_area, io_priv->dma_area_dma); > kfre...

...device interacts in any way with the memory encryption interface? [Does basic recognition work if you start a protected virt guest with a 3270 console? I realize that the console is unlikely to work, but that should at least exercise this code path.] > + if (!io_priv->dma_area) > + goto err_dma_area; > set_io_private(sch, io_priv); > cdev = io_subchannel_create_ccwdev(sch); > if (IS_ERR(cdev)) { > put_device(&sch->dev); > + dma_free_coherent(&sch->dev, sizeof(*io_priv->dma_area), > + io_priv->dma_area, io_priv->dma_area_dma); > kfre...

...e) > + goto err_priv; > + cdev->dev.coherent_dma_mask = sch->dev.coherent_dma_mask; > + cdev->dev.dma_mask = &cdev->dev.coherent_dma_mask; > + dma_pool = cio_gp_dma_create(&cdev->dev, 1); This can return NULL. gen_pool_alloc will panic in this case. [...] > +err_dma_area: > + kfree(io_priv); Indentation. > +err_priv: > + put_device(&sch->dev); > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > } [...] > void ccw_device_update_sense_data(struct ccw_device *cdev) > { > memset(&cdev->id, 0, sizeof(cdev->id)); > - cdev->id.cu_type =...

...->dev.coherent_dma_mask; + dma_pool = cio_gp_dma_create(&cdev->dev, 1); + cdev->private->dma_pool = dma_pool; + cdev->private->dma_area = cio_gp_dma_zalloc(dma_pool, &cdev->dev, + sizeof(*cdev->private->dma_area)); + if (!cdev->private->dma_area) + goto err_dma_area; + return cdev; +err_dma_area: + cio_gp_dma_destroy(dma_pool, &cdev->dev); + kfree(cdev->private); +err_priv: kfree(cdev); +err_cdev: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } @@ -884,7 +904,7 @@ io_subchannel_recog_done(struct ccw_device *cdev) wake_up(&ccw_device_init_wq); break; c...

...->dev.coherent_dma_mask; + dma_pool = cio_gp_dma_create(&cdev->dev, 1); + cdev->private->dma_pool = dma_pool; + cdev->private->dma_area = cio_gp_dma_zalloc(dma_pool, &cdev->dev, + sizeof(*cdev->private->dma_area)); + if (!cdev->private->dma_area) + goto err_dma_area; + return cdev; +err_dma_area: + cio_gp_dma_destroy(dma_pool, &cdev->dev); + kfree(cdev->private); +err_priv: kfree(cdev); +err_cdev: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } @@ -884,7 +903,7 @@ io_subchannel_recog_done(struct ccw_device *cdev) wake_up(&ccw_device_init_wq); break; c...

...= cio_gp_dma_create(&cdev->dev, 1); + if (!dma_pool) + goto err_dma_pool; + cdev->private->dma_pool = dma_pool; + cdev->private->dma_area = cio_gp_dma_zalloc(dma_pool, &cdev->dev, + sizeof(*cdev->private->dma_area)); + if (!cdev->private->dma_area) + goto err_dma_area; + return cdev; +err_dma_area: + cio_gp_dma_destroy(dma_pool, &cdev->dev); +err_dma_pool: + kfree(cdev->private); +err_priv: kfree(cdev); +err_cdev: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } @@ -884,7 +906,7 @@ io_subchannel_recog_done(struct ccw_device *cdev) wake_up(&ccw_device_init_wq)...

...= cio_gp_dma_create(&cdev->dev, 1); + if (!dma_pool) + goto err_dma_pool; + cdev->private->dma_pool = dma_pool; + cdev->private->dma_area = cio_gp_dma_zalloc(dma_pool, &cdev->dev, + sizeof(*cdev->private->dma_area)); + if (!cdev->private->dma_area) + goto err_dma_area; + return cdev; +err_dma_area: + cio_gp_dma_destroy(dma_pool, &cdev->dev); +err_dma_pool: + kfree(cdev->private); +err_priv: kfree(cdev); +err_cdev: return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); } @@ -884,7 +906,7 @@ io_subchannel_recog_done(struct ccw_device *cdev) wake_up(&ccw_device_init_wq)...

Enhanced virtualization protection technology may require the use of bounce buffers for I/O. While support for this was built into the virtio core, virtio-ccw wasn't changed accordingly. Some background on technology (not part of this series) and the terminology used. * Protected Virtualization (PV): Protected Virtualization guarantees, that non-shared memory of a guest that operates in PV

Enhanced virtualization protection technology may require the use of bounce buffers for I/O. While support for this was built into the virtio core, virtio-ccw wasn't changed accordingly. Some background on technology (not part of this series) and the terminology used. * Protected Virtualization (PV): Protected Virtualization guarantees, that non-shared memory of a guest that operates in PV

Enhanced virtualization protection technology may require the use of bounce buffers for I/O. While support for this was built into the virtio core, virtio-ccw wasn't changed accordingly. Some background on technology (not part of this series) and the terminology used. * Protected Virtualization (PV): Protected Virtualization guarantees, that non-shared memory of a guest that operates in PV

Enhanced virtualization protection technology may require the use of bounce buffers for I/O. While support for this was built into the virtio core, virtio-ccw wasn't changed accordingly. Some background on technology (not part of this series) and the terminology used. * Protected Virtualization (PV): Protected Virtualization guarantees, that non-shared memory of a guest that operates in PV

Enhanced virtualization protection technology may require the use of bounce buffers for I/O. While support for this was built into the virtio core, virtio-ccw wasn't changed accordingly. Some background on technology (not part of this series) and the terminology used. * Protected Virtualization (PV): Protected Virtualization guarantees, that non-shared memory of a guest that operates in PV

Enhanced virtualization protection technology may require the use of bounce buffers for I/O. While support for this was built into the virtio core, virtio-ccw wasn't changed accordingly. Some background on technology (not part of this series) and the terminology used. * Protected Virtualization (PV): Protected Virtualization guarantees, that non-shared memory of a guest that operates in PV

Enhanced virtualization protection technology may require the use of bounce buffers for I/O. While support for this was built into the virtio core, virtio-ccw wasn't changed accordingly. Some background on technology (not part of this series) and the terminology used. * Protected Virtualization (PV): Protected Virtualization guarantees, that non-shared memory of a guest that operates in PV

Enhanced virtualization protection technology may require the use of bounce buffers for I/O. While support for this was built into the virtio core, virtio-ccw wasn't changed accordingly. Some background on technology (not part of this series) and the terminology used. * Protected Virtualization (PV): Protected Virtualization guarantees, that non-shared memory of a guest that operates in PV