search for: dev_kfree_skb_irq

...bea55>] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0xc3/0x135 [<ffffffff814203b4>] nf_conntrack_destroy+0x16/0x18 [<ffffffff813fadee>] skb_release_head_state+0x97/0xd9 [<ffffffff813fabbe>] __kfree_skb+0x11/0x7a [<ffffffff813fac4e>] consume_skb+0x27/0x29 [<ffffffff81402d3a>] dev_kfree_skb_irq+0x18/0x62 [<ffffffff8130a762>] xennet_tx_buf_gc+0xfc/0x192 [<ffffffff8130a8fb>] smart_poll_function+0x50/0x121 [<ffffffff8130a8ab>] ? smart_poll_function+0x0/0x121 [<ffffffff8104b8d1>] __run_hrtimer+0xcc/0x127 [<ffffffff8104bad3>] hrtimer_interrupt+0x9c/0x17b...

...) | xennet_tx_buf_gc() { 1) 0.079 us | gnttab_query_foreign_access(); 1) 0.050 us | gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(); 1) 0.069 us | gnttab_release_grant_reference(); 1) | dev_kfree_skb_irq() { 1) 0.055 us | raise_softirq_irqoff(); 1) 0.472 us | } 1) 0.049 us | gnttab_query_foreign_access(); 1) 0.058 us | gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(); 1) 0.058 us | gnttab_release_gra...

...ss to 0xe0000000000000bd, ip=0xa0000001004c2ca0 xenwatch[14]: error during unaligned kernel access -1 [1] Modules linked in: Pid: 14, CPU 0, comm: xenwatch psr : 0000101008422010 ifs : 8000000000000307 ip : [<a0000001004c2ca0>] Not tainted (2.6.26-rc4xen-ia64-dirty) ip is at dev_kfree_skb_irq+0x20/0x1a0 unat: 0000000000000000 pfs : 400000000000040b rsc : 0000000000000007 rnat: 0000000000000000 bsps: 0000000000000000 pr : 000000000000a941 ldrs: 0000000000000000 ccv : 0000000000000000 fpsr: 0009804c8a70433f csd : 0000000000000000 ssd : 0000000000000000 b0 : a0000001003efb70 b6 : a00000...

...ss to 0xe0000000000000bd, ip=0xa0000001004c2ca0 xenwatch[14]: error during unaligned kernel access -1 [1] Modules linked in: Pid: 14, CPU 0, comm: xenwatch psr : 0000101008422010 ifs : 8000000000000307 ip : [<a0000001004c2ca0>] Not tainted (2.6.26-rc4xen-ia64-dirty) ip is at dev_kfree_skb_irq+0x20/0x1a0 unat: 0000000000000000 pfs : 400000000000040b rsc : 0000000000000007 rnat: 0000000000000000 bsps: 0000000000000000 pr : 000000000000a941 ldrs: 0000000000000000 ccv : 0000000000000000 fpsr: 0009804c8a70433f csd : 0000000000000000 ssd : 0000000000000000 b0 : a0000001003efb70 b6 : a00000...

...ss to 0xe0000000000000bd, ip=0xa0000001004c2ca0 xenwatch[14]: error during unaligned kernel access -1 [1] Modules linked in: Pid: 14, CPU 0, comm: xenwatch psr : 0000101008422010 ifs : 8000000000000307 ip : [<a0000001004c2ca0>] Not tainted (2.6.26-rc4xen-ia64-dirty) ip is at dev_kfree_skb_irq+0x20/0x1a0 unat: 0000000000000000 pfs : 400000000000040b rsc : 0000000000000007 rnat: 0000000000000000 bsps: 0000000000000000 pr : 000000000000a941 ldrs: 0000000000000000 ccv : 0000000000000000 fpsr: 0009804c8a70433f csd : 0000000000000000 ssd : 0000000000000000 b0 : a0000001003efb70 b6 : a00000...

I''ve been working form the netfront.c in the testing tree and using SLES 10 RC1 for i386 on a SMP box. When I stress the network using iperf in a domU, domU acting as client on a gigabit network, I occasionally get a panic at the dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb); line. This is the same panic as reported in http://lists.xensource.com/archives/html/xen-devel/2006-05/msg00919.html The trace indicates that the skb is bad and it looks like the skb is an id. Investigating further, the condition occurs if the gnttab_query_foreign_access returns non zero...

...+ + /* + * We do not unmap and chain the rx buffer to the skb. + * We basically pretend this buffer is not used and will be recycled + * by vmxnet3_rq_alloc_rx_buf() + */ + + /* + * ctx->skb may be NULL if this is the first and the only one + * desc for the pkt + */ + if (ctx->skb) + dev_kfree_skb_irq(ctx->skb); + + ctx->skb = NULL; +} + + +static int +vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete(struct vmxnet3_rx_queue *rq, + struct vmxnet3_adapter *adapter, int quota) +{ + static u32 rxprod_reg[2] = {VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD, VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD2}; + u32 num_rxd = 0; + struct Vmxnet3_RxCompDesc *rcd; + struc...

...+ + /* + * We do not unmap and chain the rx buffer to the skb. + * We basically pretend this buffer is not used and will be recycled + * by vmxnet3_rq_alloc_rx_buf() + */ + + /* + * ctx->skb may be NULL if this is the first and the only one + * desc for the pkt + */ + if (ctx->skb) + dev_kfree_skb_irq(ctx->skb); + + ctx->skb = NULL; +} + + +static int +vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete(struct vmxnet3_rx_queue *rq, + struct vmxnet3_adapter *adapter, int quota) +{ + static u32 rxprod_reg[2] = {VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD, VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD2}; + u32 num_rxd = 0; + struct Vmxnet3_RxCompDesc *rcd; + struc...

...+ + /* + * We do not unmap and chain the rx buffer to the skb. + * We basically pretend this buffer is not used and will be recycled + * by vmxnet3_rq_alloc_rx_buf() + */ + + /* + * ctx->skb may be NULL if this is the first and the only one + * desc for the pkt + */ + if (ctx->skb) + dev_kfree_skb_irq(ctx->skb); + + ctx->skb = NULL; +} + + +static int +vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete(struct vmxnet3_rx_queue *rq, + struct vmxnet3_adapter *adapter, int quota) +{ + static u32 rxprod_reg[2] = {VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD, VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD2}; + u32 num_rxd = 0; + struct Vmxnet3_RxCompDesc *rcd; + struc...

...+ + /* + * We do not unmap and chain the rx buffer to the skb. + * We basically pretend this buffer is not used and will be recycled + * by vmxnet3_rq_alloc_rx_buf() + */ + + /* + * ctx->skb may be NULL if this is the first and the only one + * desc for the pkt + */ + if (ctx->skb) + dev_kfree_skb_irq(ctx->skb); + + ctx->skb = NULL; +} + + +static int +vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete(struct vmxnet3_rx_queue *rq, + struct vmxnet3_adapter *adapter, int quota) +{ + static u32 rxprod_reg[2] = {VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD, VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD2}; + u32 num_rxd = 0; + struct Vmxnet3_RxCompDesc *rcd; + struc...

...+ + /* + * We do not unmap and chain the rx buffer to the skb. + * We basically pretend this buffer is not used and will be recycled + * by vmxnet3_rq_alloc_rx_buf() + */ + + /* + * ctx->skb may be NULL if this is the first and the only one + * desc for the pkt + */ + if (ctx->skb) + dev_kfree_skb_irq(ctx->skb); + + ctx->skb = NULL; +} + + +static int +vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete(struct vmxnet3_rx_queue *rq, + struct vmxnet3_adapter *adapter, int quota) +{ + static u32 rxprod_reg[2] = {VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD, VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD2}; + u32 num_rxd = 0; + struct Vmxnet3_RxCompDesc *rcd; + struc...

...+ + /* + * We do not unmap and chain the rx buffer to the skb. + * We basically pretend this buffer is not used and will be recycled + * by vmxnet3_rq_alloc_rx_buf() + */ + + /* + * ctx->skb may be NULL if this is the first and the only one + * desc for the pkt + */ + if (ctx->skb) + dev_kfree_skb_irq(ctx->skb); + + ctx->skb = NULL; +} + + +static int +vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete(struct vmxnet3_rx_queue *rq, + struct vmxnet3_adapter *adapter, int quota) +{ + static u32 rxprod_reg[2] = {VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD, VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD2}; + u32 num_rxd = 0; + struct Vmxnet3_RxCompDesc *rcd; + struc...

...kb. + * We basically pretend this buffer is not used and will be recycled + * by vmxnet3_rq_alloc_rx_buf() + */ + + /* + * ctx->skb may be NULL if this is the first and the only one + * desc for the pkt + */ + if (ctx->skb) + dev_kfree_skb_irq(ctx->skb); + + ctx->skb = NULL; +} + + +static int +vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete(struct vmxnet3_rx_queue *rq, + struct vmxnet3_adapter *adapter, int quota) +{ +static u32 rxprod_reg[2] = {VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD, VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD2}; + u32 num_rxd = 0; + struct Vm...

...kb. + * We basically pretend this buffer is not used and will be recycled + * by vmxnet3_rq_alloc_rx_buf() + */ + + /* + * ctx->skb may be NULL if this is the first and the only one + * desc for the pkt + */ + if (ctx->skb) + dev_kfree_skb_irq(ctx->skb); + + ctx->skb = NULL; +} + + +static int +vmxnet3_rq_rx_complete(struct vmxnet3_rx_queue *rq, + struct vmxnet3_adapter *adapter, int quota) +{ +static u32 rxprod_reg[2] = {VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD, VMXNET3_REG_RXPROD2}; + u32 num_rxd = 0; + struct Vm...

Hi Andi, This patch series implements the Linux Xen guest as a paravirt_ops backend. The features in implemented this patch series are: * domU only * UP only (most code is SMP-safe, but there's no way to create a new vcpu) * writable pagetables, with late pinning/early unpinning (no shadow pagetable support) * supports both PAE and non-PAE modes * xen hvc console (console=hvc0) *

Hi Andi, This patch series implements the Linux Xen guest as a paravirt_ops backend. The features in implemented this patch series are: * domU only * UP only (most code is SMP-safe, but there's no way to create a new vcpu) * writable pagetables, with late pinning/early unpinning (no shadow pagetable support) * supports both PAE and non-PAE modes * xen hvc console (console=hvc0) *

Hi Andi, This patch series implements the Linux Xen guest as a paravirt_ops backend. The features in implemented this patch series are: * domU only * UP only (most code is SMP-safe, but there's no way to create a new vcpu) * writable pagetables, with late pinning/early unpinning (no shadow pagetable support) * supports both PAE and non-PAE modes * xen hvc console (console=hvc0) *

Hi Andi, This patch series implements the Linux Xen guest in terms of the paravirt-ops interface. The features in implemented this patch series are: * domU only * UP only (most code is SMP-safe, but there's no way to create a new vcpu) * writable pagetables, with late pinning/early unpinning (no shadow pagetable support) * supports both PAE and non-PAE modes * xen console * virtual

Hi Andi, This patch series implements the Linux Xen guest in terms of the paravirt-ops interface. The features in implemented this patch series are: * domU only * UP only (most code is SMP-safe, but there's no way to create a new vcpu) * writable pagetables, with late pinning/early unpinning (no shadow pagetable support) * supports both PAE and non-PAE modes * xen console * virtual

Hi Andi, This patch series implements the Linux Xen guest in terms of the paravirt-ops interface. The features in implemented this patch series are: * domU only * UP only (most code is SMP-safe, but there's no way to create a new vcpu) * writable pagetables, with late pinning/early unpinning (no shadow pagetable support) * supports both PAE and non-PAE modes * xen console * virtual