search for: debug2_f

...l.h> #ifdef WITH_ZLIB #include <zlib.h> @@ -850,6 +851,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) const char *wmsg; int r, crypt_type; const char *dir = mode == MODE_OUT ? "out" : "in"; + char blocks_s[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], bytes_s[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; debug2_f("mode %d", mode); @@ -917,20 +919,18 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) } comp->enabled = 1; } - /* - * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES, - * so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes. - * See RFC4344 section 3.2. - */ - if (enc->block_s...

...lude <util.h> #ifdef WITH_ZLIB #include <zlib.h> @@ -850,6 +851,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) const char *wmsg; int r, crypt_type; const char *dir = mode == MODE_OUT ? "out" : "in"; + char blocks_s[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], bytes_s[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; debug2_f("mode %d", mode); @@ -917,20 +919,18 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) } comp->enabled = 1; } - /* - * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES, - * so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes. - * See RFC4344 section 3.2. - */ - if (enc->block_size >= 16)...

...t; #include <zlib.h> > @@ -850,6 +851,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) > const char *wmsg; > int r, crypt_type; > const char *dir = mode == MODE_OUT ? "out" : "in"; > + char blocks_s[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], bytes_s[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; > > debug2_f("mode %d", mode); > > @@ -917,20 +919,18 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) > } > comp->enabled = 1; > } > - /* > - * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES, > - * so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes. > - * See RFC4344 section...

...q, struct ssh *ssh) Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt; char *name = NULL, *inst = NULL, *lang = NULL, *prompt = NULL; char *display_prompt = NULL, *response = NULL; + struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL; u_char echo = 0; u_int num_prompts, i; + size_t name_len, inst_len; int r; debug2_f("entering"); @@ -1951,14 +1958,22 @@ input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) authctxt->info_req_seen = 1; - if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &inst, NULL)) != 0 || + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstr...

...r querying public key rsa-sha2-512 <RSA pub key> sshd-session[1889]: debug2: userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user [preauth] In particharl, the latter was generated by the below code: if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) { debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user"); goto done; } 4. Putting the #2 and #3 points above together, that "goto out;" line will make the non-local user unable to login the device, despite of the fact that its RSA public key has been setup pr...

I was wondering if there was something specific to the internal chacha20 cipher as opposed to OpenSSL implementation. I can't just change the block size because it breaks compatibility. I can do something like as a hack (though it would probably be better to do it with the compat function): if (strstr(enc->name, "chacha")) *max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (16*2);

...gt; #include <zlib.h> > @@ -850,6 +851,7 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) > const char *wmsg; > int r, crypt_type; > const char *dir = mode == MODE_OUT ? "out" : "in"; > + char blocks_s[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], bytes_s[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; > > debug2_f("mode %d", mode); > > @@ -917,20 +919,18 @@ ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) > } > comp->enabled = 1; > } > - /* > - * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES, > - * so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes. > - * See RFC4344 section...