search for: dcrypt_context_hmac

...ON_NUMBER < 0x10100000L +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) #define EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(x) x->pkey.ec #define EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(x) x->pkey.rsa #define OBJ_length(o) ((o)->length) @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ struct dcrypt_context_symmetric { struct dcrypt_context_hmac { pool_t pool; const EVP_MD *md; -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) HMAC_CTX *ctx; #else HMAC_CTX ctx; @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ static void dcrypt_openssl_ctx_hmac_destroy(struct dcrypt_contex...

If the standard way works, I am happy to include the original patch I sent, amended so that it checks for presence of LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER. If they keep this promise, then we should have no worries about things breaking up. Aki On 02.11.2016 14:24, Michael A. Peters wrote: > Indeed, which is why I use it. > > But it also is in the minority which is why I find it acceptable for

http://dovecot.org/releases/2.2/rc/dovecot-2.2.25.rc1.tar.gz http://dovecot.org/releases/2.2/rc/dovecot-2.2.25.rc1.tar.gz.sig Quite a lot of changes. Please test out before the final v2.2.25 release, which I'm planning for tomorrow. Especially the new lib-dcrypt might have compiling problems with some OpenSSL versions. * lmtp: Start tracking lmtp_user_concurrency_limit and reject already

http://dovecot.org/releases/2.2/rc/dovecot-2.2.25.rc1.tar.gz http://dovecot.org/releases/2.2/rc/dovecot-2.2.25.rc1.tar.gz.sig Quite a lot of changes. Please test out before the final v2.2.25 release, which I'm planning for tomorrow. Especially the new lib-dcrypt might have compiling problems with some OpenSSL versions. * lmtp: Start tracking lmtp_user_concurrency_limit and reject already