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https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3553 Bug ID: 3553 Summary: PROTOCOL.key format specification is incorrect for encryption using AEAD transports Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 9.3p1 Hardware: All OS: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P5

I see. From reading that wikipedia article, I'm wondering what gets compressed when compression is enabled in openssh. Is it the ciphertext or the cleartext? Regards, Mark On Fri, 2013-10-25 at 15:47 -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > On 10/25/2013 03:23 PM, Mark E. Lee wrote: > > Thanks for the response, what kind of problematic interactions would > > occur (other than

For the encryption functionality in the ZFS filesystem we use AES in CCM or GCM mode at the block level to provide confidentiality and authentication. There is also a SHA256 checksum per block (of the ciphertext) that forms a Merkle tree of all the blocks in the pool. Note that I have to store the full IV in the block. A block here is a ZFS block which is any power of two from 512 bytes to

This is about Network-Bound Disk Encryption (NBDE) not to be confused of course with NBD! NBDE is where you use disk encryption in your virtual machines. But instead of having to type a passphrase when the guest boots, there is a network server which gives out tokens, so as long as the guest is booted from the trusted network it is able to boot unattended. In RHEL[1] we have three pieces of

...extension of the "Bleichenbacher attack" on RSA with PKCS #1 v1.5 padding as used in SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0. Their attack requires the attacker to open millions of SSL/TLS connections to the server under attack; the server's behaviour when faced with specially made-up RSA ciphertexts can reveal information that in effect allows the attacker to perform a single RSA private key operation on a ciphertext of its choice using the server's RSA key. Note that the server's RSA key is not compromised in this attack. III. Impact RSA timing attack: An RSA pri...

I just want to encrypt a string submitted through a form before saving it to the DB. And then decrypt it again when I need to retrieve and use it. Im trying to use the OpenSSL::Cipher library. I have the following module for encryption/decryption [code] require ''openssl'' module AESCrypt # Decrypts a block of data (encrypted_data) given an encryption key # and an

...ailable Cygnus Solutions (http://www.cygnus.com/product/kerbnet-index.html) although ITAR restrictions may preclude its use in Portugal. The thing to keep in mind in password syncronization is that UNIX passwords and NT (not LanMan) passwords cannot be decrypted from their respective one-way hash ciphertexts. That is, you *cannot* convert through some function F: NT MD4 Hash = F(UNIX salted modified DES one-way hash); Not possible! or UNIX salted modified DES one-way hash = F(NT MD4 Hash); Not possible! [NOTE: You could probably brute-force the weaker LanMan passwords stored in the SAM back to pla...

Also nice to know that zlib at openssh.com enables the compression only after authentication, mitigating the known problems with compression and passwords. It is also very hard to do chosen-plaintext attacks on the client to server side (in opposite to HTTPS where that's trivial). And most passwords that are typed after authentications are entered character by character, making them fall under

From: Longpeng(Mike) <longpeng2 at huawei.com> [ Upstream commit d90ca42012db2863a9a30b564a2ace6016594bda ] The src/dst length is not aligned with AES_BLOCK_SIZE(which is 16) in some testcases in tcrypto.ko. For example, the src/dst length of one of cts(cbc(aes))'s testcase is 17, the crypto_virtio driver will set @src_data_len=16 but @dst_data_len=17 in this case and get a wrong at

From: Longpeng(Mike) <longpeng2 at huawei.com> commit d90ca42012db2863a9a30b564a2ace6016594bda upstream. The src/dst length is not aligned with AES_BLOCK_SIZE(which is 16) in some testcases in tcrypto.ko. For example, the src/dst length of one of cts(cbc(aes))'s testcase is 17, the crypto_virtio driver will set @src_data_len=16 but @dst_data_len=17 in this case and get a wrong at then

From: Longpeng(Mike) <longpeng2 at huawei.com> commit d90ca42012db2863a9a30b564a2ace6016594bda upstream. The src/dst length is not aligned with AES_BLOCK_SIZE(which is 16) in some testcases in tcrypto.ko. For example, the src/dst length of one of cts(cbc(aes))'s testcase is 17, the crypto_virtio driver will set @src_data_len=16 but @dst_data_len=17 in this case and get a wrong at then

From: Longpeng(Mike) <longpeng2 at huawei.com> [ Upstream commit d90ca42012db2863a9a30b564a2ace6016594bda ] The src/dst length is not aligned with AES_BLOCK_SIZE(which is 16) in some testcases in tcrypto.ko. For example, the src/dst length of one of cts(cbc(aes))'s testcase is 17, the crypto_virtio driver will set @src_data_len=16 but @dst_data_len=17 in this case and get a wrong at

From: Longpeng(Mike) <longpeng2 at huawei.com> [ Upstream commit d90ca42012db2863a9a30b564a2ace6016594bda ] The src/dst length is not aligned with AES_BLOCK_SIZE(which is 16) in some testcases in tcrypto.ko. For example, the src/dst length of one of cts(cbc(aes))'s testcase is 17, the crypto_virtio driver will set @src_data_len=16 but @dst_data_len=17 in this case and get a wrong at

Hi! I am pleased to announce the availability of libgcrypt version 1.1.11. Libgcrypt is a general purpose cryptographic library based on the code from GnuPG and licensed under the GNU Lesser General Public License. It provides functions for all cryptograhic building blocks: symmetric ciphers (AES,DES,Blowfish,CAST5,Twofish,Arcfour), hash algorithms (MD4, MD5, RIPE-MD160, SHA-1, TIGER-192), MACs

Hi,There is an alleged OpenSSH vulnerability, see http://www.cpni.gov.uk/Products/alerts/3718.aspx.According to this vulnerability an attacker can potentially recover 32 bits of plaintext from an arbitrary block of ciphertext. After having read the vulnerability note in more detail, my understanding is that the 32 bits of plaintext do not come from the exchange between the client and server of the

Compression has some problematic interactions with encryption that OpenSSH seems to have handled far before anyone else (by having it off by default). On Thursday, October 24, 2013, Darren Tucker wrote: > On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 07:30:38PM -0400, Mark E. Lee wrote: > > I'm a long time user of openssh and I was wondering if there is any work > > towards supporting alternative

This was posted not too long ago on sci.crypt... Enjoy... I think the most relevant information is near the top, but it''s all quite good... :-) -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- There is no intrinsic difference between algorithm and data, the same information can be viewed as data in one context and as algorithm in another. Why then do so many people claim that encryption algorithms

-------- Original-Nachricht -------- Betreff: STARTTLS bug - background story Datum: Mon, 7 Mar 2011 15:08:09 -0500 (EST) Von: Wietse Venema <wietse at porcupine.org> An: Postfix users <postfix-users at postfix.org> CERT/CC announces a flaw today in multiple STARTTLS implementations. This problem was silently fixed in Postfix 2.8 and 2.9. Updates for Postfix 2.[4-7] are made available

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: virtio: Fix dest length calculation in __virtio_crypto_skcipher_do_req() to the 5.7-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is:

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled crypto: virtio: Fix dest length calculation in __virtio_crypto_skcipher_do_req() to the 5.6-stable tree which can be found at: http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary The filename of the patch is: