search for: chflags_allowed

...rbitrary file systems on the host system. NOTE WELL: The above vulnerabilities occur only when a jail is being started or stopped using the host's jail rc.d(8) script; once started (and until stopped), running jails cannot exploit this. IV. Workaround If the sysctl(8) variable security.jail.chflags_allowed is set to 0 (the default), setting the "sunlnk" system flag on /var, /var/log, /var/log/console.log, and all file system mount points and their parent directories inside the jail(s) will ensure that the console log file and mount points are not replaced by symbolic links. If this is done...

...rbitrary file systems on the host system. NOTE WELL: The above vulnerabilities occur only when a jail is being started or stopped using the host's jail rc.d(8) script; once started (and until stopped), running jails cannot exploit this. IV. Workaround If the sysctl(8) variable security.jail.chflags_allowed is set to 0 (the default), setting the "sunlnk" system flag on /var, /var/log, /var/log/console.log, and all file system mount points and their parent directories inside the jail(s) will ensure that the console log file and mount points are not replaced by symbolic links. If this is done...

...rbitrary file systems on the host system. NOTE WELL: The above vulnerabilities occur only when a jail is being started or stopped using the host's jail rc.d(8) script; once started (and until stopped), running jails cannot exploit this. IV. Workaround If the sysctl(8) variable security.jail.chflags_allowed is set to 0 (the default), setting the "sunlnk" system flag on /var, /var/log, /var/log/console.log, and all file system mount points and their parent directories inside the jail(s) will ensure that the console log file and mount points are not replaced by symbolic links. If this is done...

....jail.set_hostname_allowed=0 <mother-mail>[~]# sysctl -a | grep jail security.jail.set_hostname_allowed: 1 <<<<< here security.jail.socket_unixiproute_only: 1 security.jail.sysvipc_allowed: 0 security.jail.enforce_statfs: 2 security.jail.allow_raw_sockets: 1 security.jail.chflags_allowed: 0 security.jail.jailed: 0 The variable points to 1. You can't change the hostname in jail (that's what I want). But booting OS hangs a little if you put 'security.jail.set_hostname_allowed=0' to /etc/sysctl.conf. If I put 'jail_set_hostname_allow="NO"' to /etc...

...rbitrary file systems on the host system. NOTE WELL: The above vulnerabilities occur only when a jail is being started or stopped using the host's jail rc.d(8) script; once started (and until stopped), running jails cannot exploit this. IV. Workaround If the sysctl(8) variable security.jail.chflags_allowed is set to 0 (the default), setting the "sunlnk" system flag on /var, /var/log, /var/log/console.log, and all file system mount points and their parent directories inside the jail(s) will ensure that the console log file and mount points are not replaced by symbolic links. If this is done...

Hello, I'm wondering about closing some information leaks in FreeBSD jails from the "outside world". Not that critical (depends on the application), but a simple user, with restricted devfs in the jail (devfsrules_jail for example from /etc/defaults/devfs.rules) can figure out the following: - network interfaces related data, via ifconfig, which contains everything, but the

..._max: 0 p1003_1b.sem_nsems_max: 0 p1003_1b.sem_value_max: 0 p1003_1b.sigqueue_max: 0 p1003_1b.timer_max: 0 security.jail.set_hostname_allowed: 1 security.jail.socket_unixiproute_only: 1 security.jail.sysvipc_allowed: 0 security.jail.enforce_statfs: 2 security.jail.allow_raw_sockets: 0 security.jail.chflags_allowed: 0 security.jail.jailed: 0 security.bsd.suser_enabled: 1 security.bsd.see_other_uids: 1 security.bsd.see_other_gids: 1 security.bsd.conservative_signals: 1 security.bsd.unprivileged_proc_debug: 1 security.bsd.unprivileged_read_msgbuf: 1 security.bsd.hardlink_check_uid: 0 security.bsd.hardlink_check...