Displaying 4 results from an estimated 4 matches for "channel_register_cleanup".
2008 Jun 11
1
FW: ibuf_empty delayed efd
...; delayed efd 9/(0)" condition.
>
> I'm not sure what is going wrong here, but could you please try a
> snapshot? We fixed a long-existing race in the efd handling @ close
> case and the fix may serendibitously fix your case :)
>
Is this race condition check the changes in channel_register_cleanup(),
where c->istate and c->ostate are being interrogated?
I'd really like to avoid having to add all the changes in channel.c (the
queueing, changed external interfaces, etc...) if I could avoid it.
2010 Jun 17
1
Small bug in mux_master_read_cb()
...mux.c
index 3f5babc..f151021 100644
--- a/mux.c
+++ b/mux.c
@@ -931,7 +976,7 @@ mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c)
/* Setup ctx and */
if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) {
- state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(state));
+ state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state));
c->mux_ctx = state;
channel_register_cleanup(c->self,
mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0);
--
-- Howard Chu
CTO, Symas Corp. http://www.symas.com
Director, Highland Sun http://highlandsun.com/hyc/
Chief Architect, OpenLDAP http://www.openldap.org/project/
2010 Jan 14
1
ssh(1) multiplexing rewrite
...n_confirm, cctx);
- return 0;
-}
+ debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d",
+ __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
-/* ** Multiplexing client support */
+ channel_send_open(nc->self);
+ channel_register_open_confirm(nc->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx);
+ channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 0);
+
+ /* prepare reply */
+ /* XXX defer until mux_session_confirm() fires */
+ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
+ state->conn_state = MUX_SESSION;
-/* Exit signal handler */
-static void
-control_client_sighandler(int signo)
-{
- muxclient_terminate =...
2001 Nov 09
4
keystroke timing attack
I'm reading this fine article on O'Reilly:
http://linux.oreillynet.com/lpt/a//linux/2001/11/08/ssh_keystroke.html
<quote>
The paper concludes that the keystroke timing data observable from
today's SSH implementations reveals a dangerously significant amount of
information about user terminal sessions--enough to locate typed
passwords in the session data stream and reduce the