Displaying 12 results from an estimated 12 matches for "cflags_head64".
2020 Jul 15
1
[PATCH v4 34/75] x86/head/64: Build k/head64.c with -fno-stack-protector
...ernel/Makefile
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
> OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_ftrace_$(BITS).o := y
> endif
>
> +# make sure head64.c is built without stack protector
> +nostackp := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
> +CFLAGS_head64.o := $(nostackp)
Recent refactoring[1] for stack protector suggests this should just
unconditionally be:
CFLAGS_head64.o += -fno-stack-protector
But otherwise, yeah, this should be fine here -- it's all early init
stuff.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook at chromium.org>
[1] https:...
2020 Apr 28
0
[PATCH v3 35/75] x86/head/64: Build k/head64.c with -fno-stack-protector
...cf..1192de38fa56 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_ftrace_$(BITS).o := y
endif
+# make sure head64.c is built without stack protector
+nostackp := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
+CFLAGS_head64.o := $(nostackp)
+
# If instrumentation of this dir is enabled, boot hangs during first second.
# Probably could be more selective here, but note that files related to irqs,
# boot, dumpstack/stacktrace, etc are either non-interesting or can lead to
--
2.17.1
2020 Jul 14
0
[PATCH v4 34/75] x86/head/64: Build k/head64.c with -fno-stack-protector
...91..1b166b866059 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_ftrace_$(BITS).o := y
endif
+# make sure head64.c is built without stack protector
+nostackp := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
+CFLAGS_head64.o := $(nostackp)
+
# If instrumentation of this dir is enabled, boot hangs during first second.
# Probably could be more selective here, but note that files related to irqs,
# boot, dumpstack/stacktrace, etc are either non-interesting or can lead to
--
2.27.0
2020 May 19
2
[PATCH v3 35/75] x86/head/64: Build k/head64.c with -fno-stack-protector
...efile
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
> OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_ftrace_$(BITS).o := y
> endif
>
> +# make sure head64.c is built without stack protector
> +nostackp := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
> +CFLAGS_head64.o := $(nostackp)
> +
> # If instrumentation of this dir is enabled, boot hangs during first second.
> # Probably could be more selective here, but note that files related to irqs,
> # boot, dumpstack/stacktrace, etc are either non-interesting or can lead to
The proper...
2020 May 19
2
[PATCH v3 35/75] x86/head/64: Build k/head64.c with -fno-stack-protector
...efile
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
> @@ -35,6 +35,10 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER
> OBJECT_FILES_NON_STANDARD_ftrace_$(BITS).o := y
> endif
>
> +# make sure head64.c is built without stack protector
> +nostackp := $(call cc-option, -fno-stack-protector)
> +CFLAGS_head64.o := $(nostackp)
> +
> # If instrumentation of this dir is enabled, boot hangs during first second.
> # Probably could be more selective here, but note that files related to irqs,
> # boot, dumpstack/stacktrace, etc are either non-interesting or can lead to
The proper...
2020 Jul 14
92
[PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I
addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and
rebased the code v5.8-rc5.
The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the
#VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big
pile of entry code changes merged into
2020 Jul 14
92
[PATCH v4 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
From: Joerg Roedel <jroedel at suse.de>
Hi,
here is the fourth version of the SEV-ES Guest Support patches. I
addressed the review comments sent to me for the previous version and
rebased the code v5.8-rc5.
The biggest change in this version is the IST handling code for the
#VC handler. I adapted the entry code for the #VC handler to the big
pile of entry code changes merged into
2018 Mar 13
32
[PATCH v2 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
Changes:
- patch v2:
- Adapt patch to work post KPTI and compiler changes
- Redo all performance testing with latest configs and compilers
- Simplify mov macro on PIE (MOVABS now)
- Reduce GOT footprint
- patch v1:
- Simplify ftrace implementation.
- Use gcc mstack-protector-guard-reg=%gs with PIE when possible.
- rfc v3:
- Use --emit-relocs instead of -pie to reduce
2018 Mar 13
32
[PATCH v2 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
Changes:
- patch v2:
- Adapt patch to work post KPTI and compiler changes
- Redo all performance testing with latest configs and compilers
- Simplify mov macro on PIE (MOVABS now)
- Reduce GOT footprint
- patch v1:
- Simplify ftrace implementation.
- Use gcc mstack-protector-guard-reg=%gs with PIE when possible.
- rfc v3:
- Use --emit-relocs instead of -pie to reduce
2018 May 23
33
[PATCH v3 00/27] x86: PIE support and option to extend KASLR randomization
Changes:
- patch v3:
- Update on message to describe longer term PIE goal.
- Minor change on ftrace if condition.
- Changed code using xchgq.
- patch v2:
- Adapt patch to work post KPTI and compiler changes
- Redo all performance testing with latest configs and compilers
- Simplify mov macro on PIE (MOVABS now)
- Reduce GOT footprint
- patch v1:
- Simplify ftrace
2020 Apr 28
116
[PATCH v3 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES
guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes
since the last version.
What is SEV-ES
==============
SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted
State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the
register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by
2020 Apr 28
116
[PATCH v3 00/75] x86: SEV-ES Guest Support
Hi,
here is the next version of changes to enable Linux to run as an SEV-ES
guest. The code was rebased to v5.7-rc3 and got a fair number of changes
since the last version.
What is SEV-ES
==============
SEV-ES is an acronym for 'Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted
State' and means a hardware feature of AMD processors which hides the
register state of VCPUs to the hypervisor by